Demographics and Security in Maritime Southeast Asia

Brian Nichiporuk

Angel Rabasa

Clifford Grammich

Julie DaVanzo

With a population of about 325 million, Maritime Southeast Asia is an area of significant economic and security interests for the United States. While the four nations comprising the region—Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore—differ markedly in total population and geographic size, they comprise a single cultural area of indigenous Malays and ethnic Chinese. Demographically, the significance of the region is likely to continue growing, with a current annual population growth rate (1.45 percent) exceeding that for the rest of the world (1.22 percent).[1]

The region is also home to one of the largest Muslim populations in the world, nearly 200 million (Table 1). Indonesia has one of the largest Muslim populations, 177 million, in the world, and Malaysia also has a large Muslim majority. Muslims are comparatively small minorities in the other two nations of the region, but still number nearly four million in the Philippines, including more than two million in the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao in the southern Philippines, where they are a large majority (though not throughout all Mindanao).[2] The Muslim population is also growing faster than the total population in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, the three most populous nations of the region.

Table 1--Population by Religion[3]

	Distribution			
	Muslim	Christian	Other	Total
Indonesia	88.2%	8.9%	2.9%	100.0%
Malaysia	60.4%	9.1%	30.5%	100.0%
Philippines	5.1%	90.0%	4.9%	100.0%
Singapore	15.7%	10.1%	74.2%	100.0%
Region	***64.3%***	***29.2%***	***6.4%***	***100.0%***

	Annual Growth Since Previous Census			
	Muslim	Christian	Other	Total
Indonesia	1.3%	0.4%	0.1%	1.2%
Malaysia	3.2%	??	??	2.9%
Philippines	3.4%	1.9%	14.7%	2.3%
Singapore	1.6%	3.2%	1.6%	1.8%

The prominence of the Muslim population in the region makes the relationship between Islam and the state an important part of regional politics. This relationship has recently been marred by violence such as the Bali terrorist bombings in October 2002 that killed 202 persons, the August 2003 bombing of the Marriott Hotel in central Jakarta that killed 12 and wounded 147, and the flaring conflict between Filipino authorities and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. More generally, Islamic militancy has manifested itself in

- Growth of Islamist organizations, including radical but ostensibly non-violent groups, radical elements within centrist organizations, and Islamist political parties that participate in the political process but call for establishment of Islamic law and creation of an Islamic state
- Emergence of extremist and terrorist groups, including infiltration of regional terrorist groups by those from elsewhere
- Separatist movements such as those in Aceh in Indonesia and Mindanao.

Such insurgency represents the greatest threat to security in a region where there is currently little risk of conflict between states.

Still, while the religious characteristics of the region are among its most distinctive features, other demographic characteristics merit consideration as well for at least two reasons. First, while the region has experienced increased Islamic extremism in recent years, its predominant religious ethos is more syncretistic and moderate. Second, many of the security issues confronting the region are tied to demographic trends such as urbanization, population migration, and changes in population age structures. These same trends also shape available responses to security issues.

Demographic changes, by themselves, do not caused armed conflict, but in political environments that are already tense as a result of territorial disputes, ethnic rivalries, ideological divides, or still other causes, they can exacerbate existing tensions and increase risks of violence and to security. Interactions between population pressures and environmental degradation, mass migrations, resource depletion, forced refugee flows, nationalism, and urbanization can all affect the likelihood and types of conflict that are present in a given region. Understanding the dynamic role of demographic variables in regional security issues can help both the United States and regional governments understand the most effective options for regional security. Understanding these in Maritime Southeast Asia in particular can help the United States in (1) strengthening moderate political and social movements there, (2) preventing the region from becoming a haven for Al Qaeda, (3) cementing strategic relationships increasing its influence and assuring access for its military, and possibly even (4) bolstering moderate movements elsewhere in the Islamic world.

In this article, we seek to determine how demographic variables are helping to shape security issues in Southeast Asia.[4] We define demographic variables as those representing population composition and dynamics. Population composition variables include those relevant to population size, distribution by age or geography, and ethnic characteristics (e.g., race, cultural origin, language, religion). Population dynamics refer to changes in population composition over time, including changes in absolute size or relative proportion.

In the balance of this work, we review several demographic variables and their implications for regional security. Demographic trends and variables such as urbanization and population dispersion can affect the nature and conduct of conflict by influencing its environment (e.g., by creating new areas of conflict such as urban areas) or instruments (e.g., diasporas that may seek to advance the interests of their home states or other powers). Demographic variables such as population age structure, particularly the number of persons of military age, can affect the nature of power of a state. Demographic changes such as those resulting from differential growth rates and migration affect the sources of conflict by increasing tensions between states or altering the domestic politics of a given state so that it becomes a security problem for its neighbors. After reviewing these variables, we discuss the broader implications of these trends and the policies that might best address them.

