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# *THE MISSHAPEN PLAYING FIELD: LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND MOBILITY AMONG BLACK AND WHITE IMMIGRANTS IN THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA*

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ABSTRACT:

The Post-Civil Rights Era in American has been marked by increasingly egalitarian legal structures and increasingly Black immigration flows. While overshadowed by the much larger Asian and Latino immigrant groups, those from Africa, the Caribbean and Europe important because they provide for a unique test of our Civil Rights advances. This paper uses Current Population Survey data to compare the labor force experiences of Black and White immigrants as well as their American-born children with their Native-born (third generation+) counterparts. Findings suggest that despite a great deal socioeconomic similarity in the first generation, second generation Black and White men differ substantially in terms of labor force participation and employment—to the detriment of the Black men. It is argued that this finding is reflective of a twenty-first century occupational queue that places Black immigrant men ahead of other Black American men but well behind White immigrant and White American men.

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Whatever comfort we may take in the fact that the children of immigrants appear to be faring well in terms of educational attainment (Farley and Alba 2002) must be tempered by the fact that we have not yet seriously addressed the question, to what extent does *race* affect the ability of Post-1965 immigrants to convert their educational credentials into stable well-paying jobs? More specifically, we must ask 1) are immigrants and their adult American-born children able to secure jobs? 2) If so, what is the quality of those jobs? And 3) what, if any, role does race play in determining the quantity and quality of work individuals are able to secure in the Post-Civil Rights era?

Since the enactment of the Immigration (Hart-Cellar) Act of 1965 immigrant streams have been largely Asian and Latin American in origins—adding new diversity to America's racial and ethnic mosaic and changing the way we talk about race in America. However, about a third of all immigrants in the fifteen years following the passage of the Immigration Act were of European, African and (non-Spanish) Caribbean origins. Thusly, we are afforded a unique opportunity to assess the salience of the quintessential American racial distinction—that between Black and White. Much as Stanley Lieberson compared patterns of adaptation and advancement among Black southerners and White (south, central, and east) Europeans in the first half of the twentieth century, this study begins to compare the adaptation and advancement of *voluntary* immigrants from Africa, the Caribbean and Europe in the more egalitarian social and political landscape rung in by the Civil Rights Act of the 1964.

***BACKGROUND***

The strength of the connection between education and occupational and labor market success has seemed to vary by race in the past with Black people getting significantly less "bang" for their educational "buck." This may be no less true in the present day. Another objective of this paper is to answer the question: do Black immigrants experience the same occupational "returns to education" as

White immigrants and/or their native counterparts? The research literature would suggest that the answer to this question is no.

In *A Piece of the Pie* (1980), Stanley Lieberson outlines a model of ethnic occupational stratification that makes five assumptions, the most important of which may be "group membership directly affects occupational opportunity." The mechanism through which this happens is "queueing." It is possible that different groups have different average desires, dispositions, skills, etc. However, occupational stratification may ultimately boil down to the fact that there are only so many of each type of job and only so many people can fill them. The most powerful group(s) in any society will predominate in the most desirable positions, and only when these groups are too small to fill all such positions will minorities have opportunities to do so. As immigrants become more seasoned in the American labor force they increasingly find themselves in a better position to advance occupationally. As members of the majority exit or advance in the labor force they leave vacancies that can be filled by members of the next group in the queue—probably the most well established and/or assimilated of immigrant groups—thereby promoting immigrant minorities into higher occupational strata.

Lieberson (1980) argued that there was, in 1900, an informally recognized ranking of ethnic groups present in Northern cities such that native Whites of native parents were at the top, old immigrants (northern and western Europeans) came next, followed by southern, central and eastern European immigrants and Black Americans occupying the lowest rungs of the occupational hierarchy. If queueing theory holds, we should expect to find the first group overrepresented in the most prestigious occupations and the last group over represented in the least prestigious occupations with intermediate groups falling somewhere in between. We should also see southern, central, and eastern Europeans as well as Black Americans moving up the occupational ladder over time (as members of more privileged groups move higher or out of the occupational structure and new immigrant groups enter beneath).

The queuing idea seems to have substantial explanatory power when queues are recognized as both temporally *and* preferentially based. That is, queues can only have real consequences by way of employer hiring and promotion practices. Employers' preferences may be influenced by perceptions of

ethnic or racial groups which are, in turn, shaped by the tenure of a given group but also prevailing prejudices which may have little to do with how long a group has been in the country. Lieberson (1980) found that, in the early decades of the twentieth century, native Whites of native parentage were concentrated in high status positions and Black Americans were concentrated in low status positions; European immigrants found themselves dispersed more widely.[1] It is important, however, to note that the south, central and eastern European immigrants were not far ahead of (and in some cases behind) Blacks in terms of occupational attainment in 1900.

Both European immigrants and Black migrants experienced occupational mobility over the generations spanning the first half of the nineteenth century. However, after WWII occupational status among south, central and eastern European immigrants accelerated while Black occupational attainments advanced slowly and often ran into formally and informally imposed "ceilings." Throughout the century, the returns to education experienced by the two groups were vastly different. While European immigrants and their offspring exceeded education-based expectations for professional occupations, Black Americans were underrepresented in such occupations when their education is taken into consideration. Lieberson (1980) tests two explanations of this phenomenon.

It is suggested that the difference in occupational attainments and returns to education have to do with length of residency in northern cities. That is, Blacks may have been faring worse because they were more recent migrants to northern cities thus having less time to find work and build seniority. Black Americans held a favorable position relative to south, central and eastern European immigrants early in the period when most of the former group had been in the north for longer and many of the latter were recent arrivals. This does not, however, preclude the possibility that discriminatory queues were at work in those cities. In fact, a brief study of labor union history demonstrates this. Blacks were systematically locked out of union organizations, precluding them from numerous occupations (Hill 1985). Further, there is evidence that employers often had informal policies which dictated that Blacks only be hired in

[1] However, Black Americans found themselves dispersed across a wider array of occupations in the south where they are less likely to face ethnic competition from any group other than native Whites of native parentage who comprised too small a proportion of the population to take all desirable jobs.

the case of labor shortage or strike—a fact which led White workers to try even harder to keep Blacks out of "their" occupations, industries, and labor markets. In any case, Blacks clearly fared worse over this period despite their increasing levels of education and their comparable tenure in the northern cities. Rather than moving steadily upward/forward in the queue European immigrant groups seem to have cut in line ahead of Black Americans who continue to reside at or near the bottom of the American occupational structure—arguably reflecting employers' preference for European workers irrespective of their nativity.

Whatever preferences may have been held by employers in the mid-twentieth century, they were illegalized by Title VII of the 1964 Civil Right Act which "prohibited all forms of discrimination" (Hill 1993). The passage of the Voting Rights Act, the next year, shored up a battery of federal laws mandating equality of opportunity for minorities, and in that same year the national and/or hemispheric origins were deemed unfit as a criteria for legal entry into the United States. In the years following there was a marked decline in the strength of association between the occupational achievements of parents and (adult) children (Hout 1988). The United States was becoming more "universalist" in both de jure and de facto senses—status seemed to be increasingly achieved rather than ascribed. To what extent have these developments shielded Black immigrants from entrenched patterns of Black exclusion and/or blotted out entrenched patterns of White privilege in the Post-Civil Rights Era? There is a limited body of work that has begun to address this question.

Suzanne Model (1997) employs 1990 U.S. Census and 1991 British Census data from New York and London to test the queue theory arguing that if Black Americans (and Puerto Ricans) are indeed "locked in the basement" of New York's occupational structure then there is no room down there for anyone else. The presence of this native minority should improve the occupational prospects of immigrants (i.e., all of the least desirable jobs and strata are already occupied leaving no place for immigrants to go but up). "The supposition tested [in the article] is that New York employers will rank African-Americans and Puerto Ricans at the bottom of the queue, an option closed to London employers.

And the New York groups ranked above these indigenous minorities will enjoy better job outcomes than will their compatriots in London" (Model 1997:540). Results from regression analysis indicate that African and West Indian immigrants fare better, occupationally[2], in New York City than in London. This relationship is particularly evident among men. It is concluded that these findings support the queue theory, but differential selectivity cannot be ruled out as an explanation of African and West Indian success in New York. The cross-national character of the study does, however, allow us to rule out "culture" as an explanation of Black immigrant success in New York. For example, if Jamaicans who migrate to New York fare better than those who migrate to London, we cannot say that the difference is due to different cultural values and norms Jamaican emigrants left the island with.[3] In any case, Model's (1997) findings seem to support the queue theory.

