Neighborhood Racial Integration in U.S. Metropolitan Areas, 1980-2000: Is it Stable or Just a Passing Phase?

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Abstract

Between 1980 and 2000, the level of residential segregation, or dissimilarity, between whites and blacks declined by 8.8 percentage points, going from 73.9 to 65.1. How this decline has translated into residential integration within particular neighborhoods and the stability of such integration remains to be seen. Perhaps the decline in residential segregation is due to the rise in racially integrated neighborhoods that exist only at one point in time rather than over a course of few decades. Only one study has examined the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods over a two decade-long period. The descriptive analyses conducted here reveal two major findings. First, a much lower level of stability exists among mixed-race neighborhoods when examining them over a two-decade period rather than a decade-long period. Second, whites appear to be selective in terms of the mixed-race neighborhoods within which they want to live. The findings here such that the current optimism that exists about progress made in racial residential integration should be tempered.

Introduction

Between 1980 and 2000, the level of residential segregation, or dissimilarity score, between whites and blacks declined by 8.8 percentage points, from 73.9 to 65.1 (Lewis Mumford Center 2001). Although the current average level of segregation is considered to be in the Ahigh@ range of segregation scores (Massey and Denton 1993: 20), it is evident that some progress, albeit slow progress, has been made with respect to residential integration between whites and blacks. In metropolitan areas with fewer blacks, the progress has been more substantial. For example, in metropolitan areas where blacks comprised 5 to 10 percent of the population in 2000, the level of segregation or dissimilarity score dropped by 11.9 percentage points, from 72.1 to 60.2 between 1990 and 2000 (Lewis Mumford Center 2001). Nevertheless, these metropolitan areas also remain in the Ahigh@ range of segregation.

How these trends in the aggregate have translated into residential integration within particular neighborhoods and the stability of such integration remains to be seen. Residential segregation and residential integration are not static phenomena. Instead, they are built upon the mobility or immobility of individuals, particularly whites, within the metropolis. While a neighborhood may appear to be integrated at any given point in time, the stability of that residential integration over decades is uncertain. Perhaps the decline in residential segregation witnessed in recent years is due to the rise in stable, mixed white-and-black neighborhoods. On the other hand, perhaps it is instead attributable to an increase in the share of neighborhoods that are integrated at one point in time rather than over the course of a few decades. Studying the stability of integrated neighborhoods is important in understanding recent declines in segregation, but surprisingly, the topic has been under-researched in the urban sociological literature, particularly using the most recent data available (Charles 2003).

To my knowledge, there are just two studies that have addressed this issue using 1990 and 2000 census data (Fasenfest et al. 2004; Rawlings et al. 2004). The other studies on this topic use data from 1990 and earlier censuses (e.g., Clark 1993; Denton and Massey 1991; Ellen 2000; Lee and Wood 1991). For the 10 largest metropolitan areas, Fasenfest et al. (2004) find that nearly half (47 percent) of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in 1990 remained that way by 2000; they find that 71 percent of mixed white-and-other

neighborhoods in 1990 remained that way by 2000.[1] Rawlings et al. (2004) examine neighborhood racial stability in 69 of the largest metropolitan areas in which the black population is the dominant minority group and Hispanics comprise 20 percent or less of the metropolitan population. They find that about 80 percent of mixed-majority white neighborhoods (where blacks constitute 10 to 50 percent of the neighborhood=s population) in 1990 remain the same by 2000, although the most stable neighborhoods within this group are those in which the share of the black population is closest to 10 percent.[2] Taken together, these recent studies have expressed optimism regarding the extent to which racially diverse neighborhoods remain stable and integrated.

However, it remains to be seen whether residential integration between whites and blacks is truly stable or simply a passing phase on the way to eventual resegregation. There are at least two limitations with these recent studies and the literature using older data. First and foremost, with the exception of Ellen (2000), all of these studies examine the stability of integrated neighborhoods over a decade-long period. In order to understand whether integration is a truly stable phenomenon, it is necessary to examine mixed-race neighborhoods over a longer period of time. Using data from the 1990 decennial census, Ellen (2000) finds that out of the racially integrated neighborhoods that existed in 1970, 61.0 percent of neighborhoods remained integrated by 1980; out of the racially integrated neighborhoods that existed in 1980, 76.4 percent of neighborhoods remained integrated by 1990. Taking a longer view of stability, over two decades, Ellen (2000) finds, however, that just under 57 percent of neighborhoods that were integrated in 1970 remained that way by 1990. Based upon these findings, Ellen suggests that racial integration is more stable than before

[1] AOther@ is defined as people who are not black or non-Hispanic white (Fasenfest et al. 2004).

[2] AMajority white,@ however, includes all nonblacks and not just non-Hispanic whites (Rawlings et al. 2004: footnote 4). This is the reason why the level of stability in this study is so much higher than in the study by Fasenfest and colleagues. Fasenfest et al. (2004) require that mixed white-and-black and mixed white-and-other neighborhoods have between 40 and 80 percent of their population be non-Hispanic white.

and the prospects for future integration are good. However, a main limitation with her research is that she defines integrated neighborhoods as those with populations that are 10 to 50 percent black. As a result, the majority of the residual population may not necessarily be non-Hispanic white. Thus, the extent to which truly white-black integrated neighborhoods are stable over a two-decade period is unclear from her study.

Another limitation of the studies on neighborhood racial change/stability relates to the generalizability of the findings. Fasenfest et al. (2004) examine data only for the 10 largest metropolitan areas in the United States. These areas house just about 30 percent of the nation=s metropolitan minorities. The research by Rawlings and colleagues (2004) is based on data from 69 of the largest metropolitan areas where Hispanic population shares are 20 percent or less. As a result of this restriction, data from major metropolitan areas, such as New York, Los Angeles, and Miami are not included in their analysis. Although not available in the paper, it is likely that the share of the metropolitan minority population within the 69 metropolitan areas in their analysis is less than that found in the study by Fasenfest and colleagues (2004). Previous research on this topic that has used older data is also limited to either case studies (e.g., Clark 1993; Maly 2000; Moderraes 2004) or a subset of metropolitan areas in which the minority population is less than two-thirds of the total minority population (Ellen 2000). Examining areas that house a larger share of the metropolitan minority population is essential in determining the stability of racially integrated neighborhoods as it exists in recent decades.

In addition to there being uncertainty about the stability of neighborhood racial integration because of the limitations with the existing research, there is debate on what factors are associated with whites remaining within a racially mixed neighborhood. From the literature, it is unclear whether whites will ultimately stay in a mixed-race neighborhood because of their racial prejudices. Several studies have shown that the racial composition within a neighborhood continues to be important to whites in their residential choices because of their underlying racial prejudices (Bobo and Zubrinsky 1996; Charles 2001; Emerson et al. 2001; Farley et al. 1994; Krysan 2002; St. John and Bates 1990). On the other hand, others argue that white stasis within a mixed-race neighborhood has less to do with their prejudices against minority neighbors and more to do with whites= vision of the economic circumstances and quality of the larger neighborhood

(Ellen 2000; Harris 2000; Taub, Taylor and Dunham 1984). Thus, whites are more likely to stay in a mixed-race neighborhood if their perceptions of the economic circumstances and general quality of the neighborhood are positive. Also uncertain is the role that metropolitan context plays in promoting neighborhood racial integration. It has been suggested that more racially and ethnically diverse metropolitan areas will promote more racial/ethnic tolerance on the part of whites and thereby increase the likelihood that whites remain in mixed white-and-black neighborhoods than in areas with less diversity (Frey and Farley 1996).

The goal of this paper is to build upon the work that Fasenfest et al. and Rawlings and colleagues have done and focus explicitly on the stability of racially integrated neighborhoods between 1980 and 2000. Specifically, I plan to fulfill three objectives using data on metropolitan areas with at least one million in population from the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB) released in 2002 by the Urban Institute in conjunction with Geolytics, Inc. First, I will document the percent of mixed-race neighborhoods in 1980, 1990, 2000 and the shares of the white, black, Hispanic, and other populations that live in such neighborhoods. As discussed more fully below in the data and methods section, I will focus on mixed-race neighborhoods comprised of whites and blacks, whites and others, and whites, blacks, and others. Second, I will determine the impact that time has on examining the longevity of racially integrated neighborhoods. More specifically, I will document the percent of neighborhoods that remain integrated over a decade-long period as compared to over two decades. Finally, using descriptive analyses, I will examine what factors are associated with the stability of racially integrated neighborhoods. I will specifically focus on the longevity of mixed-race neighborhoods by their poverty level, homeownership rates, and racial/ethnic diversity of the metropolitan areas within which they are located.

Theoretical Framework

For decades social scientists have focused on understanding the mobility behavior of whites that underlies segregation. They have been particularly interested in the notion of white flight because of its potential to undermine the existence of racially integrated neighborhoods. However, there are not consistent

results in the literature regarding the exact role that racial composition, taken to measure whites= prejudices, plays in impacting whites= decisions to move out of neighborhoods, relative to economic factors. The classic invasion and succession model, formulated by Park, Burgess, and McKenzie (1925), and applied specifically to characterize neighborhood racial change in Chicago during the 1940s by the Duncans (1957), demonstrates that race and changes in race are of the utmost importance in predicting whites= mobility. The main contention of the model is that white neighborhoods that are Ainvaded@ by blacks inevitably become largely black through white flight and black succession. According to Duncan and Duncan (1957: 99): AInfrequently has the succession from non-black to black occupancy in Chicago been arrested, interrupted, or reversed, once it was underway.@

Implied by the model, and explicitly revealed by Grodzins (1958), there exists a Atipping point@ at which white flight accelerates from neighborhoods that are invaded by blacks. Schelling=s segregation model (1971, 1972) reveals that the Atipping point@ results because of the feedback effect that whites= initial mobility has on subsequent whites= mobility. According to Schelling, all whites have differing tolerance levels for living in racially mixed neighborhoods. If a neighborhood is Ainvaded@ by blacks, the whites that move initially are likely those with the lowest tolerance for racial integration. However, the fact that the out-moving whites are primarily replaced by blacks, in large part because of discriminatory tactics used by real estate agents and other institutional actors within the housing market (Yinger 1995), causes other whites= tolerance levels to be reached, and as a result, those whites are likely to flee the neighborhood. Thus, the Atipping point@ occurs when the presence of blacks within a neighborhood exceeds the majority of whites= tolerance levels. It is thought that beyond this point, a neighborhood inevitably becomes predominantly black.