Urbanization: Shifting the Locus of Politics and Conflict

Like the rest of the world, Maritime Southeast Asia is becoming more urban (Table 2). In 1980, more than one in four persons across the region lived in urban areas; in 2000, nearly half did. By 2015, a majority of the population in each nation is expected to be urban. (Singapore, of course, is completely urban.) Jakarta and Manila, which each had populations of less than 2 million fifty years ago, in 2003 had populations exceeding 10 million, placing them

among the twenty largest metropolitan areas in the world. Population growth has been even more rapid in smaller metropolitan areas (i.e., those currently with less than one million persons). While urban and total populations are increasing, rural populations are decreasing. Increasing urban populations mean the cities of the region will become even more important economic, political, and social centers.

Table 2--Urban and Rural Populations (1,000s)[5]

	1980	2000	2015 (projected)
Indonesia			
Urban	33,184	88,863	144,622
Jakarta	*5,984*	*11,018*	*17,498*
Bandung	*1,774*	*3,409*	*5,315*
Surabaja	*1,719*	*2,461*	*3,453*
Medan	*1,249*	*1,879*	*2,690*
Palembang	*746*	*1,422*	*2,229*
Ujung Pandang	*629*	*1,051*	*1,573*
All other	*21,083*	*67,623*	*111,864*
Rural	116,944	122,696	105,806
Total	150,128	211,559	250,428
% Urban	22%	42%	58%
Malaysia			
Urban	5,787	14,212	20,998
Kuala Lumpur	*921*	*1,297*	*1,635*
All other	*4,866*	*12,915*	*19,363*
Rural	7,977	8,790	8,565
Total	13,764	23,001	29,563
% Urban	42%	62%	71%
Philippines			
Urban	18,024	44,327	66,658
Davao	*614*	*1,152*	*1,694*
Manila	*5,955*	*9,950*	*12,637*
All other	*11,455*	*33,225*	*52,327*
Rural	30,064	31,384	29,680
Total	48,088	75,711	96,338
% Urban	37%	59%	69%
Singapore (all urban)	2,414	4,016	4,707
REGION TOTALS			
Urban	59,409	151,418	236,985
Largest Cities	*19,591*	*33,639*	*48,724*
All other	*39,818*	*117,779*	*188,261*
Rural	154,985	162,870	144,051
Total	214,394	314,287	381,036
% Urban	28%	48%	62%
% in Largest Cities	*9%*	*11%*	*13%*

As a result of urbanization, there has been a political shift in the region from traditional, rural leadership to new types of urban leadership. In Malaysia, for example, Malay political organizations have been based in rural areas where Malays were predominant, and ethnic Chinese have been more prevalent in urban politics, reflecting traditional differences in the distribution of the Malaysian population. (In 2000, while 76 percent of ethnic Chinese citizens lived in predominantly urban states, only 47 percent of bumiputera citizens—i.e., citizens of Malay or other indigenous ethnicity—did so.[6]) As rural Malays have moved to urban areas in response to economic development, and traditional family and village bonds have weakened, Islam has grown as a source of political identity.

Urban areas with ease of communications and concentrations of peoples with shared political experiences can facilitate revolutionary movements. The "people power" movements in the Philippines that overthrew Ferdinand Marcos in 1986 and Joseph Estrada in 2001 and the Indonesian anti-government demonstrations in 1998 that led to Suharto's downfall were all urban-based movements. Urban areas, particularly those with universities, can be fertile grounds for new political movements in proselytizing, recruiting, and developing new leadership. In Indonesia, the most dynamic Islamist political forces have been increasingly based in urban and university communities.[7] The Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia), a university-based organization, provided much of the leadership, and ideology, for the Pan-Malay Islamic Party.[8] The small but dynamic Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia, led by graduates of Indonesian and Western universities, originated in Islamic study circles at Indonesian universities.[9]

Operationally, the infrastructure of urban areas can provide cover and greater ease of communication for armed clandestine militants. Because cities have substantive and

symbolically important targets (e.g., government buildings, headquarters of important institutions, major hotels, shopping and entertainment areas) and because news media are more concentrated and less likely to be restricted by government there, operations in urban settings can have a greater impact than those in rural areas. Nevertheless, dissemination of "real-time" communication can reduce the comparative advantage armed militants might see in urban over rural areas.

Differential Growth Rates: A Potential Source of Conflict

Though urban and total populations continue to grow, the actual rate of population growth is decreasing in the region. Moreover, Indonesia, by far the most populous nation in the region, has, because of decreasing fertility rates, net emigration, and higher levels of mortality, the slowest rate of population growth (currently 1.3 percent per year, compared to 1.8 percent elsewhere in the region).[10] Therefore, differential growth rates are not likely to cause conflict between nations in the region. Within states, however, differential growth rates between communities can potentially lead to conflict in ethnically mixed areas, particularly when one or more of the communities involved has a nationalist history. While there are differential growth rates between communities within each nation of Maritime Southeast Asia, it is not clear that these will lead to conflagrations.