Interestingly, Model (1997) treats West Indians, Africans, and Irish simply as immigrants, neglecting to mention that the first two are Black immigrant groups and the latter is a White group. What is not said in this study, however, may be as important as what is. The results show that many immigrant groups, including Black groups, do better vis-à-vis the native-born White population in New York City whose lower occupational strata are filled by African-American and Puerto Ricans—facts Model (1997) highlights. However, regression results also suggest that foreign-born Irish, some of whom were likely undocumented (Corcoran 1993), fare better in New York than foreign-born West Indians and Africans net of age, education, and marital status. This is particularly true of Irish women. The most obvious explanation for the relative success of Irish immigrants is American racism which leads them to be mistaken for members of the majority while West Indian and African immigrants are mistaken for members of the "basement-dwelling" African-American population. If this is the case, the queueing that Model outlines may ultimately work *against* Black immigrants (particularly in the second generation)

[2] The International Socioeconomic Index (see Ganzeboom, DeGraff, and Treiman 1992) is employed in the Model (1997) study to standardize occupational attainment across the two countries.
[3] Interestingly, Irish women fare better in New York than in London as well. However, this may be due persisting prejudices and stereotypes (regarding the Irish) in English society.

rather than for them. In short, the experiences of Black and White immigrants are shaped by the fact that they are immigrants, but Blackness and Whiteness may differentiate their experiences.

Qualitative studies of Black immigrants and their children foretell grim prospects. In her study of 66 children of Black (mostly Dominican) immigrants living in New York City, Nancy Lopez (2003) uncovered common perception among the young men (18 to 30) she interviewed that things were not good and had gotten worse in terms of job opportunities. Even those with college educations felt that the only certainty in the labor market was that there would be jobs in the "corrections" industries. Interestingly, there was no evidence of a waning work ethic of these second generation men. Not a single respondent suggested that they would not do demeaning work or would do such work if only it paid more; one study participant said that he would do any job for minimum wage, but even minimum wage jobs were simply not to be found. Getting more education was viewed as *not* guaranteeing better employment opportunities. Women, on the other hand, were more optimistic—and for good reason. More of them were college educated AND employed. Affective bonds they had to teachers and family members seem to have been the difference. Their school experiences had led to meaningful ties with some teachers and even employers. Nonetheless, many of them were still relegated to low-wage "pink collar work." Throughout Lopez' study (2003) it is suggested (by the author and many of the respondents) that the pigeon-holing of these second generation Black young people is based largely on their appearance as Black people and persistent patterns of anti-Black prejudice and discrimination in American society.

Mary Waters (1999) acknowledges the shared struggles of Black Americans and Black immigrants but points out that, much like others, Black immigrants have tried to distance themselves from Black Americans in various ways. The truth of the matter is that Black Americans and Black immigrants are reared in vastly different social, cultural and historical contexts, and this may result in different orientations toward work. So the groups are "distant" from the beginning. In the eyes of White employers, however, the two groups may be one and the same. The charge of Black immigrants is to convince employers that they do not belong in the "basement" with Black Americans, and Waters (1999)

provides some evidence that they have. Below is an exchange between a 42-year old White male manager in New York City and an interviewer in Waters' (1999) study:

A: If I had one position open and if it was a West Indian versus an American Black, I'd go with the West Indian.
Q: And that's because of your experience working with people?
A: Yes. Their reliability, their willingness to do the job or what has to be done.
Q: Are their concrete statistics on this?
A: I don't have them. I just—it's just experience that they have different drive than American blacks. (Waters 1999:116).

These perceptions may at once be a cause and an effect of high labor force participation (13.4 percentage points higher in 1990) among Black immigrants relative to Black Americans.

Neither Waters (1999) nor Lopez (2003) compare the experiences of the Black immigrants in their samples to those of White immigrants residing in the city, but the fact of their absence in the worker ranks of the "American Food Corporation" (Waters 1999) or "Urban High School" belies an important difference between their experience and that of Black immigrant populations--White immigrants less often find themselves *hypersegregated* (Massey and Denton 1993) the way Black immigrants do. In any case, the work of Lopez paints a bleak picture of life as a Black (second generation) immigrant. While Waters' portrayal is less dismal, it does hint that the fate of Black immigrants may ultimately be bound up with that of Black Americans. In short, Black immigrants may be looked upon by the majority as Black first and immigrants second. In the second generation they are American-born Black people. These facts may be detrimental to the life chances of West Indians and Africans as they navigate a society which remains, in non-trivial ways, White supremacist and anti-Black.

The preceding pages have been devoted to providing background on occupational attainment and trends among immigrants. Now we turn to the business of intergenerational social mobility. That is, how much better or worse has the second generation done for itself than the first generation? And does the answer to this question vary by race? While the degree to which race impinges on the occupational

attainment is debatable, the extent to which race inhibits one's ability to pass on occupational status to one's children is another question. Hout (1988) demonstrated that with enough education, traditional ascriptive processes of occupational stratification seem to be overcome. This bodes well for highly educated immigrant groups. Model (1997) demonstrated that immigrants fare better in New York than in London irrespective of their color. However, her regression results hint that White (Irish) immigrants may have a more positive experience in the New York labor market than is true of Black (West Indian and African) immigrants. Waters (1999) and Lopez (2003) deal explicitly with the life chances of the children of Black immigrants and leave the reader with the impression that the future of the Black second generation is precarious.

The depth and insight of these studies contribute a great deal to our understanding of the lives of the Black second generation, but in order to get a complete picture we must leave New York. The story of the second generation must include flight from their parents' ports of entry. While at least half of the first generation Black population resided in the New York CMSA in 1980, by the late 1990's only about one-third of the second-generation resided there. New York City remains a vibrant bastion of immigrant cultures but the children of immigrants—Black and White—are moving away. The queues at work in New York City may not exist elsewhere, and elsewhere is where the second generation has headed. This fact justifies the use of national random sample data in order to assess the state of the second generation vis-à-vis the first.

This study is not the first to bring such data to bear on the question of status attainment and intergenerational mobility. Farley and Alba (2002) use Current Population Survey data from the late 1990's to demonstrate that, overall, the children of Afro-Caribbean immigrants were doing better than the immigrants themselves on a number of measures. The Afro-Caribbean second generation is distributed across occupations with an average SEI four points higher than those of their parents' generation—38 and 34, respectively. Despite this intergenerational improvement, second generation Afro-Caribbeans trail native born non-Hispanic Whites by one point (in terms of SEI). Further, they are more likely to be employed in "service, operative and laborer occupations" and less likely to be occupied in "executive,

managerial and professional occupations" (Farley and Alba 2002:689) than their native White counterparts. These differences are even more pronounced when age, education and marital status are controlled for. In fact, net of these considerations the SEI difference between second generation Afro-Caribbeans and "Third and Higher Generation Non-Hispanic Whites" goes from a single point to nearly ten points.

Farley and Alba (2002) also examine patterns of status attainment and mobility among immigrants from Europe and Canada who have an average SEI of 40, are more likely than native Whites to be employed in executive, managerial and professional occupations, but are also more likely to be employed in the less prestigious (and less well compensated) service, operative and laborer occupations. The children of these immigrants have an average SEI three points higher (43) and, unlike their parents, are underrepresented in the low status occupations. These findings hold when the effects of age, education and marital status are netted out.

Farley and Alba's is the most complete quantitative study of the second generation, in that, numerous racial/ethnic groups are hewn out of a large national random sample allowing for some generalization regarding the labor force experiences of the second generation: 1) the children of immigrants are doing better than immigrant themselves in terms of occupational attainment (among other things), 2) immigrants from European and Canada have higher SEI's, on average, than do Afro-Caribbeans and the differences between these groups grow substantially when age, education and marital status are held constant. These findings are important but they do not address the issue of race directly. That is, the comparison groups are based on responses to the origins of respondents and their parents with no reference to race, so phenotypically White respondents may be included in the Afro-Caribbean groups and phenotypically Black respondents could be included in the European and Canadian group. Furthermore, an important source of Black immigration is absent in the Farley and Alba (2002) study—Africa. This paper aims to assess the influence of race *irrespective of national origins*.

Hout's (1988) finding that origins seem to be overridden by college education may be less true in the case of Black Americans and Black immigrants—a possibility reflected in the comments of a 23-year old Dominican man in New York City: "Well my friend, he's about the same age as me, and he graduated from technical college and he was supposed to work as a computer technician and he ended up working as a mechanic where his father works" (Lopez 2003:143-144). On the basis of previous research—both qualitative and quantitative—we might expect to find that while the children of Black and White immigrants outperform their parents on occupational measures, White immigrants and their children will experience greater success overall because the "returns to their education" are greater than those of the Black immigrants and their children. We may take heart in the fact that Black immigrants seem to be getting educated (Farley and Alba 2002), but it is not clear that their education "pays" commensurately.[4]

***DATA AND METHODS***

To answer questions about occupational attainment, intergenerational mobility and the place of race in these processes we must 1) identify first/parental and second/offspring generations and 2) identify appropriate measures of occupational attainment. The above requirements are addressed in turn in the pages to follow.