While the invasion and succession model has been the theoretical underpinning in all of the research on neighborhood racial change, and specifically on white flight, it has not maintained its importance within the literature without criticism. Taeuber and Taeuber (1965) were among the first researchers to reveal that white-to-black residential succession was not as inevitable or as rapid as characterized by the invasion and succession model. The Taeubers= study (1965) expanded upon the Duncans= study by focusing on

neighborhood racial change in 10 cities as opposed to just in Chicago. The main contribution of their multi-city study was revealing that white-to-black succession is dependent upon the changes in racial composition rather than static racial composition, per se, within the neighborhood and the metropolitan area more generally. Many metropolitan areas that were not receiving large proportions of blacks during the Great Migration, such as those in the South, were more likely to have stable, racially integrated neighborhoods than areas in the North.

Since the 1970s, there have been numerous other studies testing the adequacy of the classic invasion and succession model. In addition to improving the existing knowledge about the dynamics underlying residential segregation, these studies have been motivated by the fact that since the 1970s, a number of trends have emerged within American society that have potentially weakened the usefulness of the invasion and succession model in characterizing whites= mobility and thereby strengthen the notion that racial integration may be more stable than just a passing phase. First, there has been a significant increase in whites= willingness to live with black neighbors (Farley et al. 1978, 1994). Whereas in 1976, 58 percent of whites reported feeling comfortable living in a neighborhood that was 20 percent black, by 1992, 70 percent of whites felt comfortable living in such a neighborhood.

Second, there has been an increase in the socioeconomic standing of blacks relative to whites, particularly for married couples. Between 1967 and 1990, the median income of married black families as a percentage of that of married white families increased from 68 percent to 84 percent. Such economic gains have resulted in an increase in the percent of blacks buying homes (Simmons 2001) and the number of blacks having access to white neighborhoods (Lewis Mumford Center 2001). Third, there has been a number of laws enacted during the past three decades outlawing racial discrimination on the part of real estate enterprises operating within the housing market, including the Fair Housing Act and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Such legislative efforts and enforcement of such laws have increased blacks= access to white neighborhoods, and have presumably prevented real estate agents and lending institutions from precipitating white-to-black racial succession. Indeed, Turner and colleagues (2002) find that discrimination against blacks has declined since 1989.

Finally, unlike during the 1940s and 1950s, there are not large migration streams of blacks present throughout the country. On average, the rates population growth in metropolitan areas of blacks and whites are relatively small in relation to the growth of Hispanics and Asians. During the past two decades, the Hispanic and Asian populations in the U.S. grew by more than 140 and 210 percent, respectively, while the non-Hispanic white and black populations grew by 7.9 and 30 percent, respectively (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1982, 2001a).[3] The slightly higher growth rate for blacks, relative to whites, could be due, in part, to the increase in the flow of African immigrants during the 1990s (Lobo 2001). Given these substantial changes since the 1970s, it remains to be seen whether rapid white-to-black racial succession, as characterized by Duncan and Duncan (1957), has become a phenomenon of the past and has instead been replaced by the existence of stable, integrated neighborhoods. As discussed at the outset, the most current studies find that it has. However, their definition of racial integration, time period of evaluation, and the metropolitan areas included within their analyses are limited.

It is also less clear from the literature what characteristics are associated with the likelihood that whites will stay within an integrated neighborhood. More specifically, it is unclear whether whites= decisions to stay within a mixed-race neighborhood are guided by their racial prejudices (or lack thereof) or their concerns about the neighborhood=s economic circumstances and overall quality. Several studies show that racial composition, taken as an indicator of whites= prejudices, is significantly associated with the likelihood that whites will not stay (Denton and Massey 1991; Galster 1990; Lee 1985; Lee and Wood 1991). In particular these studies show that neighborhoods with a higher proportion of blacks were more likely than those with lower proportions of blacks to lose whites. A neighborhood=s distance from areas with high levels of black concentration significantly influences white loss, with neighborhoods that are closer to areas where blacks are concentrated being more likely to lose whites. Neighborhoods with stronger Asegregationist sentiments@against blacks are also more likely to experience white flight (Galster 1990).

A number of other studies, however, find that economic characteristics are more important in

[3]These calculations are done using the Arace alone@ tabulations from the 2000 Census.

influencing whites= decisions to stay within mixed-race neighborhoods than the presence of black neighbors, per se (Ellen 2000; Frey 1979; Harris 1999, 2001; Taub, Taylor and Dunham 1984). Frey (1979), for example, finds that racial composition does not influence white flight from central cities to suburbs once the economic situation of the neighborhood is accounted for. Similarly, in their study of racially mixed neighborhoods in Chicago, Taub, Taylor, and Dunham (1984) find that the characteristics of the housing market, presence of institutions, and community cohesion are more important in maintaining the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods than the variation in the number of black neighbors. Using more recent data from the 1980 and 1990 decennial censuses and focusing on neighborhoods in 34 metropolitan areas, Ellen (2000) confirms the results of these previous studies, finding that whites= decisions to stay within integrated neighborhoods is not associated with the percent black in the neighborhood. She finds that economic and demographic factors influence white loss as well as changes in the black population within the neighborhood (which she uses to gauge whites= perceptions of the overall quality of the neighborhood). Thus, static racial composition is not significantly related to whites= residential decisions, suggesting that economic decline is more important in whites= decisions to remain in a mixed-race neighborhood than whites= racial prejudices, per se.

Hypotheses

Based upon the existing literature on neighborhood racial change and residential mobility, two competing hypotheses have been developed to explain the role of race in influencing whites= decisions to stay within mixed-race neighborhoods. The *racial prejudice* hypothesis suggests that the presence of black neighbors will be important in influencing whether whites will ultimately stay in a mixed-race neighborhood because whites will act upon their prejudices in making decisions about where they want to live. Research on residential preferences finds that whites report that they are more uncomfortable in hypothetical residential situations where the percent of minority neighbors increases (Farley et al. 1978, 1994; Charles 2000). Moreover, whites= reports of their feelings are sensitive to the race and ethnicity of the hypothetical neighbors. Discomfort is the greatest when black neighbors are potentially present, compared to Hispanic

and Asian neighbors (Charles 2000).

The *race correlated* hypothesis, on the other hand, suggests that race is ultimately not as important as the economic circumstances within a neighborhood in influencing whites= stasis within mixed-race neighborhoods, supporting the findings from the broader literature on mobility. Race is only important insofar as it is a proxy for the economic changes that may be occurring within the neighborhood as well as declines in neighborhood quality (Ellen 2000; Harris 1999, 2001; Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1984). Specifically, it is the changes in the racial composition of the neighborhood that are likely to influence whites= mobility rather than the static, neighborhood racial composition (Ellen 2000; Harris 1999, 2001; Taub, Taylor and Dunham 1984). These changes are thought to make whites uncomfortable living in a particular area because of their economic concerns and not because of their racial prejudices. For example, whites who are concerned with their property values dropping but are not bothered by the presence of some black neighbors is consistent with the *race correlated* hypothesis.

Testing these competing hypotheses is one objective of the present study, although here I provide only a preliminary test of these hypotheses through a descriptive analysis. The goal here is to examine the longevity of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods compared to mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. If whites are truly race neutral, as suggested by the *race correlated* hypothesis, their likelihood of remaining within these two types of mixed-race neighborhoods should be similar. This should especially be the case in neighborhoods with positive economic circumstances (i.e., that are nonpoor and have high levels of homeownership rates). Indeed, there should be greater stability in mixed white-and-black neighborhoods that are of higher economic standing than those of poorer economic standing.

Another way to do a preliminary test of these hypotheses is by focusing on the racial/ethnic diversity of the metropolitan context in which mixed-race neighborhoods are located. If the stability of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in mostly white-and-black metropolitan areas is lower than in multiethnic neighborhoods, this could indicate that racial prejudices continue to be important in shaping whites= decisions to stay in racially-mixed neighborhoods. Although the impact that non-black minorities have on whites= mobility has not been well researched, the specific race and ethnicity of the minorities seems to

matter, consistent with proponents of the *racial prejudice* hypothesis, with whites being less likely to flee if the minorities are Hispanic or of Aother@ races (Lee 1985; Lee and Wood 1991). At the metropolitan level, it has been shown that in multiethnic metropolitan areas black segregation levels are lower and were more likely to decline than in other types of metropolitan areas (Frey and Farley 1996). Thus, it is hypothesized that whites= contact with non-black minorities decreases their prejudices against blacks. Whether this *contact* hypothesis finds support remains to be seen.