Among Southeast Asian communities with the most sensitive flashpoints for potential conflict are those with ethnic Chinese minorities. Historical details on the Chinese population in Indonesia are lacking. The 2000 census, the first since 1930 to include data on ethnic background, indicates that 1.5 percent of the population was Chinese.[11] As a proportion of the total population, the ethnic Chinese have shrunk considerably in recent decades and, with decreases in fertility since 1980, will likely soon decrease in absolute numbers as well. Envy and

resentment of the ethnic Chinese have repeatedly led to anti-Chinese riots during economic and political crises, most recently in 1998 riots that some speculate the military may have encouraged or abetted in an effort to discredit anti-Suharto demonstrators.[12] Following these riots, some Indonesian Chinese, and approximately $20 billion in ethnic Chinese capital, left the country, though some recent anecdotal evidence suggests that ethnic Chinese are again investing in Indonesia.[13] Nevertheless, there is little evidence that differential population growth rates have had much to do with waxing and waning of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia.

Malaysian ethnic politics have been influenced by concerns about the ethnic composition of the population at least since the 1965 separation of Singapore and Malaysia over Malay concerns about possible political predominance by ethnic Chinese. Since 1970, while the ethnic Chinese population increased from 3.7 million to 5.7 million, the Chinese proportion of the total population decreased from 36 to 24 percent because of net emigration and sharp decreases in fertility rates.[14] Such trends have led to ethnic Chinese concerns that ethnic Malay political domination of the peninsula will increase. Such concerns, by stimulating ethnic Chinese emigration, can become self-fulfilling. Despite these trends, violence between Chinese and Malays does not appear likely.

Population Dispersion: A Challenge to Weak Central Authorities

In areas with less population growth, wide population distribution and varying population density can still have security implications. Indonesia, for example, includes more than 17,000 islands, of which approximately 6,000 are inhabited, and stretches about 4,000 kilometers from east to west. Population density across Indonesia is 109 persons per km^2, but varies from 6 persons per km^2 in Papua, the site of a separatist movement in extreme eastern Indonesia, to more than 12,000 persons per km^2 in Jakarta.[15] Though more compact, the Philippines stretch

1,200 kilometers from the north to south. Population density across the Philippines is 255 persons per km^2, but varies by province, ranging from 24 persons per km^2 in Apayao of the Cordillera Administrative Region to more than 88,000 persons per km^2 of Navotas in the National Capital Region.[16]

Such widely dispersed populations may facilitate campaigns of "ethnic cleansing" on sparsely populated islands far removed from central military authorities. Both the Indonesian and Filipino archipelagos have islands with ethnically mixed populations. If provincial political and security arrangements were to crack, ethnic cleansing campaigns by local radicals might succeed for two reasons. First, low population densities would prevent an opposing ethnic group from concentrating its self-defense capabilities in any meaningful way. Second, long distances between such islands and major military concentrations would mean any government response to such campaigns would likely be slow. No Southeast Asian military has sufficient long-range capability to transfer its military forces rapidly by sea or air. The Indonesian Air Force, for example, has only 18 C-130 aircraft, a single Boeing 707, and a smattering of Cessna for troop support, while the Filipino Army has only two squadrons of aging transport helicopters.[17] Such equipment is clearly not sufficient for rapid transport of troops to outlying islands.

Indonesian Kalimantan provides a recent example of how population dispersion and weak central government authority can, in combination, facilitate ethnic cleansing. Transmigration (a topic discussed in more detail below) to Kalimantan, including more than a half million migrants, primarily to Madurese, to West Kalimantan, first stirred conflict by displacing the indigenous Dayak population that depends on slash-and-burn agriculture and hunting for their livelihood. Periodic violence since 1996 has led to the deaths of hundreds and displacement of thousands of Madurese. Demographic settlement patterns were one of the

contributors to this violence against the Madurese. Though less densely populated than other areas of Indonesia, Kalimantan has ethnically mixed settlement patterns that prevented the Madurese from consolidating themselves into a few defensible enclaves, making them vulnerable to attacks by the majority Dayaks. Perhaps even more importantly, the distance of Kalimantan from the main Indonesian military garrisons on Jawa, about 300 miles, created an obstacle for any rapid military intervention that could have halted the violence. The situation was further exacerbated in 2001 by the fact that Indonesian military and security forces were overstretched by several other flaring ethnic and separatist conflicts elsewhere, including fighting between Muslims and Christians in Maluku and the ethnic Acehnese uprising in northern Sumatera.