The first of these tasks necessitates the use of the Current Population Survey (1996, 1998, 2000, 2002) data which is the only large national random sample survey that asks questions necessary to accurate identify the adult children of immigrants. Doing so requires that for each respondent we have "fathers place of birth" and "mothers place of birth." In this study the first generation is defined as all

[4] "Returns to education" may be influenced by "place of education." It may be that college graduates with degrees from foreign colleges and universities fare less well that those with degrees earned in the U.S. This hypothesis is supported by the recent work of Zeng and Xie (2003) who find that when "place of education" is held constant the Asian earning disadvantage disappears. However, for Blacks and Whites it is likely that race matters irrespective of place of education as is supported by the work of Dodoo and Takyi (2002) who find that Whites immigrants educated in Africa earn significantly more than Blacks immigrants educated in Africa.

foreign-born respondents who immigrated between 1960[5] and 1975 and were of childbearing age during any part of that interval and were, by 1996, still young enough for us to reasonably expect that they continue to participate in the labor force. By the year 2000 the vast majority of this group should range in age from 45 to 54. In other words, the first generation is comprised of those immigrants who are old enough and have been in the U.S. long enough to have American-born children who have reached adulthood. The second generation is defined as all American-born respondents between 25 and 39 years of age whose parents are foreign-born. The "2.5 generation" is comprised of American-born respondents between 25 and 39 years of age but who have one foreign-born and one American-born parent. Finally, native groups are included as points for comparison. These groups are comprised of respondents who are American-born and of American-born parentage. They are referred to as "third+ generation" since we know that they are *at least* of the third generation but are quite possibly of the fourth generation or beyond. The "third+ generation youth" are those third+ generation respondent between 25 and 39 years old while their "parents" generation is comprised of third+ generation respondents between 45 and 54 years of age. We are left with five groups whose criteria for membership are summarized in Table 1.

***Table 1. about here***

These groups are further dissagregated by race. Until 2003, the CPS used a single race question whose possible responses were White, Black, American Indian and Asian. A separate question was used to identify Hispanic origins. Without an "other" category as an option on the race question, the overwhelming majority of Hispanic respondents were coded "White" on the race question. This was true of 9 of 10 Puerto Ricans in the sample—a group typically treated as a racial minority in social science literature. Confusion around race led me to exclude Hispanic respondents from the study leaving us with

[5] 1965 or 1968 makes more sense here since these years mark the passage and full implementation of the Hart-Cellar Act, but by using 1960 we are able to capture a larger share of the White first generation which was less influenced by the immigration reforms. Unlike Black immigrants, White immigrants had been streaming into the U.S. in substantial number long before 1965.

Black and White non-Hispanics of five different generational groupings. Sample sizes for each of these ten *race-nativity* groups are displayed in Table 2. Labor outcomes will be assessed and compared across these groups.

***Table 2. about here***

This brings us the second methodological task—the identification of appropriate measures of occupational attainment, a term that is conceived of very broadly in the analysis to follow. Four labor related outcomes—labor force participation, employment, ethnic niche employment and Duncan's socioeconomic index (SEI)—are employed to answer the questions, who works? And who works in what kind of occupation? Occupational attainment and mobility both begin and end with labor force participation and employment; without them occupational attainment is moot. Labor force participation is used in the social sciences to mean the state of being employed OR actively seeking employment.[6] Those who do not participate in the labor force are predominantly children (not of legal working age), the disabled, and retirees. A significant share of the working age population do not participate in the labor force either—full-time students and parents being two common examples. However, there are other would-be workers who have (perhaps temporarily) given up on the labor market. The labor market participation of Black men fell from 84% in 1940 to 67% in 1980 (Wilson 1987:82) suggesting two things: more Black men were reaching retirement ages, and fewer working-age Black men were employed or looking for employment. By 1998 that figure was back up to 69% (Fullerton 1999)—a small increase which may partly reflect the very high labor force participation of foreign-born Black men and their children.

Once it is determined just who is in the labor market, the question becomes who has the most success in it? Success may be measured by rates of employment as well as continuous measures of

[6] It is important to note that labor force participation rates typically exclude institutional (i.e., prison) populations. Since Black Americans are more likely to spend time in prison than other Americans, their labor force participation is overestimated.

occupational attainment such as Duncan's SEI. Thusly, the questions to be answered in this paper have to do with the likelihood of labor force participation, the likelihood of employment and the levels of occupational attainment Black and White members of the American first, second, and third+ generations. The quality of immigrants' labor force experience is also addressed here by examining patterns of ethnic concentration in particular industries, occupations, or self-employment. Ethnic niches have served, historically, to advance immigrant populations economically, but persistence in such niches may reflect constrained occupational opportunities, which might, in turn, hinder socioeconomic assimilation. All said, this paper will address each of four substantive concerns related to occupational attainment and mobility—labor force participation, employment, employment in ethnic niches, and occupational attainment as captured by SEI. Each of these will be addressed in its own section which will be comprised of bivariate and multivariate analyses of race-nativity and one of these labor force outcomes.[7]

## *RESULTS*

Tables 3 and 4 provide a sense of how the ten race-nativity groups are doing on five measures of work status; they are identical save for the fact that Table 4 disaggregates results by gender—a difference with profound implications for the interpretations and conclusions drawn later in this paper. We turn first to the issue of labor force participation.

***Tables 3 and 4 about here***

### *Labor Force Participation across Race, Nativity and Gender*

According to the 2000 U.S. Census, 2.5% of Black Americans were confined to adult correctional facilities. The corresponding figure for White Americans was .4%. Since labor force participation rates do not include institutional populations in the numerator, they may over estimate actual labor force

[7] For the purposes of this paper, respondents above the age of 54 are excluded since above that age respondents are likely to be retired or disabled obscuring generational comparisons.

participation—especially among Black Americans. That said, labor force participation remains a fundamental measure of socioeconomic well-being for all but the wealthiest Americans. Low levels of participation may indicate that all avenues for employment have been exhausted with no success or, perhaps, high levels of frustration and/or disability in some groups.[8]

Table 3 indicates that 80% of first generation White cohorts are labor force participants compared to 85% for the rest of the White population. White second and third+ generation groups are identical on this measure suggesting that, in the space of a single generation, White immigrants have become indistinguishable from the "old stock" White Americans. The Black first generation (87%), on the other hand, is more likely than any other group of Black Americans to be active in the labor force. All in all, immigrants and their children experience labor force participation rates between 80 and 87%--not varying much across racial groups. These numbers, however, obscure important gender differences.

Turning to Table 4, a number of things are immediately apparent with regards to labor force participation. First, women are less often participants in the labor force than is true of men. This is the case within both Black and White groups, but is more pronounced among Whites. White men in the sample have labor force participation rates between 90 and 93 percent while White women have rates of between 72 and 79 percent. This gap of (at least) 11 percentage points may be partly attributable to traditional norms which discourage paid labor force participation among women—particularly White women (Geschwender and Carroll-Seguin 1990). Black men in the sample have labor force participation rates between 80 and 92 percent. Black women in the sample have labor force participation rates between 74 and 85 percent. So it seems that, as a rule, White men work more than White women, but the same does not hold true among Blacks in the sample. For example, in the second generation, Black women (85%) are more likely to participate in the labor force than are Black men (80%). In fact, Black second

[8] In a small number of cases non-labor force participation is reflective of wealth and investments sufficient to meet living costs. In a larger number of cases, especially for women, non-participation may be a function of marital and/or parental status and not reflective of frustration or exasperation with the labor force. The first of these categories is too small to warrant concern, and the second prompted me to exclude married women who are non-labor force participants from the analysis of income in other work (Emeka 2004). "Discouraged workers" constitute a large proportion of those not in the labor force, particularly among the younger (25-39) cohorts.

generation women are more likely to be active in the labor force than any other group of women in this study. Conversely, Black second generation men are less likely to participate in the labor force than any other group of men in the study. They are outdone by the White second generation men on this measure by a margin of 13 percentage points. This is somewhat surprising given that Black and White first generation men are practically identical in terms of labor force participation. These relationships are dramatized by Figure 1.

***Figure 1 about here***

With Black second generation groups all numbering less than one-hundred, there is a distinct possibility that racial and intergenerational differences observed here are reflective of sampling error. Figure 1 displays 90% confidence intervals to compensate for the small sample sizes in this study. When we observe non-overlapping intervals we can be 90% sure the observed difference would show up no matter what randomly drawn set of cases we chose. The mapping of these intervals onto a single graph is meant to make it easier to discern patterns of intergenerational improvement which seem to favor White women and disfavor Black men. That is, in the first generation White women experience a low level of labor force participation but in the second they exhibit rates that match those of native White women of native parentage. Second generation Black men, on the other hand, seem to exhibit lower labor force participation than their fathers' generation. White men and Black women do not exhibit pronounced patterns of intergenerational mobility one way or the other. (It is important to note, in any case, that the overlapping intervals in Figure 1 mean that no second generation group is better or worse off than their first generation counterparts to a degree that is statistically significant.)