Data and Methods

The analysis undertaken here is based upon 1980, 1990, and 2000 long-form decennial census data at the census-tract level available within the Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB), released in 2002 by the Urban Institute in conjunction with Geolytics, Inc.[4] The unique feature of the NCDB is that it allows the user to examine 1980, 1990, and 2000 census-tract data in 2000 census-tract boundaries. Considering that approximately half of census tracts changed geographic boundaries between 1990 and 2000, tract comparability is the most valuable feature of the NCDB. Indeed, it is likely that the main reason why previous research has been limited to examining neighborhood racial integration over a decade-long period or limited to particular locales is because researchers had to make census-tract boundaries comparable between censuses.

Using Geographic Information Systems (GIS), the Urban Institute and Geolytics examined how census tracts in earlier censuses mapped into 2000 census-tract boundaries. From there, they examined 1990 block level data in order to determine what proportion of the population within the 1990 tract-level boundaries could be allocated into the 2000 tracts. Then based upon this analysis, the researchers refit the earlier census data to fit into the 2000 boundaries weighting the data based upon these proportions. For example, if a tract in 1990 split into two tracts in 2000, the Urban Institute and Geolytics went down to the block level and examined what proportion of the 1990 population went into each of the split census tracts in

[4]The Rockefeller Foundation funded the creation of the NCDB project.

2000 and reweighted the 1990 data accordingly. Because a reliable source for 1980 block data was unavailable, the refitting of 1980 tract data into 2000 census-tract boundaries was a bit more complex. Essentially, tract/block comparability tables between 1980 tracts and 1990 blocks were used to refit the data into 2000 boundaries (for more details about this procedure, see Appendix J of Tatian (2003)).

I restrict the analysis here to metropolitan areas in 2000, defined at the Metropolitan Statistical Area level (MSA) or Primary Metropolitan Statistical Area level (PMSA), that had populations of at least one million persons in 2000. My final analytical data set is thus comprised of census-tracts within 61 metropolitan areas that met this criterion.[5] Essentially there are two main reasons for limiting the data to this subset of metropolitan areas. First, this subset of metropolitan areas contains a large percentage of all metropolitan minorities. In 2000, this group of metropolitan areas housed 72 percent of the metropolitan black population, 73 percent of the metropolitan Hispanic population, and 80 percent of the metropolitan Asian population. Second, this group of areas is large enough to be unaffected by census-tract boundary problems. More specifically, because all of the United States was not divided into census tracts or tracted in 1980, it was critical to choose large areas that likely had the greatest coverage during that period. Within these areas, only 1 percent of the census tracts in 1990 and 2000 were not tracted in 1980.[6]

The central focus in my analysis is on mixed-race neighborhoods. I consider three racial categories for the purpose of this analysis: 1) non-Hispanic whites; 2) blacks (both non-Hispanic and of Hispanic orign); and 3) others (all non-black minorities).[7] I adopt the same typology as Fasenfest et al. (2004) and Ellen (2000: 29-30) to classify neighborhoods as integrated.[8] The following seven categories are included within this typology: 1) predominantly white B at least 80 percent of the population is white, and no minority group represents more than 10 percent of the population; 2) mixed white-and-black B between 10 and 50 percent of

[5]In 1980, 44 of the 61 metropolitan areas also had a population of at least one million; 50 of the 61 metropolitan areas had a population of at least 900,000.

[6]In 1990 and 2000, all of the United States was tracted.

[7]For simplicity, I refer to non-Hispanic whites as whites throughout the paper.

[8]Ellen (2000) did not use this classification to examine racial integration over a two-decade period. She used the classification system described earlier in the paper to analyze racial integration during that time period.

the population is black, between 40 and 80 percent of the population is white, and no more than 10 percent of the population is classified as other; 3) mixed white-and-other B between 10 and 50 percent of the population is classified as other, between 40 and 80 percent of the population is white, and no more than 10 percent of the population is black; 4) mixed multiethnic B at least 10 percent of the population is black, at least 10 percent is classified as other, and at least 40 percent of the population is white; 5) mixed black-and-other B at least 10 percent of the population is black, at least 10 percent is classified as other, and no more than 40 percent of the population is white; 6) predominantly other-race B at least 50 percent of the population is classified as other and no more than 10 percent of the population is black; and 7) predominantly black B at least 50 percent of the population is black and no more than 10 percent of the population is classified as other race. Thus, census tracts are assigned to one of these seven categories based upon their racial composition.

As in previous research (e.g., Ellen 2000), I make the assumption that census tracts approximate neighborhoods. Census tracts are comprised of populations that range in size from 2,500 to 8,000. The advantage of using these areas to approximate neighborhoods is that it is easy to get comparable demographic, social, and economic data over time for all tracts. In the case of studying neighborhood racial integration, census tracts are likely to be good approximations of neighborhoods because the Census Bureau purposely defines tract boundaries to encompass areas that are homogeneous. Thus, it may be the case that racially integrated neighborhoods might be more stable because of the homogeneity inherent within census tract definitions.

The typology that I employ within this study is particularly useful in studying racial integration for at least three reasons. First, neighborhoods are classified based explicitly upon their share of whites. This is critical because neighborhoods with greater shares of whites have been shown to have greater resources and amenities and provide their residents with more access to the opportunity structure (Logan and Alba 1993a,b; Logan and Schneider 1984). Thus, explicitly gauging minorities= access to neighborhoods with larger shares of whites and the stability of such neighborhoods is important in gauging their potential for social mobility. Previous recent research has ignored this important distinction and has likely overstated the extent to which integration, particularly for blacks, exists (Ellen 2000; Rawlings et al. 2004). Second, non-black minorities

are incorporated into the classification, accommodating metropolitan areas that have an extremely diverse racial/ethnic composition (e.g., New York, Los Angeles). Thus, integration between whites and blacks and whites and others may be examined, and with respect to the former, integration can be examined in contexts that vary in terms of the overall diversity of groups present in such areas. Some previous research has largely ignored the fact the rise in racial/ethnic diversity that exists in many areas (Ellen 2000; Rawlings et al. 2004). Finally, the classification system allows for a varied view of racial integration rather than having one category of integration. The categories allow for a very detailed analysis of the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods.

There are some weaknesses, however, with such a classification system. Taking an absolute approach to defining integrated neighborhoods ignores the fact that in some areas, such a classification system may distort what should truly be considered integrated. For example in Miami in 2000, whites comprised 20.7 percent of the overall population. Neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black and mixed white-and-other actually will not reflect true integration in this area. Only areas that are mixed black-and-other will gauge true integration. The other weakness with this typology is that it classifies neighborhoods on the basis of three racial groups, white, black, and other. These are broad categories that could contain great variation. For example, in the case of New York, the black category is comprised of Dominicans, other Caribbeans, Africans, and native-born blacks. This is very different from a place like Detroit where the black category is likely to be comprised mostly of native-born blacks. While both of these weaknesses deserve to be recognized, they are hard to acknowledge in a two-decade view of neighborhood racial change. In other words, it would be hard to employ a relative definition of neighborhood racial integration over time because the actual cutoffs for the percentage of racial/ethnic groups would change over time making it very hard to achieve comparability over time. With respect to the limited breadth of groups examined here, it would also be difficult to examine such detail over time because of the large number combinations of neighborhood trajectories that could exist. Nevertheless, future research should explore both of these nuances in defining racially integrated neighborhoods.

In order to evaluate the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods over time, I had to develop a typology

of neighborhoods= racial trajectories over the two-decade period, 1980 to 2000. After classifying neighborhoods in 1980, 1990, and 2000 using the typology discussed above, I examined a three-way cross tabulation of these categories. Because a total of 343 possible combinations of trajectories could exist (i.e., 7*7*7), it was necessary to develop a limited number of meaningful categories to characterize the stability or type of change that occurred.[9] I created a typology including 11 categories.[10] The main principle underlying this classification system was to characterize whether tracts remained within the same category as in 1980, became more minority, or more white.

In considering the paths that neighborhoods could take, I organized the possible neighborhood trajectories with a hierarchy in mind. The hierarchy was based upon the neighborhoods that whites would find most desirable because the presence of whites in this study is considered an essential ingredient to defining a racially integrated neighborhood. Therefore at one end of this typology of neighborhood trajectories lie predominantly white neighborhoods and at the other end are predominantly minority neighborhoods (i.e., either predominantly black or other). Falling in the middle of this continuum are the mixed-race neighborhoods. The mixed white-and-black and mixed white-and-other are likely to be the most desired mixed-race neighborhoods because whites comprise the large majority in such areas (see the Appendix Table). Across the three time points, whites comprised roughly between 71 and 76 percent of the population living in mixed white-and-black and mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (see the Appendix Table). Multiethnic neighborhoods are likely to be the next desired neighborhood types because whites still comprise the majority, albeit a smaller majority (see the Appendix Table). Finally, mixed black-and-other are likely to be the least desirable to whites because, by definition, whites are in the minority within these neighborhoods. An examination of the data reveals this to be the case (see the Appendix table).

[9] In actuality, 233 trajectories existed within the data, which is still too many categories upon which to make meaningful comparisons.

[10] Not all 11 categories, however, characterize the trajectory of every neighborhood type in 1980 (see Table 5 for details).

Based upon this hierarchy, I created the following neighborhood-trajectory typology: 1) remained the same in 1980, 1990, and 2000; 2) became predominantly white in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 3) became mixed white-and-black in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 4) became mixed white-and-other in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 5) became mixed white-and-black/white-and-other B was one category in 1990 and the other in 2000 or vice versa; 6) became multiethnic in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 7) became mixed black-and-other in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 8) became predominantly black in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 9) became predominantly other in 2000 alone or in both 1990 and 2000; 10) became predominantly black or other B was one category in 1990 and the other in 2000 or vice versa; and 11) other (i.e., did not fit into the previous 10 categories). This typology is straightforward when a neighborhood transitions to a category in both 1990 and 2000. However, when it transitions to a particular category in 2000 only, I had to take into account the origin category and the 1990 category. The guiding principle I used to determine whether the neighborhood ultimately fell into the category reflected by the 2000 classification was whether the neighborhood was going through an upward or downward trajectory.