Migration: Igniting Conflict from Longstanding Divisions

The communal violence in Kalimantan, as noted, has its origins in Indonesian transmigration programs. The general effects of migration on regional security depend on whether it is voluntary (e.g., economic) or involuntary. Involuntary flows tend to have more direct effects on security and are often the result of governments seeking to change cultural population balances, remove politically troublesome groups, or exert pressure on neighboring states.[18] Much of the communal conflict in eastern Indonesia and the southern Philippines has occurred in areas where the demographic balance has been altered as the result of government induced internal migration flows.

Internal migration in Indonesia has occurred both in spontaneous movements and as part of the government policy of transmigration, initiated by Dutch colonial administrators in the early 20th century and maintained after independence in 1949. The transmigration policy sought to transfer population from overcrowded islands such as Jawa and Madura to less populated

ones, as well as to assimilate indigenous populations into the national mainstream. During its peak in the 1980s and 1990s, transmigration involved more than 5 million persons.[19]

Transmigration, as noted above, was one of the causes of communal violence in Kalimantan. While indigenous leaders cite cultural clashes with the Madurese as the reason for the violence, Dayak animosity toward the newcomers was fuelled by the economic and social marginalization of the Dayak people under the Suharto regime. Such violence can be understood as a continuation and accentuation of a pattern of resistance by indigenous peoples to Jakarta's integrationist policies.

In Maluku, transmigration has sparked conflict between Christians and Muslims in an area where there had been longstanding, friendly, and cooperative relations, including institutionalised mutual help arrangements.[20] Muslim migrants became dominant in small trade, transport, and similar occupations, while Christian dominance of the local bureaucracy was undermined by expanded educational opportunities for Muslims.[21] Violence sparked by transmigration led to the deaths of more than five thousand persons and was spread to Central Sulawesi by Laskar Jihad fighters intervening on behalf of the Muslim populations before specialized military units were able to restore order.[22]

Migration in the Philippines to Mindanao has likewise stirred conflict between ethnic groups. The population of Mindanao was 50 percent Muslim in the early 20th century before migration—driven by colonial and independent government policies for greater cultural, economic, and political integration of the island with the rest of the archipelago—helped reduce it to 18 percent today.[23] While these long-term trends fuelled Muslim perceptions that their community was endangered and thereby secession sentiment, there was little armed confrontation between Muslims and Christians before the mid-1970s, when the National Moro

Liberation Front, backed by Libya, launched the secessionist struggle. In recent decades, a more Islamist insurgency movement, represented by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) with Libyan and subsequently Al Qaeda support, has mobilized an estimated 18 thousand fighters. Large-scale government offensives in early 2003, and what appears to be a more pragmatic approach by the new MILF leadership, have led to the recent resumption of settlement talks.

While the communal struggle in eastern Indonesia and the separatist insurgency in the Muslim areas of the Philippines have local roots, external parties have taken advantage of the conflicts to promote a broader Islamist struggle. Al Qaeda has sought to play a role in Southeast Asia since the early 1990s when a brother-in-law of Osama bin Laden helped establish the Abu Sayyaf Group and finance the MILF. The ability of Al Qaeda to infiltrate the region was facilitated by participation of several hundred Southeast Asian volunteers in the Afghan War. Al Qaeda and its associated Southeast Asian group, the Jemaah Islamiyah, also placed a large number of instructors in training camps in Indonesia and the Philippines.[24]

The relationship between Al Qaeda, Jemaah Islamiyah, and local militant groups is very complex. Many local groups share ties across the region and have documented ties to Al Qaeda. Long porous borders and lax controls typical in the region facilitate these ties. The upsurge in Islamic militancy has also been accelerated by the difficulties of transition to democratic government in countries such as Indonesia. Nevertheless, the agendas of the groups are different, with separatists seeking limited territorial and ethnic nationalist goals that have been deeply influenced by demographic factors, and Al Qaeda and associated groups pursuing broader objectives and seeking to subordinate local jihads in a pan-Islamist agenda.

Ethnic Diasporas: Transmitting Conflict?

The relationship between Islamist groups in the region and elsewhere is further complicated by ethnic diasporas migrating to and from the region. Diasporas have existed since ancient times, but advances in transportation and communication in recent decades have increased their size, visibility, and influence.[25] More rapid and widespread long-range transportation have permitted larger migratory flows, thus increasing the size of diasporas. Continuing improvements in communications and information technology allow leaders of these communities more rapid and visible means of calling attention to issues of interest in their home countries or to help their home countries or territories achieve political or military objectives.