Bivariate results, however, may obscure our view of the causal mechanisms at work here. There are a number of reasons the findings described above might not surprise the astute reader. First, it was established in other work that while Black immigrants and their children were more likely to graduate college than most of their age-mates, they were less likely to graduate high school (Emeka 2004). A high

incidence of high school drop out, it makes sense, would lead to lower levels of labor force participation. This is born out in the statistics presented in Table 3. Second, Black immigrants and their children are more heavily concentrated in central cities, in general, and New York City, in particular. Whatever, the New York and/or central cities economies are doing (i.e., downsizing, deindustrializing, out-sourcing) will disproportionately impact Black immigrants and their children. Lastly, we know that marriage is less prevalent among Blacks than is true of Whites (see Table 5), which may partly explain why Black immigrant women and their daughters are more likely to participate in the labor force than are White women. These possibilities are addressed statistically by controlling for high school and college graduation, central city residence, New York City residence, and marital/family status in three logistic regressions estimating the odds of labor force participation.

***Table 5 about here***

Table 6 displays results from four models predicting labor force participation among women and Table 7 does the same for men.[9] Most of the racial and generational differences observed in the bivariate case persist when education, place of residence, and family status are controlled, but are not statistically significant. They are, nonetheless, worthy of our attention; but first let us examine the effects of the other covariates.

***Tables 6 and 7 about here***

For both men and women, high school and college education have significant effects on labor force participation. Interestingly, high school graduation seems to have a more pronounced effect than college graduation, especially for women. High school graduates are more than twice as likely as non-

[9] Only respondents under the age of 55 are included because after that age there is a sharp increase in labor force disengagement—resulting from retirement and disability—which could obscure intergenerational comparisons.

graduates to be labor force participants (all else being equal). As we will see, it takes a high school diploma to be employable and a college degree to get a *good* job. In any case, the fact that Black immigrants and their children are less likely to have graduated from high school than White immigrants and their children reduces the unexplained variance (or, more precisely, the -2 Log Likelihood) considerably.

Surprisingly, residence in the New York CMSA is associated with lower rates of labor force participation. While men in New York appear no different from those in other regions (in terms of labor force participation), women in New York are substantially less likely to participate in the labor force than other women. Central city residence[10] has a negative effect on labor force participation for both men and women. This may, on its face, seem to be an indicator of poverty, but it should be pointed out that it may also reflect prosperity. Central cities are home to very wealthy families who are in the uncommon position of having a single earner and/or investment portfolio sufficient to support an entire household—making labor force participation optional for all other members of that family or household. However, we can be sure that the overwhelming majority of would-be workers in central cities (and New York City more particularly) who have withdrawn from the labor force have done so out of frustration (Wilson 1996). In any case, the overrepresentation of Black immigrants and their children in New York City and central cities, more generally, may be driving racial and generational differences in labor force participation observed here.

Finally, there is the matter of family status. To analyze the effects thereof, I include a set of dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is single with no children, single with children, married with no children, or married with children—the last of these is treated as the referent. As we might guess, the effects of family status on labor force participation varies dramatically by gender: men who are married and have children are significantly *more* likely to participate in the labor force than other men, while women who are married and have children are significantly *less* likely to participate in the labor force than other women. The direction of causation is difficult to assess in the case of men. Are

[10] That is, residence in *any* central city, not just New York City.

they in the labor force *because* they are married and have kids? Or are they married with children *because* they are in the labor force? As a matter of expediency, these questions are not taken up here. In any case, the fact that White groups are overrepresented in "married with children" category may be driving the racial differences in labor force participation observed in the bivariate case.

In short, the fact that Black men are less likely to participate in the labor force may have a great deal to do with the fact that they are more often residents of central cities, and they are less often high school graduates who are married and have children (see Table 5) than is true of their White counterparts. Black women may be more likely than White women to participate in the labor force partly because they are less likely to be married than White women.

For women, the inclusion of education, place of residence and family status in the multivariate analysis of labor force participation increases the variance explained (McFadden's pseudo-$R^2$) by a factor of more than 40—from .1% to 4.2%. Interestingly, these three factors influence the labor force participation of men and women differently. Model fit statistics near the bottom of Table 6 tell us that, for women, the inclusion of race-nativity, education, place of residence and family status accounts for 4.2% of the unexplained variance (-2 log likelihood) observed in the null model. For men (Table 7) that figure is 6.4% suggesting that our ability to accurately predict labor force participation is better for men than women when we have only information regarding race, nativity, education, place of residence, and family status. On closer inspection of Tables 6 and 7 we can see that the impact of each block of variables also differs by gender. For women, nearly two-thirds (65%) of the variance explained by the variables in the fully specified model is explained by education; the other third is explained almost entirely by family status (32%). The race-nativity variables account for only 2% of the explained variance, and place of residence only 1%. Turning to Table 7, we can see the same is not true of men. The effects of education, family status, and place of residence have roughly the same amount of explanatory power for men as they do for women, but there is a pronounced difference with regards to race-nativity. The inclusion of the race-nativity dummies in the women's equation explains about 2% of the variance accounted for by the fully specified model. The inclusion of the race-nativity variables in the

men's equation explains 29% of the variance accounted for in the fully specified model. If women's race-nativity had the same impact the pseudo-$R^2$'s for men and women would be nearly identical with the women's figure at 6%--very close to the men's figure of 6.4%.

Tables 8 and 9 display results from regression runs in which race and nativity are treated separately rather than as a set of interactions. This way we can see how much of the race-nativity effect is nativity-based and how much has to do with race. It appears that while neither race nor nativity is a pivotal factor in the prediction of labor force participation among women, for men about three-quarters of the race-nativity effect is attributable to race.[11] Among men, important racial differences in labor force participation persist even when nativity, education, family status and place of residence are held constant.

***Tables 8 and 9 about here***

The presence of sociodemographic covariates in the regression model reduces many of the racial and generational differences discussed in the preceding pages to statistical insignificance. This may be largely due to the very small sample sizes of Black immigrants, which make it difficult to reject the null hypothesis. Despite this difficulty, at least one statistically significant and substantively important racial difference persists. Figure 2 illustrates generational and racial patterns of labor force participation after educational, residential, and familial influences are netted out.

***Figure 2 about here***

Figure 2 displays confidence intervals around predicted probabilities of labor force participation (calculated using exponentiated beta coefficients from logistic regressions which control for education, place of residence and family status). Intervals that do not overlap in these figures indicate that

[11] This is true regardless of the order in which race and nativity are introduced into the model.

corresponding groups have different levels of labor force participation when all else is equal, and that the difference is statistically significant (at α=.10) meaning that the difference is most likely "real."

Figure 2 illustrates the relative position of the ten race-nativity groups for men and women, respectively. It appears that while predicted probabilities of labor force participation are higher among Black first and second generation women than is true of White first and second generation, those differences also fail to meet the α=.1 criterion for statistical significance. This disaggregation increases standard errors for all ten coefficients making it still more difficult to find statistically significant differences. Figure 2, however, does expose one important difference that is robust; *while Black and White first generation men do not differ significantly in terms of labor force participation, Black second generation men are significantly less likely to participate in the labor force than White second generation men even when education, place of residence, and family status are held constant*.

In sum, there is no convincing evidence of a substantial increase or decrease in labor force participation across generations, and this is true for both Black and White groups. This should not come as a great surprise, as labor force participation is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for survival in industrial economies. This is no less true for older people than for younger people. Nonetheless, this analysis uncovers a disturbing phenomenon; while Black and White women seem not to differ significantly in terms of labor force participation once education and family status are controlled for, Black second generation men have fared significantly worse than White second generation men—a finding consistent with the qualitative evidence and arguments leveled by Lopez (2003).

***Employment across Race, Nativity and Gender***

While it is important to know whether immigrants and their children participate in the labor force, it is at least as important to assess the quality of their experiences in it. Thusly, I seek to answer the question: Among those participating in the labor force, how prevalent is actual employment, and how is employment influenced by race, nativity and other relevant factors?

As was mentioned earlier, labor force participation includes employment as well as the act of looking for employment. So the labor force always includes some number of unemployed persons. The question is, are these persons disproportionately foreign-born? Children of the foreign-born? Black? If the queueing theory outlined earlier holds, we should expect to find high employment among "favored" groups (i.e., native born Whites of native-born parentage) and low levels of employment among traditionally excluded groups (i.e., native born Blacks of native parentage). The question for immigrants is, will White immigrants melt into the favored group and experience "White privilege" in the labor market? Will Black immigrants melt into the traditionally excluded Black American group and experience less success in the labor market?[12] This section begins to answer these questions by looking at the respective rates of employment for each of the ten race-nativity groups by gender and goes on to assess the extent to which any race-nativity differences observed in the bivariate case are functions of educational, residential or familial characteristics of the various groups. The analysis to follow includes only those who are in the labor force.