An example will help illustrate this principle. Let me take the case of neighborhoods that began in 1980 as multiethnic. In order to fall in the neighborhood trajectory category, Abecame predominantly white,@ the neighborhood had to be: 1) predominantly white in 1990 and 2000; 2) multiethnic in 1990 and predominantly white in 2000; 3) mixed white-and-black in 1990 and predominantly white in 2000; or 4) mixed white-and-other in 1990 and predominantly white in 2000. Thus, if the multiethnic neighborhood in 1980 only became predominantly white in 2000, it had to be either multiethnic in 1990 or its white population had to be increasing in 1990 (i.e., in the mixed white-and-black or mixed white-and-other categories). A multiethnic neighborhood that became predominantly black in 1990 and predominantly white in 2000 would be classified in the Aother@ category in this neighborhood-trajectory typology rather than the category Abecame predominantly white@ because it experienced a Azig-zagged@ trajectory rather than a smooth upward trajectory. Fortunately, the Azig-zagged@ trajectories were exceptions in characterizing neighborhoods= racial trajectories rather than the norm.

Results

What percent of neighborhoods are racially integrated? Table 1 addresses this question by showing the percent of neighborhoods by neighborhood type in 1980, 1990, and 2000. Whereas in 1980 the majority of neighborhoods were predominantly white, by 2000 only 28.06 percent were classified in the same category. Interestingly, all of the mixed race neighborhoods, except those that were classified as mixed white-and-black increased in their representation as a proportion of all neighborhoods. More specifically, by 2000, the share of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods as a percentage of all neighborhoods increased from 16.24 percent to 28.10 percent. The share of neighborhoods classified as multiethnic increased from 3.35 percent to 8.24 percent. The share of neighborhoods classified as mixed black-and-other also nearly tripled, comprising 4.12 percent of neighborhoods in 1980 and increasing to 11.28 percent of neighborhoods by 2000. The percentage of predominantly black neighborhoods remained about the same over this period and the share of predominantly other neighborhoods increased from 5.34 percent to 10.25 percent. By and large, these results are consistent with the results of Fasenfest and colleagues (2004), although in this study the magnitude of the change in mixed white-and-other and multiethnic neighborhoods was slightly larger.[11] It=s likely that the slight difference in results relates directly to the fact that more metropolitan areas are included in my analysis.

<Table 1 about here>

Taken together, the results provide an optimistic view of racial integration in metropolitan America. However, there are several aspects of the analysis in Table 1 that suggest we should be cautiously optimistic rather than overly optimistic about the progress made with respect to integration. The fact that the share of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black actually declined between 1980 and 200, while the percentage of integrated neighborhoods with other races increased over time, suggests that whites are indeed selective about whom they want to live in their integrated neighborhoods. This table is also misleading because it examines what percentage of neighborhoods fall within categories of the typology in one given

[11]For this particular typology, Ellen (2000) does not present similar results. Therefore, I am unable to compare how my analysis relates to her analysis.

year. In other words, it should not be assumed that neighborhoods, which are integrated in 1980, are necessarily in the same category in 1990 and 2000. In order to understand the extent to which progress has been made in terms of racial integration, the stability of racially integrated neighborhoods needs to be better understood. Finally, it is also necessary to examine what share of the white and minority populations actually live in integrated neighborhoods. Do a large share of whites and minorities live in mixed-race neighborhoods?

Table 2 addresses this question by presenting the distribution of whites, blacks, Hispanics, and others across each neighborhood type. It is clear from the first portion of this table that the white population is more likely to live in mixed white-and-other neighborhoods than in mixed white-and-black neighborhoods. Between 1980 and 2000, the share of the white population living in such neighborhoods more than doubled, increasing from 16.15 percent to 35.61 percent, and at the same time, the percent of the white population living in predominantly white neighborhoods declined from 69.81 percent to 42.25 percent. In total in 2000, 88 percent of the white population lived within these two neighborhood types. Consistent with the idea that whites are selective about their neighbors and the *racial prejudice* hypothesis, it is noteworthy that the percent of whites living in mixed white-and-other neighborhoods was 7 times greater than the share living in mixed white-and-black neighborhoods. Moreover, while the share of whites living in mixed white-and-other neighborhoods increased over the two-decade period, it declined within the category of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods.

<Table 2 about here>

What is the access that minorities have to neighborhoods that are most popular with whites? Table 2 makes clear that the other-race population, which includes Asians, has the greatest access to these neighborhoods. Focusing on the 2000 data, 10.12 percent of those classified as other have access to predominantly white neighborhoods, compared to 3.84 percent of Hispanics and 3.88 percent of blacks. Considering mixed white-and-other neighborhoods also reveals this group=s greater access. Just under 39 percent of the other-race population was located in this type of neighborhood in 2000, compared to 22.98 percent of Hispanics and 6.73 percent of blacks. Among the latter two groups it is clear that Hispanics have

much greater access than blacks to mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. Interestingly, even if the focus is on mixed white-and-black neighborhoods, it is clear that only 7.95 percent of blacks have access to such areas. In 2000, blacks were slightly more likely than Hispanics to have lived in multiethnic neighborhoods, areas not inhabited by a very large share of whites.[12] However, on the other hand, blacks were more likely than Hispanics to live in mixed black-and-other neighborhoods.

While the results in Table 2 are consistent with the literature on racial residential preferences (e.g., Farley et al. 1994; Charles 2000), examining the data from a longitudinal perspective reveals that the greater access that other races, and to a lesser degree Hispanics, have to whiter neighborhoods is declining. As in the case with whites, significantly lower shares of other race and Hispanic populations have access to predominantly white neighborhoods in 2000 as compared to 1980. In addition, during this period, there has been a 7 percentage-point decrease in the share of Hispanics living in mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. For Hispanics and those classified as other races, there has been a 10 percentage-point increase in the shares of these groups living in neighborhoods classified as predominantly other. Consistent with the literature on segregation (e.g., Lewis Mumford Center 2001), it appears that residential segregation is on the rise for Hispanics and others, relative to whites, despite the fact that overall levels of segregation are lower for these groups than is the case for blacks.

[12] As shown in Table 2, only 8.12 percent of whites lived in such neighborhoods in 2000. However, examining the racial and ethnic composition within multiethnic neighborhoods (see the Appendix Table), it is clear that whites comprised 57.54 percent of the population within such areas in 2000 and roughly the same percentage in 1980 and 1990. Therefore, although multiethnic neighborhoods are not areas in which a large share of the white population resides, on average, they are integrated with whites.

Given the inequality among minority groups in terms of the access to neighborhoods with whites, particularly those that are integrated, how stable are the neighborhoods that are racially integrated? Table 3 begins to address this issue by revealing how stable mixed-race neighborhoods are over two, separate decade-long periods. Panel A examines stability over the 1980 to 1990 period. Consistent with Ellen (2000), among the mixed-race neighborhoods containing sizeable shares of whites, mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods are less stable than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. Just over 59 percent of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black in 1980 remained that way by 1990; 49.55 percent of neighborhoods defined as multiethnic in 1980 remained in the same category by 1990. Yet, 72.75 percent of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-other in 1980 remained mixed white-and-other by 1990. Among neighborhoods classified as mixed black-and-other in 1980, there is even greater stability, with 89.02 percent remaining in the same category. It is likely that these neighborhoods are more stable because their population is not comprised of a large share of whites (see the Appendix Table). Taken together, these results in Panel A of Table 3 suggest little support for the rapid turnover predicted by the invasion and succession model. Indeed, more than 1 in 2 mixed white-and-black neighborhoods, just about 1 in 2 multiethnic neighborhoods, and nearly 3 in 4 mixed white-and-other neighborhoods remain that way 10 years later.[13]

<Table 3 about here>

What happened to the mixed-race neighborhoods that did not remain stable over this decade-long period? Consistent with Ellen (2000) and somewhat surprising, Panel A of Table 3 shows that a greater share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods became predominantly white than was the case for mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (9.22 percent versus 2.66 percent). At the same time, however, 14.34 percent of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black in 1980 became predominantly black by 1990; fewer mixed white-and-other neighborhoods B 11.79 percent B became predominantly other by 1990. On the whole, considering mixed-race neighborhoods that either remained stable or became predominantly white, it

[13]Although it is not clear that the same residents live in these neighborhoods over the ten-year period, it is clear that the racial composition remained the same during this period.

is clear that there were a smaller share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in these categories than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (68.48 percent versus 75.41 percent). As evident in the previous results, this suggests that whites exercise a degree of selectivity in choosing their neighbors, lending further preliminary support to the *racial prejudice* hypothesis.

Among homogeneous neighborhoods, there was even greater stability than was the case for the mixed-race neighborhoods (see Panel A of Table 3). Of those classified as predominantly white, predominantly black, and predominantly other in 1980, 75.30 percent, 89.85 percent, and 75.82 percent remained the same by 1990, respectively. Consistent with the decline of predominantly white neighborhoods revealed in Table 1, 16.83 percent of neighborhoods classified as predominantly white in 1980 were classified as mixed white-and-other by 1990. Interestingly, among neighborhoods defined as predominantly other in 1980, 9.9 percent became predominantly white in 1990; among neighborhoods defined as predominantly black in 1980, only a mere .14 percent became predominantly white in 1990. These results are also reflective of whites= selectivity in whom they want to live with.