Both Indonesia and the Philippines have a substantial number of nationals overseas and have had relatively high net emigration (i.e., a number of emigrants exceeding the number of immigrants) in recent years.[26] While comparatively little information is available on the distribution of Indonesians overseas, a recent Indonesian government estimate indicates there are one million Indonesian migrant workers in Malaysia, 500 thousand in Saudi Arabia, 40 thousand in Singapore, 40 thousand in Taiwan, and 30 thousand in Kuwait.[27] Other additional sources indicate there are more than 135 thousand native Indonesians in the Netherlands, 73 thousand in the United States, 47 thousand in Australia, 15 thousand in Japan, and 10 thousand in Canada.[28] Concentrations of native Filipinos now residing overseas include 1.37 million in the United States, 239 thousand in Canada, 104 thousand in Australia, and 94 thousand in Japan.[29] In addition to these concentrations, there are more than one million Filipinos who work abroad, nearly all as contract workers, and return to the Philippines.[30] More than one in four such Filipinos work in Saudi Arabia, primarily as service or production workers. Remittances from overseas workers—estimated in recent years to be 0.6 percent of the Filipino GDP and 0.2

percent of the Indonesian GDP—constitute small but noticeable portions of the Filipino and Indonesian economies.[31]

In contrast to Indonesia and the Philippines, Singapore and Malaysia have had net immigration (i.e., a number of immigrants exceeding emigrants) in recent years.[32] Singapore historically has selectively encouraged immigration, seeking to draw skilled labor, though some officials also express concern about the potential social impact of a large number of unskilled migrants drawn to Singapore as well.[33] Malaysia is seeking to reduce immigration and the problems it perceives resulting from it, though its policies for doing so are sometimes erratic.[34]

Of particular interest for analysis of demographics and security, especially that relevant to U.S. interest in promoting moderate social and political movements in the Muslim world, is how diasporas may help transmit Islamic militancy to Southeast Asia. Arab communities have deep roots in the region, but the variety of influences on the Muslim community have led some to label it the least "Arabized" of leading Muslim communities.[35] Individuals of Arab origin are, for the most part, well integrated into local societies. For example, the Hadramami (Yemeni) diaspora, numbering about five million across Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, includes a former foreign minister of Indonesia, the current foreign minister of Malaysia, and a community whose wealth (though surpassed by that of ethnic Chinese) is among the greatest in the region.

Nevertheless, the local Arab diaspora, particularly its newer elements, may serve as either a liaison or camouflage for missionaries or terrorists arriving from the Middle East. Islamic radicals of Arab background in the region include the founders of Jemaah Islamiyah across the region and the leaders of Laskar Jihad and of the Front Pembela Islam (Islam Defenders Front) in Indonesia. The Yemeni diaspora could serve as a demographic "beachhead" for radical Middle

Eastern and South Asian Islamists seeking to infuse Malay ethnicity with Salafism and Wahhabism.

Population Age Structure: Shaping the Available Responses

How are demographic variables affecting the resources Southeast Asian states have to confront security challenges? Traditionally, quantity has long been believed to count for much in security and military issues, leading nations to raise large conscript armies with plenty of reserve forces to battle over extended fronts. Today, many militaries may face a tradeoff between more personnel or technology in seeking to maintain their power. Developing states facing conflicting demands of domestic politics and military investment may seek to create bifurcated forces in which most forces might be low-quality infantry units for internal policing or static defensive duties in wartime while an elite remainder, perhaps more skilled in modern warfare tools such as advanced sensory and information processing technologies, handles more complicated operations of warfare or counterinsurgency.

Military-age male youth cohorts (i.e., numbers of males 15 to 24 years of age) are projected to increase in each of these nations in coming years (Table 3). In Indonesia and the Philippines, these cohorts are more than adequate to staff current forces, exceeding by far the number of persons in the Armed Forces, who in turn account for fewer than 0.5 percent of the total labor force (compared to just over 1.0 percent in the United States).

Table 3--Military Populations and Investments[36]

	Indonesia	Malaysia	Philippines	Singapore
Male population, 15 to 24 years of age (1,000s)				
1985	17,106	1,624	5,661	284
2000	21,358	2,214	7,736	260
2015 (projected)	21,535	2,804	9,649	345
Numbers in Armed Forces (1,000s)				
1985	278.1	110.0	114.8	55.0
2002	297.0	100.0	106.0	60.5
Numbers of reserve forces, 2002 (1,000s)	400	41.6	131	312.5
Armed Forces as percent of labor force, 1999	0.30%	1.02%	0.34%	3.04%
Defense expenditures per capita (Year 2000 US$)				
1985	$23	$112	$12	$613
2002	$29	$145	$19	$1,010

The greater challenge for Indonesia and the Philippines may be in developing the capital-intensive forces required to face extensive near- and far-term threats. In fact, the Indonesian navy deteriorated to the point that in July 2002 the chief of the naval staff that no vessels were combat ready, and only a few ships were less than ten years old, leaving Indonesia unable to patrol its territorial waters and subject to the highest number of pirate attacks in the world.[37] Funding shortages have also prevented the Filipino military from developing the air mobility needed to conduct effective counterinsurgency operations. Per capita military expenditures in both these nations are only a fraction of the global level ($136 in 2002). While military

expenditures as a proportion of gross domestic product have remained relatively stable, the sharp economic contraction in these nations in the late 1990s means defense expenditures have decreased in recent years. Population growth among youth populations and concomitant demands for social spending, particularly on educational and health programs, to support these populations could also limit funds for military investment.