Percentages in Table 3 suggest that Black respondents are as much as twice as likely as Whites to have been unemployed at the time of the Current Population Survey (March of 1996, 1998, 2000 or 2002). Whites were employed at rates between 96% and 98%; Blacks were employed at rates between 91% and 95%. However, these numbers are a bit misleading; when they are disaggregated by gender more pronounced inequities emerge.

Figure 3 displays employment rates from Table 4 with 90% confidence intervals. The upper panel tells us that the employment rates are higher among White immigrant women than among White women of the second generation. The opposite is true of Black immigrant women and their American-born daughters whose observed employment rate is as high as any group in the study. Add to this the fact

[12] For the purposes of this study, this question is less of personal identity, which is formulated and maintained in each persons psyche, and more one of social identity which is formulated (at least in part) by society and imposed on the individual. Thus the process of "melting" that I refer to here may not be a volitional process whereby a White immigrant decides to become a White American or a Black immigrant a Black American. Rather it may be a process whereby teachers, employers, and other traditional authorities categorize them in those ways to such an extent that their respective socioeconomic profiles begin to mirror those of their proximal hosts (see Mittelberg and Waters 1991).

that 85% of them are in the labor force and one can see that about five-sixths (83%) of them are employed—a number that, as we will see, far outstrips that of their male counterparts. They seem to have experienced more success than their mothers and fathers in finding employment.[13] The same cannot be said of Black second generation men. The lower panel of Figure 3 evidences stark racial and generational differences that do not bode well for the Black immigrant progeny. The employment rates for White men are very similar across generations—very high (observed rates of 96-98%). Among Black men, however, there is a distressing pattern of low and declining rates of employment rates across the generations. 93% of Black first generation men are employed while only 85% of Black second generation men are so fortunate. The figure for Black second generation men with one American-born parent was similarly low at 88%--leaving the second generation groups with unemployment rates three times as great as their White counterparts. This is particularly alarming since the Black second generation men in the labor force are a select group, as 20% are not even present in the labor force—meaning that *only about two-thirds of Black second generation men in this sample were employed at the time they were surveyed*. While there is no distinct pattern of intergenerational mobility on this measure for Whites, there does seem to be a pattern of downward mobility between generations of Black men and a pattern of upward mobility between generations of Black women (important patterns that are missed when data are not disaggregated by gender). Next, we will see whether these patterns persist when other socioeconomic and demographic factors are accounted for.

***Figure 3 about here***

As in the case of labor force participation, we may expect that differences in mean levels of education between the ten comparison groups explain some of the "employment gap." The labor market

[13] Now we can start talking about intergenerational mobility since, unlike labor force participation, employment can be reflective of nothing but success. Going from not participating in the labor force to participating may be an indicator of financial distress. For those already in the labor force the goal is to be employed, so moving from the ranks of the unemployed to the ranks of the employed can only be a good thing.

conditions in New York disproportionately affect Black immigrants and their offspring who tend to be overrepresented there. Family status may also have some sway. For men, marriage and parenthood may be taken by prospective employers as signs of stability and commitment to the labor force while for women they may be taken as signs of fleeting attachment to the workplace. This may lead men to have more favorable experiences in the labor force in many ways, and at the same time lead women to be "mommy tracked" into part-time and/or temporary work with little opportunity for advancement. The high-turnover and temporary nature of this work may lead to higher rates of unemployment among married women (and especially those with young children). Controlling for family status, then, may reduce the gap observed between Black and White women observed in the bivariate case.

Figure 4 is graphic representation of predicted probabilities from a logistic regression predicting employment among those who are in the labor force—education, residence and family status being held constant. The upper panel shows no pronounced pattern of racial or intergenerational inequality, but on closer inspection there are some noteworthy findings reflected. Among White women it appears that the older among them (irrespective of nativity) have better luck finding and/or maintaining employment. However, employment rates are highly associated with age and experience so the difference observed here may be more reflective of the fact that the younger women have not reached their most productive/marketable years yet. Instead they are entering or re-entering the paid labor force after family or school related hiatuses. By the time women reach their forties and fifties they may be more likely to have re/established careers and less likely to be seen as "temporary employees" by prospective employers. Patterns are less clear among Black women due especially to the small number of Black second generation women which undermines our ability to confidently generalize on the basis of observed differences. While the odds of employment are high for Black second generation women in this sample (indeed, higher than any other group of women), there is at least a 10% chance that this finding is due to bias or error in the random sample.

***Figure 4 about here***

The lower panel in Figure 4 displays confidence intervals (about predicted probabilities) for men. There is a more uniform pattern here whereby younger men tend not to fare as well as older men. However, there are no statistically significant intergenerational differences among Black men or among White men (save for those between American-born young people and their American-born parents). As in the case of labor force participation, however, *employment rates are significantly lower among Black second generation men than is true of the White second generation men net of education, residence, and family status*.[14] They are no better off on this measure than their Black American counterparts. So again we find that whatever differences there are between second generation Black and White women, they probably favor the former while the reverse is true of men for whom being Black is detrimental.

It should also be noted that race, nativity, and family status seem to have different impacts on rates of employment among men and women. Taken together the independent variables account for about 5% of the variability of employment (see column 5, rows 4 and 9 in Table 10). However, the share of the variance explained by race-nativity, education, place of residence and family status varies by gender. For both men and women, education is the most powerful determinant of employment, accounting for better than two-fifths (43 to 44 percent) of the explained variance. Place of residence does not explain much for either men or women. Interestingly, for both men and women, there is a positive association between marriage and employment.[15] For women, race-nativity is the second most important influence accounting for another 38%; family status accounts for another 17%. For men, these influences are not quite the same, as race-nativity accounts for less (25%) and family status accounts for more (30%). Table 11 provides evidence to suggest that race (Black=1, White=0) is the more powerful piece of the race-nativity effect.[16]

[14] This is reflected in the fact that their confidence intervals, as represented in Figure 4, do not overlap. The same would be true were the 95% applied.
[15] Again, this raises the question of causal direction. It is just as likely that people get married and have children because they have stable jobs as it is that people get stable jobs because they are married and have children.
[16] This is true no matter which variable—race or nativity—is introduced into the model first.

***Tables 10 and 11 about here***

All of this said, taking these influences into account does not change the fact that Black men of two foreign-born parents fare worse in terms or both labor force participation and employment than do White men of two foreign-born parents. American social scientists have repeatedly documented disparate labor force experiences between Black and White Americans. Specifically, Black American men have continued to suffer a significant "employment disadvantage" that is robust across regions (D'Amico and Maxwell 1995; Moss and Tilly 1993; Petterson 1998). The experience of Black immigrant men appears to have conformed to this pattern. Black second generation women, on the other hand, seem to do as well as, if not better than, all other groups of women included in this study. Of course, these findings are empty without knowing what *kind* of work they are finding (or not finding).

***Ethnic Niche- and Self-Employment across Race, Nativity and Gender***

There are a number of reasons to predict that the kind of work available to immigrants and their offspring would be limited both by race and nativity. Numerous immigrants have gained footing in the American economy through self-employment and ethnic niches to avoid the discrimination often encountered by new immigrants in the mainstream labor force. Self-employment and ethnic niche-employment need not be looked upon as defeat, but rather as rational strategies for success developed by immigrants. Bonacich (1973) referred to such immigrants as "middleman minorities" who, through self-employment and ethnic niche-employment, propelled themselves up and away from the bottom of the economic ranks while "staying out of the way" of majority workers (see also Boyd 2001).[17] Only when such avenues become involuntary do they take on the character of a *caste*. The imposition of *caste systems* was a means by which "higher paid labor [could] deal with the undercutting potential of [minority] cheaper labor" (Bonacich 1972:555) where the total exclusion of cheap/minority labor was not possible. Under such circumstances "the higher paid group controls certain jobs exclusively and gets paid

[17] An idea also put forward by Lieberson (1980) in the conclusion of "A Piece of the Pie."

at one set scale of wages, while the cheaper group is restricted to another set of jobs and is paid at a lower scale. The labor market split is submerged because the differentially priced workers ideally never occupy the same position" (Bonacich 1972:555). While a proper "split labor market" was no longer legal or viable by 1965, a "submerged labor market split" may have impinged upon the occupational opportunities and attainments of immigrants in the immediate Post-Civil Rights Era. Thusly, we have to ask the questions: To what extent have recent immigrants found themselves concentrated into a few industries or lines of work, and can they or their children get out? Also, is their ability to do so influenced by race? Have recent Black and White immigrants begun to move upward through occupational queues, or does a submerged labor market split prevail in the Post-Civil Rights Era?

It is clear in Table 4 that self-employment is not a prominent feature of the recent immigrant experience. While White immigrant men (16%) are slightly more likely than their native-born age-mates (14%) to be self-employed, second generation White men (7%) are half as likely as their fathers' generation to be self-employed and no more likely than their counterparts of American-born parentage. They do not appear to be "stuck" in such pursuits. Nor do White women. For Black immigrants as well as native Blacks of native parentage, self-employment is rare (9 to 10% for men and 2 to 4% for women), and among younger cohorts it is also uncommon. However, young Black women (second and third+ generation) are slightly more likely to be self-employed than those of their mother's generation, possibly signaling more autonomy among the daughters of immigrants and more financial wherewithal among women more generally. In any case, neither White nor Black immigrants seem to be preponderant in self-employment suggesting that other occupational opportunities must be available to them.