How stable were mixed-race neighborhoods between 1990 and 2000? Panel B of Table 3 reveals a similar pattern of stability as found in Panel A. Among the mixed-race neighborhoods containing sizeable shares of whites, mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods are less stable than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. Between 1990 and 2000, however, the former neighborhoods were even less stable than was the case between 1980 and 1990, particularly those neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black. Nearly 43 percent of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black in 1990 remained that way by 2000 (compared to 59.26 percent between 1980 and 1990); 40.48 percent of neighborhoods defined as multiethnic in 1990 remained in the same category by 2000 (compared to 49.55 percent between 1980 and 1990). Yet, 70.48 percent of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-other in 1990 remained mixed white-and-other by 2000 (compared to 72.75 percent between 1980 to 1990). As in Panel A of Table 3, among neighborhoods classified as mixed black-and-other in 1990, there is even greater stability, with 86.23 percent remaining in the same category.

What happened to the mixed-race neighborhoods that did not remain stable over this decade-long

period? Consistent with Fasenfest and colleagues (2004) and again somewhat surprising, Panel B of Table 3 shows that a greater share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods became predominantly white than was the case for mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (5.60 percent versus 1.49 percent). However, the gap between the two groups was smaller than was the case between 1980 and 1990. Unlike was the case in Panel A, a much larger share of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black in 1990 became multiethnic in 2000 as compared to those classified as mixed white-and-other in 1990. Just over 29 percent of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in 1990, as compared to only 7.69 percent of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, became multiethnic by 2000. Also unlike the case during the 1980 to 1990 period, the share of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods that became predominantly other exceeded the share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods that became predominantly black (16.99 percent versus 11.12 percent).

On the whole, considering mixed-race neighborhoods that either remained stable or became predominantly white, it is clear that there were a smaller share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in these categories than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (48.5 percent versus 71.97 percent) and the gap between these groups was larger in the 1990 to 2000 period than in the 1980 to 1990 period. What differed between the two periods was that a greater share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods became multiethnic rather than predominantly black during the 1990 to 2000 period. Although this suggests less of a rapid succession to becoming predominantly black, it is still the case that blacks have less access to neighborhoods chosen by whites. These results, therefore continue to provide preliminary support for the notion that blacks are more constrained in their residential choices than those of other races, consistent with the *racial prejudice* hypothesis.

Among homogeneous neighborhoods, with the exception of neighborhoods classified as predominantly white in 1990, there was greater stability than was the case for the mixed-race neighborhoods (see Panel B of Table 3). Of those classified as predominantly white, predominantly black, and predominantly other in 1990, 63.67 percent, 80.53 percent, and 86.96 percent remained the same by 2000, respectively. Consistent with the decline of predominantly white neighborhoods revealed in Table 1, 27.64 percent of neighborhoods classified as predominantly white in 1990 were classified as mixed white-and-other

by 2000. This was an even larger share than was present in the 1980 to 1990 period. As with the case with the results in Panel A of Table 3, these results are also reflective of whites= selectivity in whom they want to live with.

As already indicated above, the results in Table 3 reveal a significant amount of stability in mixed-race neighborhoods during both decade-long periods, contrary to the assumptions of the invasion-and-succession model but consistent with recent research (e.g., Ellen 2000; Fasenfest et al. 2004). Yet the question that remains is whether the same level of stability exist over the two-decade period spanning from 1980 to 2000. Table 4 specifically addresses this question using the neighborhood trajectory typology discussed in the data and methods section above. The columns in Table 4 are organized by the category in which neighborhoods were initially classified in 1980. The rows indicate what happened to neighborhoods over the two-decade period. As discussed above, there are 11 possible trajectories within the neighborhood trajectory typology that neighborhoods could have taken over the two-decade period.

<Table 4 about here>

Focusing on neighborhoods that were classified as mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in 1980 (column 2 of Table 4), it is evident that a much lower level of stability exists, as only 28.36 percent of these neighborhoods remained mixed white-and-black in 1990 and 2000. The same is true with respect to mixed white-and-other neighborhoods; 46.59 percent of such neighborhoods remained exactly the same in 1990 and 2000. Even less stable are neighborhoods that were classified as multiethnic in 1980. Only 19.15 percent of such neighborhoods remained stable over the two-decade period. As was the case in both panels of Table 3, it is evident that the share of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods that remained stable is much larger than the share of mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods. Consistent with the decade-long analyses, however, 81.13 percent of neighborhoods classified as mixed black-and-other in 1980 remained that way in 1990 and 2000. Taken together, the results reveal that racial integration is much less stable that recent studies have suggested (e.g., Ellen 2000; Fasenfest et al. 2004). In addition, the results in Table 4 reveal that neighborhoods that contain blacks and whites are much less likely to remain stable than those only containing whites and people of other races.

What happened to the mixed-race neighborhoods that did not remain stable over this two-decade period? Table 4 shows that a greater share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods became predominantly white than was the case for mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (8.22 percent versus 1.12 percent). Like the results in Panel B in Table 3, a much larger share of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black in 1980 became multiethnic in 2000 as compared to those classified as mixed white-and-other in 1990. Nearly 22 percent of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in 1980, as compared to only 6.34 percent of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, became multiethnic by 2000. Also like the findings in Panel B of Table 3, the share of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods that became predominantly other during this two-decade period exceeded the share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods that became predominantly black (32.77 percent versus 14.8 percent). With respect to multiethnic neighborhoods, 51.18 percent became mixed black-and-other by 2000. Just under 18 percent became predominantly black or other.

On the whole, considering mixed-race neighborhoods that either remained stable or became predominantly white, it is clear that there were a smaller share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods in these categories than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods (36.58 percent versus 47.71 percent) by 2000. While there was a greater share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods, compared to mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, that became multiethnic during the 1980 to 2000 period, as stated above, these neighborhoods contain a very small share of the overall white population. These results, therefore, continue to provide preliminary support for the notion that blacks are more constrained in their residential choices than those of other races, consistent with the *racial prejudice* hypothesis.

What were the neighborhood trajectories of homogeneous neighborhoods? Table 4 shows that there was greater stability than was the case for the mixed-race neighborhoods, although the level of stability was lower than was the case in the decade-long analyses. Of those classified as predominantly white, predominantly black, and predominantly other in 1980, 48.41 percent, 74.61 percent, and 64.11 percent remained the same by 2000, respectively. Consistent with the results in both panels of Table 3, not an insignificant share B 34.02 percent B of neighborhoods classified as predominantly white in 1980 were classified as mixed white-and-other by 2000. As in the case in Panel A of Table 3, among neighborhoods

defined as predominantly other in 1980, 7.91 percent became predominantly white by 2000; among neighborhoods defined as predominantly black in 1980, only 1.14 percent became predominantly white by 2000. Taken together, the results in Table 4, as with the previous results, are reflective of whites= selectivity in their residential location.

Perhaps the fact that mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods are less likely than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods to remain stable possibly relates to the variation in poverty status among these neighborhoods. To address this possibility, Table 5 reports two panels of data, structured each like Table 4, for nonpoor and poor tracts. To be considered nonpoor, the tract must have had a poverty rate below the national poverty rate in 1980, 1990, and in 2000.[14] To be considered poor, the tract must have been above the poverty rate in 1980, 1990, and 2000. The last row of Panel A in Table 5 reveals that a greater percent of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, relative to mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods, are nonpoor (49.85 percent versus 41.51 percent and 24.50 percent, respectively). Among nonpoor tracts in Panel A, it is clear that the shares of neighborhoods classified as mixed white-and-black and multiethnic in 1980 are considerably less likely than those classified as mixed white-and-other to remain stable or become predominantly white by 2000. Whereas nearly 63 percent of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods remained stable or became predominantly white in 2000, only about 41 percent of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods and roughly 29 percent of multiethnic neighborhoods had similar trajectories.

<Table 5 about here>

In addition to the inequality of outcomes found across neighborhood types among nonpoor neighborhoods, Table 5 reveals that there is considerable variation in the difference in mixed-race neighborhoods= trajectories between those that are nonpoor and poor. As just revealed, nearly 41 percent of nonpoor, mixed white-and-black neighborhoods remained stable or became predominantly white. Among

[14]The national poverty rates in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, were 13 percent, 13.5 percent, and 12.38 percent (U.S. Bureau of Census 2001b, 2005a).

poor, mixed white-and-black neighborhoods, 32.09 percent had the same neighborhood trajectories, making the difference between the two sets of neighborhoods equal to 8.75 percentage points. The difference in the shares of multiethnic neighborhoods that remained stable or became predominantly white by 2000 between nonpoor and poor neighborhoods was 11.35 percentage points (28.89 percent minus 17.54 percent). By comparison, however, the difference in the shares of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods that remained stable or became predominantly white between nonpoor and poor neighborhoods was significantly larger, 33.68 percentage points (62.8 percent minus 29.12 percent).

Taken together what the results in Table 5 suggest is further preliminary support for the *racial prejudice* hypothesis. Consistent with the previous results, it is evident that mixed-race neighborhoods that contain whites and blacks are much less likely to remain stable or become more white than is the case for mixed-race neighborhoods with just whites and people of other races, even when focusing on neighborhoods that were nonpoor in 1980, 1990, and 2000. Moreover, it is clear that the economic well-being of the neighborhood only promotes stability among the latter tracts. In other words the Areturns@ as far as stability gained by a neighborhood=s economic status are only significantly improved for mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. These results are less supportive of the *race correlated* hypothesis, which predicted that there would be greater levels of stability among all mixed-race neighborhoods of higher socioeconomic status.