In proportion to the size of its military-age population and its overall labor force, Malaysian military forces are larger than those in Indonesia and the Philippines and roughly comparable to those elsewhere in the world. Its per capita military expenditures in 2002 were also roughly comparable to global levels as well.

Demographics pose several unique constraints to the power of Singapore. A nation of more than four million persons on a landmass about three times the size of Washington, D.C., has, of course, no strategic depth. Through heavy use of conscripts—including nearly two-thirds of its military personnel—Singapore has built a military that is quite large in relation to its population but one that may not be able to grow much further. The current number of active and reserve forces, 373 thousand, comprises about three-fourths of the population of male citizens 20-to-39 years of age (the ages of obligatory military service or annual reserve training), and the percentage of its labor force in the armed forces is among the highest in the world. (Among nations with a higher proportion of the labor force in the military are Eritrea, North Korea, and Israel.)

Immigration, which has boosted Singaporean population growth, could, theoretically, boost the numbers on which Singapore may base some of its power. Immigration may also, however, present its own challenges. Immigration has led to growth in the foreign population in the past three decades at a rate about five times that for the native population (though foreign

population growth has slowed recently).[38] Among permanent Singapore residents, population growth and fertility rates are now lowest for the Chinese majority.[39] (Singapore is the only nation in the region to have fertility levels below those needed for population replacement.) Such trends, should they continue, may call into question the ability of Singapore to maintain a large well-integrated military in future years.

Implications and Conclusions

The interaction of demographic and security variables in Maritime Southeast Asia poses several implications for security and development policies in the region.

The continuing urbanization of the region means urban areas are likely to become more frequent sites of armed conflict. Urban areas that are home to many recent migrants may in particular prove to be fertile ground for radical and revolutionary groups. This is particularly true for insurgencies against existing governments, which are more likely to succeed when combining both urban and rural operations rather than relying on rural operations alone.[40] U.S. military forces in the Pacific Command that might be asked to undertake counterterrorism missions in Maritime Southeast Asia must therefore be fully trained in urban warfare. The Department of Defense might want to consider establishing a training complex somewhere in theater, perhaps on Okinawa, devoted exclusively to military operations on urban terrain.

While urbanization will likely change conflict in the region, Indonesia, the Philippines, and perhaps even Malaysia will still face security challenges in rural areas. The Indonesian and Filipino militaries clearly already have difficulties in meeting security challenges throughout their territory. One way the United States may wish to boost security in the region is through providing sealift and airlift equipment and support. In particular, the United States should consider reorienting its arms sales programs in the region to emphasize air and sealift platforms

for internal security forces, while deemphasizing sales of sophisticated systems (e.g., advanced fighter aircraft) that might provoke tensions between regional states. Transport ships and planes would help government forces squelch communal violence in distant provinces more rapidly, thereby meeting one of the more likely security needs of the region.

More generally, maintaining the viability of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), securing regional borders, and perhaps even more development aid can help maintain and improve region security. Washington should work hard to hold the ASEAN together as a viable diplomatic organization so that it can continue to be a firewall against interstate conflicts in Southeast Asia. This would allow regional states to focus their security policies on counterterrorism. The ASEAN could also serve as a means for providing specialized training for regional military forces.

Improving customs and border control services in the region may help reduce the movement of insurrectionists from elsewhere, particularly those seeking to take advantage of demographic tensions within it. The United States should therefore increase support to regional border control authorities. Key leaders and managers in Southeast Asian border control agencies could be trained by the U.S. Border Patrol. The United States could also provide advanced border surveillance technologies and advanced database software programs that would allow for rapid identification of international travelers passing through major air and sea ports of the region.

Development aid could help reduce tensions resulting from demographic changes, although there are questions that the United States, if offering such aid, should consider in targeting and selecting partners for programs. With the population of the region soon becoming an urban majority, for example, should development programs help nations of the region

alleviate poverty in increasingly isolated rural areas, or should they address problems of urbanization? In dealing with the Muslim majority of the region, what further information is needed to identify appropriate partners for development programs?

Most of the implications and policy prescriptions above apply primarily to the three larger nations of Maritime Southeast Asia, but others for Singapore merit attention as well. As the only urban state of the region and the only one whose population may not be able to yield the desired number of military personnel, Singapore has three options to maintain its military prowess: expand the population of persons eligible for military service, invest more in military hardward, or seek other security guarantees. Over the long term, low fertility in Singapore may limit how much the county can modernize its own armed forces. At some point, this limitation may cause Singapore's leaders to ask for very explicit security guarantees from the United States. American policymakers need to think hard about how to address Singapore's security concerns without unduly provoking Indonesia and Malaysia. Alternatively, Singapore, to boost its military, could expand the population eligible for military service by broadening its ages of services or inducting females. Should Singapore seek to invest in military technology rather than personnel, it might pursue such investments as more F-16 fighters, guarded missile frigates, and diesel submarines, though such acquisitions could threaten and thereby increase tensions with Malaysia, particularly if tied to a strategy of preemption to assure secure access to such resources as water.