Logan, Alba and McNulty (1994) use industry designations from the census to define ethnic niches. Industries in which a particular ethnic group is overrepresented by 50%[18] or more are treated as niches. The Current Population Survey data provides industry information as well, allowing us to identify

[18] 1.5 times as many of that group's members are found in a given industry as you would expect to find if they were distributed across industries in a way that mirrors the distribution of the general population.

ethnic niches in the same way. The variable employed here has 23 industry categories.[19] By dividing the percentage of immigrants (Black or White, male or female) in each of the 23 categories by the percentage of total population in each category, we can get a sense of how many more or less immigrants there are in each category than there would be if everyone had the same chances of ending up in each of the categories. Basically, a ratio of percentages is used to determine niche industries where a figure of 2 means that immigrants are twice as likely as "all Americans" to be employed in the corresponding industry. Table 12 lists all industries in which Black and White immigrants are overrepresented by gender (emboldened are the names of industries which meet the 1.5 criterion). In the interest of space, I will not go into the nature of each of these categories. Black immigrant women are concentrated in hospital, medical (non-hospital), private household, transportation, and utilities and sanitary service industries. Black immigrant men are overrepresented in social services, hospital, transportation, medical, educational, finance, insurance and real estate industries. White immigrant women are overrepresented (though only marginally) in manufacturing and personal services while White immigrant men tend to concentrate in medical and other professional industries. The pressing question here is to what extent have the children of these immigrants remained in these industries?

***Table 12 about here***

Returning to Table 4, column 4, it is clear that employment in niches is much more common among Black than White immigrants. Among immigrants, only 12% of White men and 13% of Women work in industries in which they are overrepresented while 44% of Black men and 49% of Black women find themselves in such industries. An intergenerational migration out of these industries would not necessarily signal upward mobility, but would indicate a greater range of employment opportunities for the children of immigrants than the immigrants themselves.

[19] There are industry variables with more refined categories available, but the small sample sizes in this study preclude their use here.

As a rule, second generation figures for niche employment "regress to the mean." That is, from the first generation to the second, employment in the niches outlined above seems to decrease and approach the figures for the general population. The best examples of this are observed among women. Thirteen percent of White immigrant women are employed in manufacturing and personal service work, but in the second generation 8 to 9% of White women are found in those industries—a number that is virtually identical to that for all women. In the case of Black women, nearly half (49%) of the first generation group is employed in one of the niche industries identified in Table 12, but by the second generation, less than a quarter (21 to 23%) are found in those industries—20% of all women are found in these industries. A similar pattern is observed among White men but not Black men. 44% of first generation Black men are employed in the six niche industries identified above—a figure that is twice as high as that for the total population. Unlike other second generation groups, second generation Black men seem to stay in their fathers' industries with a figure of 40%. Those members of the Black second generation who have one American-born parent, however, are no different from the general population on this count.

In sum, White immigrants appear far less likely than Black immigrants to concentrate in a small set of industries and by the second generation they are practically indistinguishable from the general population in terms of their distribution across industries. Black immigrants seem to have a much different experience, with nearly half of them working in industries in which Black immigrants are overrepresented. By the second generation, Black women seem to have moved out of their mothers' industries with distributions across the industries that are comparable to that of the general population. Black men of the second generation, however, seem to have remained in their fathers' industries. Thus, Black men of the second generation are less likely to participate in the labor force, less likely to be employed, and less likely to have transcended their fathers' industries.

***Black and White Immigrants and Occupational Stratification***

Before we can decide whether the waning or persistence of industrial niches is really bad news we must take a close look at occupation. Each industry has its own occupational structure(s). A Black man who works in a hospital as an administrator and whose father works in a hospital as an orderly has certainly experienced upward mobility but has done so without leaving his father's industry. Therefore, it is important we ask, what is the quality of immigrants' occupations and how does it compare to that of their adult children?

Assessing the quality of occupations has been something of an industry within the discipline of sociology. Subjective and objective measures have been employed to rank occupations. Early measures were based on survey questions asking respondents to rate the prestige of various occupations. In doing so it was found that there was a great deal of consistency in these rankings. In the 1950's it was found that these rankings were highly correlated with the average levels of education and income associated with those occupations (Blau and Duncan 1967). This finding ushered in the era of Duncan's socioeconomic index (SEI) which used average educational and income levels for each occupation to assign each a number which ordered them continuously from the lowest status to the highest status occupation. Since attaining prestige rankings for several hundred occupations through surveys was impractical and census data allowed for the easy calculation of average educational and income levels of all occupations, the SEI became a favorite of social scientists. Furthermore, the SEI consistently ranked occupations in a manner very similar to prestige scores based on surveys of the general public. This was an enormous step towards solving analytical problems associated with assessing the causes and effects of membership in hundreds of discrete occupational categories. While there has been debate about the form and function of the SEI (see Hauser and Warren 1997) it is used in this study to assess the "quality" of the labor force experience among Black and White immigrants in the pages to follow.

Returning to Table 4 we can see that whatever intergenerational mobility occurring is driven largely by the elevated occupational attainment of second generation women vis-à-vis their mothers. All second generation groups (Black and White, male and female) have average SEI's of 42—a figure that

outstrips that for any other group(s). Notice that for White 2.5 generation men and women the average SEI is identical. Black 2.5 generations, however, do considerably worse with mean SEI's of 38 for both men and women. This may be because when White immigrants marry non-immigrants they marry native Whites and thus increase the chance that any children they have will benefit from both "immigrant optimism" and "White privilege." Black immigrants who outmarry, on the other hand, may be likely to marry native Blacks and perhaps expose their children to the countervailing forces of "immigrant optimism," institutionalized racism and "oppositional culture." In any case, the second generation has outperformed the first on this measure, and this is particularly true of women who have outdone their mothers by 4 to 8 points. Evidence of intergenerational mobility among men on this measure is tenuous at best. Second generation men have mean SEI's 1 to 2 points higher than those of their fathers, and the 2.5 generation men show no improvement over their fathers.[20] Nonetheless, it is important to note that, as a rule, the children of Black and White immigrants outperform the children of the American-born on this measure.

In order to assess differences net of relevant social, economic and demographic characteristics, ordinary least squares regression will be used. The models will emulate those in Tables 6 and 7 with the exception that a dummy variable for niche employment[21] will be included to examine the relationship between niche-employment and occupational attainment. I have made much of the fact that second generation Black men seem to have remained in the same industries as their fathers, but it is not clear that this is a bad thing. By including this dummy variable we can find out. If the assumptions of Lieberson's queue theory hold, we might expect to find that the "niche" variable acts differently upon members of different race-nativity groups. Specifically, we might expect that Whites in industries in which Blacks

[20] It is quite possible that this will change over time as members of the second generation are still in the early stages of their careers unlike members of the older (first and third+ generation) groups most of whom have gone as high as they will go occupationally.

[21] Because the White niches capture only very small fractions of the labor force I have chosen to look at the influence of employment in industries where first generation Black immigrants are overrepresented. First generation Black men **and** women are overrepresented in the Social Service, Hospital, Medical (non-hospital), Transportation and Private Household work. Anyone who is employed in one of these industries gets a one on the "niche" variable.

(irrespective of nativity)[22] are overrepresented fare better than Whites in other industries. Interaction terms (race-nativity*niche) are included to test this expectation.

Figure 5 displays predicted SEI by race-nativity group with 90% confidence intervals. The coefficients mapped here are from models (1 in Tables 13 and 14) containing only race-nativity covariates (education, residence, family status, and niche status are not included). In effect, Figure 5 displays observed mean SEI for men and women with 90% confidence intervals. In the case of women, many of the differences highlighted in the previous paragraphs appear to be statistically significant. First generation Black and White women are outdone by their daughters to a degree that meets the significance criteria employed here. This is especially noteworthy for Black women where small samples make it difficult to generate statistically significant results. Second generation men are also doing better than their third+ generation counterparts. The case of men, as mentioned earlier, reflects less intergenerational mobility. Among White men, SEI's vary somewhat from generation to generation but are statistically indistinguishable.[23] The exception to this is the White third+ generation (25-39) group which is doing significantly worse than all other groups of White men. Black men can be characterized similarly; first and second generation groups are statistically indistinguishable while the third+ generation groups are doing significantly worse in terms of SEI.

***Tables 13 and 14 about here***

***Figure 5 about here***

Figure 6 displays 90% confidence intervals for mean SEI when education, residence, family status, and niche employment are controlled. As we might expect, race-nativity differences moderate when these covariates are included. This is evident in the increased amount of overlap between the

[22] Interestingly, of the five industries Black immigrants are overrepresented in, the larger Black (native) population is also overrepresented in four—hospital, transportation, social services, and private household work. Whites are overrepresented in none of these.