According to the *race correlated* hypothesis, one of the main reasons why whites leave neighborhoods with more minorities is because they fear that a decline in economic status may occur as well as a decline in quality. As discussed earlier, proponents of this perspective maintain that whites use the racial composition of the neighborhood to gauge what will happen to the neighborhood. In effect if a mixed-race neighborhood becomes more minority, it is assumed that whites will leave such neighborhoods because they will associate the racial composition and changes in the racial composition in the area with future declines in economic status and qulaity rather than basing their decisions on racial prejudice. The analysis in the previous table revealed little support for this hypothesis because of the disparity that existed in the trajectories among mixed white-and-black, mixed white-and-other, and multiethnic neighborhoods. It is

useful to examine the neighborhood trajectories of mixed-race neighborhoods by the level of owner-occupied housing present within the neighborhood. As discussed by Ellen (2000), it is likely that whites in areas that are predominated by owner-occupied housing will be more likely to be concerned about the racial composition of their neighbors than those in renter-occupied housing. Because homeownership entails a long-term investment, it is the case that whites will act more upon their fears about declines in economic status and neighborhood quality than their counterparts in neighborhoods predominated by renter-occupied housing.

Table 6 presents an analysis structured in the same way as in Table 5, except neighborhoods are grouped according to the levels of owner-occupied and rental-occupied housing within them. Homeowner tracts are comprised of neighborhoods that had at or above national-level rates of owner-occupied housing in 1980, 1990, and 2000; renter tracts are comprised of neighborhoods that had above national-level rates of renter-occupied housing in 1980, 1990, and 2000.[15] The results in Table 6 reveal little support for the *race correlated* hypothesis. Panel B of Table 6 reveals that, among renter tracts, a greater percent of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, relative to mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods, remain stable or become predominantly white (39.59 percent versus 25.26 percent and 20.44 percent, respectively). Panel A of Table 6 reveals that, among homeowner tracts, the same pattern emerges. Thus, consistent with the results throughout this paper, the racial composition of mixed-race neighborhoods is directly related to their trajectories, with those just containing whites and people of other races being more likely to be stable.

<Table 6 about here>

As mentioned at the outset, it has been suggested that the metropolitan context within which neighborhoods are located could have an impact on the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods. More specifically, Frey and Farley (1996) suggest that within multiethnic metropolitan areas, there could be greater levels of stability among mixed-race neighborhoods than in metropolitan areas where one minority group

[15]The national rates of owner-occupied housing in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, were 65.5 percent, 64 percent, and 67.1 percent; the national rates of rental-occupied housing in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively were 34.5 percent, 36 percent, and 32.9 percent (U.S. Bureau of Census 2005b).

predominates. The idea is that areas in which whites have more contact with a diverse group of minorities, there is the potential for them to be more open to living with all minority groups. Table 7 specifically addresses this *contact* hypothesis by presenting an analysis structured in the same way as Tables 5 and 6, except neighborhoods are grouped by the racial and ethnic diversity present within their metropolitan areas. Following Frey and Farley (1996), four metropolitan types are defined: 1) multiethnic B areas in which two or more of the three minority groups (blacks, Hispanics, and Asians) make up a larger share of the metropolitan area=s population than in the national population in at least two of the three years (1980, 1990, 2000); 2) mostly white-black B areas in which only the share of blacks exceeds that in the national population in at least two of the three years; 3) mostly white-Hispanic B areas in which only the share of Hispanics exceeds that in the national population in at least two of the three years; 4) mostly white B areas in which neither blacks nor Hispanics exceed the national population in at least two of the three years.[16] Out of the 61 metropolitan areas included in this study, 17 are classified as multiethnic, 21 as mostly white-black, 4 as mostly white-Hispanic, 17 as mostly white.[17]

<Table 7 about here>

The descriptive analyses in Table 7 reveal that the stability of mixed-race tracts is actually lower in multiethnic metropolitan areas than in areas predominated by only one minority group, contrary to the *contact* hypothesis put forth by Frey and Farley (1996). For example, with respect to mixed white-and-black neighborhoods, it is evident that only 12.37 percent of such neighborhoods remain stable in multiethnic metropolitan areas (Panel A) compared to 35.68 percent in mostly white-black metropolitan areas (Panel B). Regarding mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, the same pattern is evident, with 45.66 percent of such

[16]The shares of each minority group at the national level in 1980, 1990, and 2000, respectively, are as follows: 1) non-Hispanic blacks B 11.54 percent, 11.78 percent, and 12.57 percent; 2) Hispanics B 6.45 percent, 9 percent, and 12.55 percent; and 3) Asians B 1.57 percent, 2.81 percent, and 3.91 percent (U.S. Bureau of Census 2001c, 2005c). I have categorized areas in which only the share of Asians exceed the national share as mostly white for the purposes of this paper primarily because I am most interested in how the shares of blacks and Hispanics at the metropolitan level will affect the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods.

[17]Fort Lauderdale and Orlando were not included in the analysis because they were classified in different categories in 1980, 1990, and 2000. Therefore, I could not assign them to one specific category.

neighborhoods remaining stable in multiethnic metropolitan areas (Panel A) and 60.19 percent remaining stable in mostly white-Hispanic metropolitan areas (Panel C).

What happens to the mixed white-and-black neighborhoods that do not remain stable in multiethnic neighborhoods? Panel A of Table 7 reveals that by 2000, 30.19 percent become classified as multiethnic, 23.69 percent become mixed black-and-other, and 13.21 become predominantly black. With respect to mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, Panel A of Table 7 shows that 5.68 percent become classified as multiethnic, 9.69 percent become mixed black-and-other, and 35.59 percent become predominantly other. Interestingly, within multiethnic metropolitan areas, more than half (52.69 percent) of neighborhoods classified as multiethnic in 1980 become mixed black-and-other. Thus, even though a large share of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods are becoming classified as multiethnic, it is unclear about the stability of such neighborhoods in the future.

How stable were predominantly white neighborhoods across these different metropolitan contexts? The results in Table 7 reveal that those in mostly white-black metropolitan areas were the most stable. Whereas 65.93 percent of predominantly white neighborhoods remained that way by 2000 in such areas (Panel B), in multiethnic metropolitan areas 21.02 percent of predominantly white neighborhoods remained stable (Panel A) and in mostly white-Hispanic metropolitan areas 28.45 percent of such neighborhoods were still classified as predominantly white by 2000 (Panel C). Interestingly, the stability of predominantly white neighborhoods within mostly white-black metropolitan areas exceeded that in mostly white metropolitan areas (65.93 percent (Panel B) versus 59.27 percent (Panel D)). Among the predominantly white neighborhoods that did not remain classified that way by 2000, within multiethnic and mostly white-Hispanic metropolitan areas, 60.99 percent and 53.59 percent, respectively, became classified as mixed white-and-other.

Taken together, these results suggest that the *contact* hypothesis suggested by Frey and Farley (1996) receives little support. Within multiethnic metropolitan areas, in particular, whites gravitate towards sharing neighborhoods with people of other races rather than blacks, consistent with the *racial prejudice* hypothesis. However, in these areas, there is ultimately less stability among mixed-race neighborhoods, in which whites

inhabit, than is the case in other metropolitan area types. Yet, the stability that exists among mixed-race neighborhoods varies by what racial groups are living in the neighborhoods. While 60.19 percent of mixed white-and-other neighborhoods remain stable within mostly white-Hispanic metropolitan areas, only 35.68 percent of mixed white-and-black neighborhoods remain stable within mostly white-and-black metropolitan areas. Thus, once again, it is the case that whites are selective in choosing their neighbors.

Discussion

The goals of this paper were essentially threefold. One objective was to document the prevalence of mixed-race neighborhoods in 1980, 1990, and 2000 as well as the shares of white, black, Hispanic, and other-race populations living in such areas. A second and related objective was to determine the impact that time has on the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods. The final objective was to examine a few key factors that might be associated with the such stability, namely poverty status, homeownership rates, and the racial/ethnic composition of the larger metropolitan area. While the *racial prejudice* hypothesis suggests that the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods will be dependent upon who lives in such neighborhoods, the *race correlated* hypothesis maintains that neighborhood=s economic status and quality, factors inextricably linked to race, will be more important in gauging its stability over time. A separate, *contact* hypothesis, suggests that within metropolitan areas that are racially/ethnically diverse, as is present in multiethnic metropolitan areas, the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods should be greater than is the case in metropolitan areas with one significantly large minority group.

The descriptive analyses conducted here reveal two major findings in relation to these objectives. First and foremost, the way time is incorporated into the study of mixed-race neighborhoods directly affects the level of optimism that may be expressed regarding the future of racial integration in metropolitan America. It is clear from the analyses presented here that while the share of neighborhoods that are classified as mixed white-and-other and multiethnic has risen between 1980 and 2000, these neighborhoods are not stable over a two-decade period. The same is true for mixed white-and-black neighborhoods. Thus, although mixed-race neighborhoods are becoming more common, they are not remaining that way over time.

Examining the proportion of mixed-race neighborhoods in discrete points in time and then comparing them across those time points is, therefore, misleading. Equally misleading is evaluating the stability of racially mixed neighborhoods over a decade-long period because it provides us with a level of optimism about racial integration that is not sustained in a longer time period.