Singapore is also the only Chinese majority state in the region. While the relation between demographic variables and tensions involving the ethnic Chinese community is murky, it is clear that the presence of ethnic Chinese populations and reactions to them can pose security challenges. Accordingly, the United States, in advancing its interests in regional stability, may

wish to encourage Southeast Asian governments to take concrete and visible steps to ensure the security of ethnic Chinese communities in the region. The economic power of these communities can help to ensure the economic stability of Maritime Southeast Asian nations. Their continued presence will also support political secularism in Southeast Asia, thereby helping to weaken the momentum of fundamentalist Islamic movements in the region.

Further analysis of Maritime Southeast Asia may yield insights for advancing U.S. security interests elsewhere. Such analysis may include that on the demographic characteristics shared by subregions with the strongest support for Islamic militancy. The large numbers of Indonesians and Filipinos who leave the region for work also merit further analysis, particularly regarding the extent and use of their remittances, the degree to which (if any) they may be radicalized when abroad, and the role they may have in transmitting Islamist (or other) radicalism from elsewhere to the region.

[1] United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision*, New York, 2003, online at http://esa.un.org/unpp/ (as of August 10, 2004).

[2] Philippines National Statistics Office, "Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao: Nine in Every Ten Persons Were Muslims," July 15, 2003, online at http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2003/pr0301tx.html (as of August 10, 2004).

[3] Leo Suryadinata, Evi Nurvidya Arifin, and Aris Ananta, *Indonesia's Population: Ethnicity and Religion in a Changing Political Landscape*, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003, p. 106; Malaysia Department of Statistics, "Key Summary Statistics by State," 2001, online at http://www.statistics.gov.my/English/KeysumStats.htm (as of August 9, 2004); Philippines National Statistics Office, "Philippines: Additional Three Persons Per Minute," February 18, 2003, online at http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2003/pr0323tx.html (as of August 9, 2004); Singapore Department of Statistics, "Singapore Census of Population, 2000, Advance Data Release No. 2—Religion," November 2000, online at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/papers/c2000/adr-religion.pdf (as of August 9, 2004); United States Census Bureau, International Data Base, online at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html (as of August 9, 2004). Among "other" religious groups in Malaysia, Buddhists, 19.2 percent of the total population, are most prominent. Among Christians in the Philippines, Catholics, 81.0 percent of the population, are most prominent. Among "other" religious groups in Singapore, Buddhists, 42.5 percent of the population, are most prominent.

[4] For a more extended and systematic discussion of how demographic variables affect security, see Brian Nichiporuk, *The Security Dynamics of Demographic Factors*, Santa Monica, Calif.:

RAND MR-1088-WFHF/RF/DLPF/A, 2000, online at http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1088/ (as of August 12, 2004).

[5] United Nations Population Division, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision*, New York, 2004, online at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2003/2003WUP.htm (as of August 9, 2004).

[6] Calculations based on Malaysia Department of Statistics, "Key Summary Statistics by State."

[7] Angel Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Adelphi Papers No. 358, August 2003; Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2003.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects: The 2002 Revision*.

[11] Suryadinata, Arifin, and Ananta, *Indonesia's Population*.

[12] David Bourchier, "Skeletons, Vigilantes, and the Armed Forces' Fall from Grace," in Arief Budiman, Barbara Hatley, and Damien Kingsbury, eds., *Reformasi: Crisis and Change in Indonesia*, Melbourne: Monash Asia Institute, 1999, pp. 149-171.

[13] Robert Go, "Chinese Community Ready to Reinvest in Country," *The Straits Times*, March 9, 2002.

[14] Loh Foon Fong, "The Make Up and Break Up," *The Star* (Malaysia), August 11, 2003.

[15] Statistics Indonesia, "Population Density per Square Kilometer by Province," 2000, online at http://www.bps.go.id/sector/population/table3.shtml (as of August 12, 2004).

[16] Republic of the Philippines, National Statistics Office, "Total Population, Number of Households, Average Household Size, Population Growth Rate and Population Density by

Region, Province and Highly Urbanized City," 2000, online at http://www.census.gov.ph/census2000/index.html (as of August 12, 2004).

[17] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*, London: Oxford University Press, annual.

[18] Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992-93, pp. 91-126.

[19] M. Adriana Sri Adhiati and Armin Bobsien, eds., *Indonesia's Transmigration Programme—An Update: A Report Prepared for Down to Earth*, London: International Campaign for Ecological Justice in Indonesia, July 2001, online at http://dte.gn.apc.org/ctrans.htm (as of August 12, 2004).