[23] Of course, intergenerational comparisons are significantly influenced by the fact that the second generation cohorts are younger than the first and so, in many cases, have not reached their highest occupational status.

confidence intervals. While the same general patterns are clear, they are less marked and less often statistically significant. Among women the large differences between first and second generations observed in Figure 5 are still evident but are reduced to statistical insignificance. Nor are there any statistically significant differences between second and third+ generation women once education, residence, family status and niche employment are controlled. Among men it remains clear that the Black second generation outperforms the third+ generation groups. A similar but less obvious pattern is evident among White second and third+ generation groups.

***Figure 6 about here***

In sum, with regards to occupational attainment, first and second generation men (irrespective of race) do not differ significantly. The second generation does, however, outperform its third+ generation counterparts (particularly the younger of them). Among women, there are relatively large differences in SEI between the first and second generations which are reduced considerably by the inclusion of additional socioeconomic variables in the regression analysis. A close look at Table 13 reveals that the introduction of education variables is chiefly responsible for this reduction. In fact, they account for 93% of the variance explained. In Model 1 we can see that the gap between the White first and second generation is nearly 6 points (3.62 – (-2.12)) on the SEI scale. Model 2 introduces dummy variables indicating High School and College Graduation which reduces this gap dramatically—from just under 6 points to just over 2 points (.61 – (-1.43)). The same happens for Black first and second generation women—the SEI gap is more than 8 points in Model 1 and less than 4 points in Model 2. The introduction of education dummies into the men's model has an effect of the same valence but of not nearly the magnitude (see Table 14).

As was mentioned earlier, the effects of ethnic niche employment are of particular importance here because of its implications for "queuing theory." To address these effects we turn to Table 15 which displays coefficients from OLS runs which include both men and women. (It can be seen in Tables 13

and 14 that the effects of niche employment are similar across gender.) Recall that niche employment refers to all paid labor in social service, hospital, medical (non-hospital), transportation and private household industries (those in which Black immigrants are overrepresented by a factor of 1.5 or greater). Employment in these industries is positively associated with SEI which is reflected in a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Table 15, Model 6. However, "queuing theory" posits that members of ethnic minorities, Black people, in particular, tend to be disfavored in hiring and promotion processes across industries. In the industries they occupy, then, Blacks will tend to cluster near the bottom of the occupational structure leaving room for non-Blacks only in higher strata. In this sense, immigrants (assuming they are deemed more desirable than Blacks) and other non-Black minorities may benefit by locating themselves in industries in which Blacks are overrepresented. In statistical terms, there may be interaction effects between niche employment and race-nativity such that Whites (immigrants and otherwise) do better in industries where Blacks are overrepresented and Blacks do worse. The question becomes, are Black immigrants lumped in with Blacks and passed over by other immigrants or are they lumped in with immigrants, themselves passing over native Blacks?

***Table 15 about here***

Model 7 in Table 15 addresses these questions by including interaction terms for niche employment and nine (of ten) race-nativity groups (the effects of niche employment on the tenth is captured in the "Black Niche Industries" coefficient). The results seem to support the queuing theory. Starting with the "Black Niche Industries" coefficient we can see that the effect of employment in Black niche is positive and statistically significant. Since the effects of Black niche employment for all other groups are captured in the interaction terms below it, the "Black Niche Industries" coefficient captures the effects of employment in these industries for White Third+ Generation Parents only. They have achieved occupational standings an average of 1.4 points higher than those employed elsewhere. This effect is even stronger for White Immigrants who gain 5 points (1.44 + 3.54) for being employed in a Black niche.

The advantage is not as great for the White second generation but is still significant. All White groups in this study are better off for working in industries where Black immigrants are overrepresented. The same cannot be said for Black groups. Black immigrants themselves, appear to have SEI's that are, on average, 3 points ((-4.45) + 1.44) lower than there non-niche peers. The Black second generation appears to benefit from employment in the Black niches. However, while its coefficient is large, it is not statistically significant; nor is that for the 2.5 generation. Black third+ generation groups seem not to benefit either. If they do benefit from employment in these industries, their benefit is significantly smaller than that of White third+ generation parents. Black third+ generation parents appear to be worse off for working in social service, hospital, medical (non-hospital), transportation and private household industries in that their negative (and statistically significant) coefficient is larger than the positive slope enjoyed by White third+ generation parents. In short, whatever occupational benefits there are to working in Black niche industries, they are primarily enjoyed by Whites.

***Occupational Returns to Education across Race, Nativity and Gender***

Finally, it is important to note that occupational returns to education (among first and second generation labor force participants) seem not to vary by race. As was suggested earlier in this paper, native Black men do not fare as well as native White men even when education is held constant. The fourth column in Table 16 demonstrates this point. White third+ generation youth (25-39) with college degrees have a mean SEI of 50.6 while Black third+ generation college graduates have mean score of 46.6—a deficit of four points. Similar deficits are not apparent when comparing Black and White second generation groups. In fact, Black male second generation college graduates (56.3) outscore all other groups in the study—male or female. Among high school educated men (column 5 in Table 16) a similar pattern is evident with higher scores for White third+ generation men than for Black third+ generation men, but very similar scores for Black and White first and second generation groups. Among non-graduates, however, Black second generation men have occupational attainments that are more similar to native Blacks than to Whites. All of this would seem to suggest a bifurcation of the "new Black second

generation" whereby Black immigrant men either fare very well, elevating themselves above the achievements of most other groups in society, or very poorly, finding themselves mired in unemployment and underemployment on par with the achievements of their slave-descended brethren. Among women, there appears to be no White advantage except when comparing Black and White third+ generations groups.

***Table 16 about here***

***DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS***

This paper began by posing three questions regarding the experiences of recent immigrants and their children. Previous studies suggest that, on the whole, upward mobility is more likely than downward mobility across generations (especially in groups with high incidence of college completion in the second generation), and that women were particularly prone to such improvements (Hout 1988). However, other authors suggest the processes of intergenerational mobility are not race-neutral. Historically, Black migrants (from the American south) experienced lower "returns to education" than European (White) immigrants (Lieberson 1980). Though recent Black immigrants seem to have distinguished themselves from their Black American-born counterparts in terms of identity and socioeconomic status (Waters 1999; Model 1997; Kalmijn 1996; Dodoo 1997), there is some evidence to suggest that recent White immigrants (men, in particular) have fared better. All of this led me to predict a less favorable pattern of occupational achievement across generations among recent Black immigrants than that observed among recent White immigrants. This prediction finds support here.

In order achieve occupationally, one must participate in the labor force. Disability and discouragement sometimes prevent individuals from doing so. Interestingly, evidence uncovered here suggests that Black second generation women are more likely than any other group of women under study here to participate in the paid labor force, but the opposite is true of Black second generation men who are the least likely of all groups of men in this study to be labor force participants. Employment is also

particularly low among Black second generation men. In fact, at the time they were surveyed, only about two-thirds (68%) of Black second generation men were actually working. The corresponding figure for White second generation men was in excess of seven-eighths (89%). Differences were far less pronounced in the first generation and among women, and some such differences seem to favor Black (female) groups. But what of job quality?

Duncan's Socioeconomic Index (updated by Hauser and Warren in 1997) is used to assess the quality of jobs among labor force participants and it is found that on this measure, Black and White immigrants do not differ very much all else being equal. Interestingly, when we consider only those in the labor force, Black first and second generation respondents—including men—do at least as well as their White counterparts. This is true at all levels of education except the lowest. That is, Black and White immigrants who are college and/or high school graduates find themselves, on average, in similar occupational positions. However, among non-graduates Whites seem to have a significant occupational advantage. This fact is of tremendous gravity given that Black second generation men are significantly less likely to graduate high school than White second generation men. Further, in light of the low levels of labor force participation and high levels of unemployment among Black second generation men documented earlier, their situation warrants concern.

Lastly, a word on ethnic niches and their role in ethnic occupational stratification. It has been suggested that the early twentieth century workplace was comprised partly of industrial niches and ethnic queues which were used by immigrants to gain toeholds in the American economy and by employers to maintain cheap yet productive labor forces. Evidence provided here suggests that by the year 2000 there were still a number of industries in which Black immigrants were overrepresented. In fact, nearly half of the Black first generation cohorts in this study worked in such industries while only a small fraction of White immigrants found themselves in such a situation. Working in Black niche industries is positively correlated with SEI for White workers and negatively associated with SEI for Black workers hinting at the presence of occupational queues propelling White workers in Black niche industries upward in the occupational hierarchy and leaving Black immigrants at a significant disadvantage.