The second major finding gleaned from the analyses presented here is that whites are selective in terms of the mixed-race neighborhoods within which they want to live, consistent with the *racial prejudice* hypothesis. Regardless of what time period was evaluated, mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, neighborhoods without blacks, were more likely than mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods to remain stable. Further analyses revealed that even among neighborhoods that had populations not in poverty or at or above national levels of owner-occupied housing across the three points in time, there were the same disparities. Thus, even in neighborhoods with better economic circumstances, mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods were more likely to become more minority over time than was the case for mixed white-and-other neighborhoods, contrary to the *race correlated* hypothesis. The differences in the neighborhood trajectories among these neighborhood types were also present among areas with high-levels of rental-occupied housing. Therefore, contrary to the idea that whites may use the racial composition to gauge what will happen to a particular neighborhood, which would be particularly salient among homeowners, the selectivity among whites was not just present in areas with greater levels of owner-occupied housing. Supportive of the *racial prejudice* hypothesis was the fact that mixed white-and-black and multiethnic neighborhoods within multiethnic metropolitan areas were less stable than mixed white-and-other neighborhoods. Thus, contact with other minorities did not increase whites= willingness to remain in neighborhoods with blacks over time. It actually significantly decreased their willingness as compared to such whites living in mostly white-black metropolitan areas, consistent with the findings of one other study (Krivo and Kaufman 1999).

The fact that integrated neighborhoods are not stable over longer time periods has profound effects for minorities. As shown in analyses here and consistent with other research (e.g., Massey and Denton 1993; Logan and Alba 1993a,b), it is the case that blacks have less access than other minorities to predominantly

white neighborhoods and mixed neighborhoods, where whites comprise the majority of residents. This has implications for their access to better quality schools, jobs, and connections to the larger opportunity structure. What this analysis further reveals is that even though blacks are gaining greater access to neighborhoods that are integrated with whites, it is largely a short-term phenomenon.

In the case of people of other races, the analysis here should be regarded with cautious optimism. Although mixed white-and-other neighborhoods are more stable than mixed white-and-black neighborhoods, a larger share of the former neighborhoods are becoming predominantly other-race neighborhoods over the two-decade period. Such trends mirror the stability and increases in residential segregation that has occurred between whites and Hispanics and whites and Asians. How such transitions relate to in-group preferences related to immigration or discrimination in the housing market remains to be seen, especially because the latest Housing Discrimination Study has revealed that discrimination against Hispanic renters is greater than that against blacks (Turner et al. 2002). Also how these neighborhood changes ultimately affect Hispanics and Asians, with respect to their educational and occupational attainment as well as their wages remains to be seen.

While the findings here are important, they are preliminary. There are several limitations with the current study. Among the most important is the fact that this is a purely descriptive analysis. Multivariate analyses need to be done in order to conduct a more rigorous test of the *racial prejudice*, *race correlated*, and *contact* hypotheses and to examine exactly what factors promote the stability of mixed-race neighborhoods. In addition, it is essential to map the data on these neighborhoods in order to understand how geography influences the stability of racially integrated neighborhoods. Are those that are most stable located mostly near predominantly white or affluent neighborhoods? Are the neighborhoods that are most likely to transition to having more minorities located nearly largely minority neighborhoods? How does neighborhood racial integration vary by city and suburban locations? Incorporating geography is not only essential from a descriptive standpoint but also from a modeling standpoint. Previous demographic and sociological research has treated neighborhoods as if they are independent entities when in fact that is not the case. Finally, different definitions of integration must be explored in addition to the typology used here to

broaden our understanding of racial integration. Basing a definition on three racial groups is very limiting, particularly in areas like New York and Washington, DC where the Hispanic population is extremely diverse.

In conclusion, there is a lot to be learned about racially integrated neighborhoods. This paper serves as a starting point to refocus our attention to this important phenomenon. The findings here suggest that perhaps the optimism that has been expressed in reaction to recent studies, which have cited a rise in integrated neighborhoods, should be tempered because of these neighborhoods= short-term stability. Future research should be devoted to learning exactly what makes a mixed-race neighborhood remain that way over a span of several decades. Only when we have that kind of information can we establish policies that will help us replicate such success stories. It is then that we can have real optimism for the future of racial integration.

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Table 1. Percent of Neighborhoods by Neighborhood Type, 1980-2000

	Percent of Neighborhoods		
Neighborhood Type	1980	1990	2000
Predominantly White	54.27	42.62	28.06
Mixed White-and-Black	7.91	7.98	5.36
Mixed White-and-Other	16.24	21.41	28.10
Multiethnic	3.35	5.67	8.24
Mixed Black-and-Other	4.12	6.53	11.28
Predominantly Black	8.77	9.41	8.70
Predominantly Other	5.34	6.38	10.25
N		32911	

Source: Author's tabulations of Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB)

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Table 2. Distribution of Population by Race/ethnicity by Neighborhood Type, 1980-2000

	Percent of White Population			Percent of Black Population			Percent of Hispanic Population			Percent of Other Population		
Neighborhood Type	1980	1990	2000	1980	1990	2000	1980	1990	2000	1980	1990	2000
Predominantly White	69.81	57.99	42.25	6.16	5.71	3.88	13.17	7.93	3.84	29.88	18.02	10.12
Mixed White-and-Black	7.66	8.27	5.97	12.71	12.05	7.95	1.86	1.46	0.84	4.51	3.57	2.28
Mixed White-and-Other	16.15	23.79	35.61	3.03	4.99	6.73	29.82	27.34	22.98	35.22	38.13	38.43
Multiethnic	2.78	5.10	8.12	4.83	7.73	11.43	6.50	7.83	7.49	8.02	9.61	10.23
Mixed Black-and-Other	0.94	1.52	3.09	14.97	19.81	30.21	18.02	21.34	24.64	7.76	10.91	14.12
Predominantly Black	1.40	1.35	1.04	57.70	48.39	37.24	1.42	1.04	0.61	2.62	1.65	1.92
Predominantly Other	1.27	1.97	3.92	0.60	1.32	2.57	29.20	33.06	39.59	12.00	18.11	22.90
N	83673448	88416111	89415405	15936418	18563248	21388679	9113390	14178524	23036001	2882014	5677655	11619457

Source: Author's tabulations of NCDB

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Table 3. Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Change/Stability over a Decade

Panel A. 1980 to 1990

	1990 Neighborhood Type						
1980 Neighborhood Type	PW	MWB	MWO	MULTI	MBO	PB	PO
Predominantly White	75.30	5.24	16.83	2.25	0.07	0.21	0.10
Mixed White-and-Black	9.22	59.26	1.46	13.30	2.38	14.34	0.04
Mixed White-and-Other	2.66	0.22	72.75	9.54	2.96	0.07	11.79
Multiethnic	1.63	2.90	5.44	49.55	34.66	2.18	3.63
Mixed Black-and-Other	0.00	0.29	0.07	1.55	89.02	4.05	5.01
Predominantly Black	0.14	1.14	0.00	0.59	7.90	89.85	0.38
Predominantly Other	9.90	3.75	3.01	1.31	5.63	0.57	75.82

Source: Author's tabulations of NCDB

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Panel B. 1990 to 2000

	2000 Neighborhood Type						
1990 Neighborhood Type	PW	MWB	MWO	MULTI	MBO	PB	PO
Predominantly White	63.67	4.08	27.64	4.03	0.16	0.26	0.14
Mixed White-and-Black	5.60	42.90	3.09	29.33	7.85	11.12	0.11
Mixed White-and-Other	1.49	0.16	70.48	7.69	3.19	0.00	16.99
Multiethnic	0.48	0.97	9.65	40.48	42.63	0.48	5.31
Mixed Black-and-Other	0.23	0.14	0.28	1.72	86.23	1.16	10.24
Predominantly Black	0.16	0.87	0.03	0.68	17.44	80.53	0.29
Predominantly Other	1.57	0.24	6.52	1.00	3.38	0.33	86.96

Source: Author's tabulations of NCDB

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Table 4. Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Change/Stability from 1980 to 2000

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	48.41	28.36	46.59	19.15	81.13	74.61	64.11
Became Predominantly White	na	8.22	1.12	0.64	0.00	0.21	9.33
Became Mixed White-and-Black	4.70	na	0.11	1.09	0.00	1.32	2.73
Became Mixed White-and-Other	34.02	2.31	na	8.53	0.37	0.14	9.10
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.27	na	na	0.36	0.00	21.23	4.27
Became Multiethnic	4.12	21.60	6.34	na	2.21	1.00	1.82
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	1.91	11.34	9.67	51.18	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	0.92	7.23	0.07	1.54	1.25	na	0.74
Became Predominantly Other	1.00	0.00	32.77	10.25	10.61	0.35	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	14.80	0.00	0.09	0.07	na	na
Other	4.65	6.15	3.31	7.17	4.35	1.14	7.91
N	17861	2602	5344	1102	1357	2887	1758

Source: Author's tabulations of Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB)

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Table 5. Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Change/Stability from 1980 to 2000, By Poverty Status of Tracts

Panel A. Nonpoor Tracts, 1980-2000

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	53.84	28.43	61.22	27.78	62.50	75.42	36.97
Became Predominantly White	na	12.41	1.58	1.11	0.00	0.00	20.44
Became Mixed White-and-Black	3.91	na	0.00	1.48	0.00	1.69	4.77
Became Mixed White-and-Other	33.41	3.43	na	9.26	0.00	0.42	22.49
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.19	na	na	0.37	0.00	18.64	1.53
Became Multiethnic	3.34	21.67	5.44	na	2.08	0.85	4.09
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	0.84	8.43	4.73	38.15	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	0.62	6.39	0.04	1.85	2.08	na	1.36
Became Predominantly Other	0.55	0.00	23.24	12.96	18.75	1.69	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	11.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	na
Other	3.29	7.78	3.75	7.04	14.58	1.27	8.35
N	14639	1080	2664	270	48	236	587
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	81.96%	41.51%	49.85%	24.50%	3.54%	8.17%	33.39%