[20] Paul Michael Taylor, "Turbulent Times Past and Present in the Moluccas," United States-Indonesia Society Open Forum, Washington, September 13, 2000.

[21] International Crisis Group (ICG), "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku," ICG Asia Report No. 31, February 8, 2002, online at http://www.crisisweb.org//library/documents/report_archive/A400544_08022002.pdf (as of August 12, 2004).

[22] ICG, "Indonesia: The Search for Peace in Maluku"; Rabasa, *Political Islam in Southeast Asia.*

[23] Samuel K. Tan, "The Socio-Economic Dimension of Moro Secessionism," Mindanao Studies Reports No. 1, 1995, as cited in Amina Rasul, *The Road to Peace and Reconciliation: Muslim Perspectives on the Mindanao Conflict*, Makati City, Philippines: Asian Institute of Management Policy Center, 2003.

[24] Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia*, especially pp. 13-20.

[25] Myron Weiner, "Security, Stability, and International Migration."

[26] United Nations Population Division, *International Migration Report 2002*, New York, 2002b. Online at http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ittmig2002/ittmigrep2002.htm (as of August 12, 2004).

[27] "Government Readies Advocacy Teams for Migrant Workers," Jakarta *Post*, March 17, 2004.

[28] Statistics Netherlands, "People with a foreign background by age, sex, and group of origin," 2003, online at http://statline.cbs.nl (as of August 12, 2004); United States Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3, 2002, online at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2002/sumfile3.html (as of August 12, 2004); Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Birthplace of Individual by Sex," 2003, online at http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats (as of August 12, 2004); Japan Statistics Bureau, "Special Tabulation on Foreigners by Nationality and Sex," 2000, online at http://www.stat.go.jp/data/kokusei/2000/gaikoku/00/zuhyou/a001-1.xls (as of August 12, 2004); Statistics Canada, "Immigrant Status and Period of Immigration and Place of Birth of Respondent for Immigrants and Non-permanent Residents," 2001, online at http://www12.statcan.ca/english/census01/release/index.cfm (as of August 12, 2004). Singapore Department of Statistics, *Singapore Population*, Singapore, 2001, online at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/c2000/handbook.pdf (as of August 12, 2004), also confirms the Jakarta *Post* report of 40 thousand Indonesians in Singapore.

[29] United States Census Bureau, Census 2000 Summary File 3; Statistics Canada, "Immigrant Status and Period of Immigration and Place of Birth of Respondent for Immigrants and Non-Permanent Residents"; Australian Bureau of Statistics, "Birthplace of Individual by Sex"; Japan Statistics Bureau, "Special Tabulation on Foreigners by Nationality and Sex."

[30] Philippines National Statistics Office, "2002 Survey on Overseas Filipinos," April 23, 2002, online at http://www.census.gov.ph/data/pressrelease/2003/of02tx.html (as of August 12, 2004).

[31] Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, and Samir Jahjah, "Are Immigrant Remittance Flows a Source of Capital for Development," International Monetary Fund Working Paper WP/03/189, September 2003, online at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp03189.pdf (as of August 12, 2004).

[32] United Nations Population Division, *International Migration Report 2002.*

[33] Yap Mui Teng, "Issues Paper from Singapore," 1997, in *Migration Issues in the Asian Pacific*, compiled by Patrick Brownlee and Colleen Mitchell, Wollongong, Australia: Asia Pacific Migration Research Network, online at http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrnw13.htm (as of August 12, 2004).

[34] Tey Nei Peng, "Issues Paper from Malaysia," 1997, in *Migration Issues in the Asian Pacific*, online at http://www.unesco.org/most/apmrnwp9.htm (as of August 12, 2004).

[35] Azyumardi Azra, Rector, Indonesian State Islamic University, Interview with Angel Rabasa, Jakarta, June 2002.

[36] United Nations Population Division, *World Population Prospects*; International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*; World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, Washington, annual.

[37] International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance*.

[38] Tan Yeow Lip, "Singapore's Current Population Trends," *Statistics Singapore Newsletter*, September 2002, online at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ssn/feat/oct2002/pg2-6.pdf (as of August 12, 2004); Edmond Lee Eu Fah and Yeo Yen Fang, "Singapore's Demographic Trends in 2002," *Statistics Singapore Newsletter*, September 2003, online at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/ssn/feat/nov2003/pg10-13.pdf (as of August 12, 2004).

[39] Singapore Department of Statistics, "Key Indicators of the Resident Population," 2000, online at http://www.singstat.gov.sg/keystats/c2000/indicators.pdf (as of August 12, 2004); Edmond Lee Eu Fah and Yeo Yen Fang, "Singapore's Demographic Trends in 2002."

[40] Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman, *The Urbanization of Insurgency: The Potential Challenge to U.S. Army Operations*, Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND MR-398-A, 1994.