Panel B. Poor Tracts, 1980-2000

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	19.80	30.46	28.90	17.54	83.55	76.45	87.25
Became Predominantly White	na	1.63	0.22	0.00	0.00	0.09	0.00
Became Mixed White-and-Black	11.64	na	0.22	1.18	0.00	1.21	0.00
Became Mixed White-and-Other	33.48	1.49	na	5.69	0.27	0.05	1.00
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	1.02	na	na	0.00	0.00	20.42	5.88
Became Multiethnic	8.59	21.40	9.20	na	1.68	0.89	0.38
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	7.13	14.12	14.94	59.00	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	1.75	8.62	0.11	1.42	0.97	na	0.00
Became Predominantly Other	3.35	0.00	43.18	8.77	10.26	0.00	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	18.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	na
Other	13.25	3.42	3.25	6.40	3.27	0.89	5.50
N	687	673	924	422	1131	2140	800
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	3.85%	25.86%	17.29%	38.29%	83.35%	74.13%	45.51%

Source: Author's tabulations of Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB)

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Table 6. Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Change/Stability from 1980 to 2000, By Housing Tenure within Tracts

Panel A. Homeowner Tracts, 1980-2000

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	62.12	36.88	58.23	16.49	84.71	77.66	59.83
Became Predominantly White	na	17.57	2.19	0.52	0.00	0.22	26.78
Became Mixed White-and-Black	3.57	na	0.00	1.03	0.00	1.95	6.69
Became Mixed White-and-Other	28.19	3.15	na	8.25	0.00	0.22	1.26
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.09	na	na	1.03	0.00	17.35	0.84
Became Multiethnic	2.35	13.34	5.15	na	0.00	1.74	0.00
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	0.70	5.10	5.33	48.45	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	0.73	6.18	0.00	2.58	2.35	na	0.00
Became Predominantly Other	0.22	0.00	25.41	14.95	5.88	0.00	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	9.87	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	na
Other	2.02	7.92	3.67	6.70	7.06	0.87	4.60
N	10815	922	1688	194	85	461	239
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	60.55%	35.43%	31.59%	17.60%	6.26%	15.97%	13.59%

Panel B. Renter Tracts, 1980-2000

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	24.56	22.91	38.90	20.18	81.79	75.10	78.82
Became Predominantly White	na	2.35	0.69	0.26	0.00	0.05	1.20
Became Mixed White-and-Black	6.26	na	0.23	1.18	0.00	1.17	0.55
Became Mixed White-and-Other	43.63	1.62	na	9.17	0.34	0.05	5.52
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.51	na	na	0.26	0.00	21.55	5.80
Became Multiethnic	6.94	27.04	6.90	na	2.32	0.87	1.29
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	4.51	16.44	12.05	51.38	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	1.38	8.18	0.15	0.92	0.95	na	0.64
Became Predominantly Other	2.74	0.00	38.56	9.17	10.40	0.24	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	16.68	0.00	0.13	0.00	na	na
Other	9.46	4.78	2.52	7.34	4.21	0.97	6.17
N	4121	1235	2622	763	1164	2060	1086
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	23.07%	47.46%	49.06%	69.24%	85.78%	71.35%	61.77%

Source: Author's tabulations of Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB)

Table 7. Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Change/Stability from 1980 to 2000, By Metropolitan Type

Panel A. Multiethnic Metros

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	21.02	12.37	45.66	16.14	80.78	61.81	71.46
Became Predominantly White	na	4.40	0.83	0.49	0.00	0.25	3.99
Became Mixed White-and-Black	1.32	na	0.10	0.49	0.00	0.58	1.09
Became Mixed White-and-Other	60.99	2.94	na	10.27	0.35	0.25	9.46
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.33	na	na	0.37	0.00	34.44	4.77
Became Multiethnic	4.38	30.19	5.68	na	1.99	1.25	1.56
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	2.73	23.69	9.69	52.69	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	0.90	5.66	0.10	1.71	1.13	na	0.55
Became Predominantly Other	3.06	0.00	35.59	11.86	11.43	0.33	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	13.21	0.00	0.12	0.09	0.33	na
Other	5.28	7.55	2.36	5.87	4.24	1.08	7.11
N	4547	477	4192	818	1155	1202	1279
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	25.46%	18.33%	78.44%	74.23%	85.11%	41.63%	72.75%

Panel B. Mostly White-Black Metros

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	65.93	35.68	19.44	26.60	84.78	89.53	27.67
Became Predominantly White	na	10.05	4.86	1.06	0.00	0.21	32.70
Became Mixed White-and-Black	10.66	na	0.69	7.45	0.00	2.05	19.50
Became Mixed White-and-Other	10.32	1.08	na	1.06	2.17	0.07	1.89
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.24	na	na	0.00	0.00	6.44	3.14
Became Multiethnic	4.18	16.25	25.00	na	0.00	0.50	0.63
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	1.66	6.74	12.50	37.23	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	1.81	8.48	0.00	3.19	6.52	na	3.77
Became Predominantly Other	0.21	0.00	23.61	5.32	0.00	0.42	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	16.79	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	na
Other	5.00	4.93	13.89	18.09	6.52	0.78	10.69
N	6340	1662	144	94	46	1414	159
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	35.50%	63.87%	2.69%	8.53%	3.39%	48.98%	9.04%

Source: Author's tabulations of Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB)
Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Table 7. Neighborhood Racial/Ethnic Change/Stability from 1980 to 2000, By Metropolitan Type (cont'd)

Panel C. Mostly White-Hispanic Metros

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	28.45	0.00	60.19	23.73	82.93	12.50	86.18
Became Predominantly White	na	0.00	0.46	1.69	0.00	0.00	0.81
Became Mixed White-and-Black	0.00	na	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Became Mixed White-and-Other	53.59	9.68	na	6.78	14.63	0.00	4.07
Became Mixed White-Black/White-Other	0.29	na	na	0.00	0.00	81.25	1.63
Became Multiethnic	7.18	32.26	5.09	na	0.00	0.00	1.63
Became Mixed Black-and-Other	2.44	35.48	5.79	50.85	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	0.00
Became Predominantly Other	0.14	0.00	23.15	10.17	0.00	0.00	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	9.68	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	na
Other	7.90	12.90	5.32	6.78	2.44	6.25	5.69
N	696	31	432	59	41	32	123
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	3.90%	1.19%	8.08%	5.35%	3.02%	1.11%	7.00%

Panel D. Mostly White Metros

	Neighborhood Type in 1980						
Neighborhood Trajectory (1990, 2000)	Predominantly White	Mixed White and Black	Mixed White and Other	Multiethnic	Mixed Black and Other	Predominantly Black	Predominantly Other
Remained the same	59.27	22.42	50.00	30.09	84.09	55.25	28.43
Became Predominantly White	na	5.60	2.48	0.00	0.00	0.00	46.08
Became Integrated -- White/Black	1.82	na	0.00	0.88	0.00	0.55	1.96
Became Integrated -- White/Other	31.50	4.42	na	2.65	0.00	0.00	8.82
Became Integrated -- White/Black/White/Other	0.15	na	na	0.00	0.00	38.67	4.90
Became Multiethnic -- White/Black/Other	3.17	30.97	10.99	na	6.82	2.76	3.92
Became Integrated -- Black/Other	0.97	14.75	16.67	56.64	na	0.00	0.00
Became Predominantly Black	0.10	5.60	0.00	0.00	1.14	na	0.00
Became Predominantly Other	0.21	0.00	12.41	3.54	2.27	0.00	na
Became Predominantly Black/Other	0.00	18.26	0.00	0.00	0.00	na	na
Other	2.81	7.96	7.45	6.19	5.68	2.76	5.88
N	5232	339	282	113	88	181	102
Percent of all tracts in neighborhood type	29.29%	13.03%	5.28%	10.25%	6.48%	6.27%	5.80%

Source: Author's tabulations of Neighborhood Change Database (NCDB)
Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White; Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks); Other refers to the remaining population

Appendix Table. Racial/ethnic Composition of Neighborhoods by Neighborhood Type, 1980-2000

	1980					1990					2000				
Neighborhood Type	Total Pop	W	B	H	O	Total Pop	W	B	H	O	Total Pop	W	B	H	O
Predominantly White	61452881	95.05	1.60	1.95	1.40	54479985	94.11	1.94	2.06	1.88	40667989	92.90	2.04	2.17	2.89
Mixed White-and-Black	8731110	73.37	23.20	1.94	1.49	9956648	73.41	22.48	2.07	2.04	7497801	71.22	22.67	2.58	3.53
Mixed White-and-Other	17726851	76.22	2.72	15.33	5.73	28006343	75.12	3.31	13.84	7.73	43038422	73.98	3.34	12.30	10.37
Multiethnic	3916755	59.30	19.67	15.13	5.90	7602683	59.35	18.88	14.59	7.18	12620576	57.54	19.37	13.67	9.40
Mixed Black-and-Other	5041412	15.67	47.32	32.58	4.44	8667739	15.52	42.42	34.91	7.15	16541857	16.70	39.06	34.32	9.92
Predominantly Black	10570419	11.06	87.00	1.22	0.71	10419588	11.48	86.21	1.42	0.90	9256464	10.00	86.06	1.53	2.42
Predominantly Other	4165842	25.52	2.30	63.88	8.30	7702552	22.61	3.18	60.86	13.35	15836433	22.13	3.47	57.59	16.80

Source: Author's tabulations of NCDB

Note: White refers to non-Hispanic White (W); Black refers to all Blacks (including Hispanic blacks) (B); Other refers to the remaining population (O)