In all, evidence here suggests that immigrants and their children have done quite well when compared to their third+ generation counterparts. This is particularly true among second generation women who outperform their foreign-born mothers by a wide margin and perform at least as well as their American-born peers (of American-born parentage) on measures of labor force participation, employment, and occupational attainment (SEI). The same is true of White second generation men but not those of the Black second generation. Once they are educated and in the labor force, the occupational achievements of Black second generation men are not out of line with other groups, but the fact is that they are considerably less likely to graduate high school, participate in the labor force, or find employment. What work they do find tends to be in the same industries as their fathers'. In short, Black men experience a less favorable pattern of occupational mobility across generations than is true of Black women, White women, and White men, but not in the sense that they are unable to achieve occupational standing—they do. Rather, their disadvantage is manifest in the fact that, net of other relevant considerations, they are less likely to be employed than other people. This fact has serious ramifications for their earnings and, ultimately, the resources available for the rearing of the "new third generation."

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


Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are constructed about Model 1 coefficients in Tables 6 and 7.

**Figure 1.** Probability of Labor Force Participation with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender




Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are constructed about Model 4 coefficients in Tables 6 and 7 with all respondents assigned mean values on educational, residential and familial variables.

**Figure 2.** Predicted Probability of Labor Force Participation with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race and Nativity Net of Education, Residential and Family Status by Gender




Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are constructed about coefficients from a logistic regression model predicting employment with only race-nativity variables.

**Figure 3.** Probability of Employment among Labor Force Participants with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender




Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are constructed about coefficients from a logistic regression model predicting employment net of education, residence and family status with all respondents assigned mean values on control variables.

**Figure 4.** Predicted Probability of Employment among Labor Force Participants Net of Education, Residence and Family Status with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender




Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are constructed about Model 1 coefficients in Tables 13 and 14.

**Figure 5.** Mean SEI among Labor Force Participants with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender




Data Source: CPS 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

Notes: Confidence intervals depicted here are constructed about Model 5 coefficients in Tables 13 and 14 with all respondents assigned mean values on educational, residential and familial variables.

**Figure 6.** Mean SEI among Labor Force Participants with 90% Confidence Intervals by Race, Nativity and Gender Net of Education, Residence and Family Status

**Table 1.** Selection Criteria and Counts for Three Immigrant Generations in the CPS

| | *Time of Arrival* | *Place of Birth Birth (POB)* | *Mother's POB* | | *Father's POB* | *Age* | *n* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| First Generation (45-69) | 1960 to 1974 | Foreign | Foreign | AND | Foreign | 45 to 39 | 2,049 |
| Second Generation (25-39)[1] | na | USA | Foreign | AND | Foreign | 25 to 39 | 1,756 |
| 2.5 Generation (25-39) | na | USA | Foreign | OR | Foreign | 25 to 39 | 3,187 |
| Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)[2] | na | USA | USA | AND | USA | 25 to 39 | 93,902 |
| Third+ Generation Parents(45-69) | na | USA | USA | AND | USA | 45 to 69 | 111,739 |
| | | | | | | | 212,633 |

Data Source: CPS Annual Demographic File 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

[1]Second generation group also includes all foreign-born respondents who arrived in the U.S. prior to the age of six.

[2]Third generation groups also include foreign-born persons of American-born parents.

**Table 2.** Nativity by Race and Gender (Hispanic excluded)

| | *White* | | *Black* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Women | Men | Women | Men | Total |
| First Generation (45-69) | 953 | 734 | 196 | 166 | 2,049 |
| Second Generation (25-39) | 787 | 797 | 97 | 75 | 1,756 |
| 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 1610 | 1410 | 103 | 64 | 3,187 |
| Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 42357 | 39804 | 6869 | 4872 | 93,902 |
| Third+ Generation Parents(45-69) | 50237 | 48279 | 7586 | 5637 | 111,739 |
| Total | 95,944 | 91,024 | 14,851 | 10,814 | 212,633 |

Data Source: CPS Annual Demographic File 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002

**Table 3.** Labor Force Characteristics by Race and Nativity among Respondents between 25 and 55 Years of Age

| Race and Nativity | % in the Labor Force | Number in the Labor Force | Among those in the Labor Force: % Employed | % Self-Employed | % Emplyd in Ethnic Niches | Mean SEI |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wht First Generation (45-54) | 80% | 608 | 98% | 13% | 13% | 39 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 85% | 1,347 | 96% | 7% | 9% | 42 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 85% | 2,563 | 96% | 7% | 9% | 41 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 85% | 70,139 | 96% | 7% | 7% | 39 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-54) | 85% | 45,761 | 97% | 12% | 8% | 40 |
| Blk First Generation (45-54) | 87% | 131 | 92% | 6% | 47% | 37 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 83% | 142 | 92% | 6% | 29% | 42 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 84% | 141 | 91% | 6% | 23% | 38 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 82% | 9,589 | 91% | 3% | 23% | 34 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-54) | 76% | 5,163 | 95% | 5% | 28% | 34 |
| **Education** | | | | | | |
| College Graduate | 90% | 43,037 | 98% | 8% | 12% | 50 |
| Non-College Graduate | 82% | 92,547 | 95% | 9% | 9% | 33 |
| High School Graduate | 86% | 127,417 | 97% | 9% | 10% | 39 |
| Non-HS Graduate | 67% | 8,167 | 91% | 11% | 10% | 26 |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | | | |
| Central City | 83% | 26,959 | 95% | 7% | 14% | 40 |
| Suburban/Rural | 85% | 108,625 | 96% | 9% | 9% | 38 |
| New York CMSA | 83% | 7,236 | 96% | 6% | 13% | 41 |
| Other or non-CMSA | 84% | 128,348 | 96% | 9% | 10% | 38 |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey

**Table 4.** Labor Force Characteristics by Race, Nativity and Gender among Respondents between 25 and 55 Years of Age

| | | | *Among those in the Labor Force:* | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Men** | *% in the Labor Force* | *Number in the Labor Force* | *% Employed* | *% Self-Employed* | *% Emplyd in Ethnic Niches* | *Mean SEI* |
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 91% | 306 | 98% | 16% | 12% | 41 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 93% | 738 | 96% | 7% | 9% | 42 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 92% | 1,298 | 96% | 8% | 9% | 41 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 93% | 36,906 | 96% | 8% | 6% | 38 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 90% | 24,201 | 97% | 14% | 9% | 40 |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | 92% | 70 | 93% | 9% | 44% | 40 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 80% | 60 | 85% | 7% | 40% | 42 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 91% | 58 | 88% | 5% | 22% | 38 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 85% | 4,123 | 90% | 4% | 25% | 33 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 78% | 2,291 | 94% | 7% | 30% | 33 |
| | | | | | | |
| **Women** | | | | | | |
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 72% | 302 | 98% | 10% | 13% | 37 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 77% | 609 | 95% | 5% | 8% | 42 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 79% | 1,265 | 97% | 6% | 9% | 42 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 78% | 33,233 | 96% | 7% | 9% | 39 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 79% | 21,560 | 97% | 9% | 8% | 39 |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | 81% | 61 | 92% | 2% | 49% | 34 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 85% | 82 | 98% | 5% | 21% | 42 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 81% | 83 | 93% | 6% | 23% | 38 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 80% | 5,466 | 91% | 3% | 22% | 34 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 74% | 2,872 | 96% | 4% | 27% | 34 |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey

**Table 5.** Family Composition by Race and Nativity

| Race/Nativity | *Single w/ No Children* | *Single w/ Children* | *Married w/ No Children* | *Married /w Children* | ***TOTAL*** |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 20% | 3% | 58% | 20% | 100% |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 33% | 7% | 14% | 47% | 100% |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 30% | 9% | 14% | 47% | 100% |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 25% | 9% | 13% | 53% | 100% |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 22% | 4% | 54% | 21% | 100% |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | 30% | 9% | 37% | 24% | 100% |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 49% | 22% | 7% | 22% | 100% |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 38% | 21% | 14% | 27% | 100% |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 31% | 31% | 7% | 31% | 100% |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 41% | 11% | 32% | 15% | 100% |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey

**Table 6.** Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Equations Predicting Labor Force Participation among Women*

| Race/Nativity | *Model 1* Exp(B) | *Model 2* Exp(B) | *Model 3* Exp(B) | *Model 4* Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 0.69 *** | 0.80 * | 0.82 | 0.85 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 0.95 | 0.84 * | 0.87 | 0.98 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 1.01 | 0.95 | 0.96 | 1.09 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 1.01 | 0.99 | 0.99 | 1.16 *** |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | 1.27 | 1.44 | 1.60 | 1.60 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 1.51 | 1.43 | 1.58 | 1.54 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 1.15 | 1.22 | 1.25 | 1.26 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 1.08 * | 1.23 *** | 1.24 *** | 1.25 *** |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 0.75 *** | 0.91 * | 0.92 * | 0.85 *** |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | 2.91 *** | 2.91 *** | 3.13 *** |
| College Graduate | | 1.64 *** | 1.65 *** | 1.67 *** |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | 0.82 *** | 0.81 *** |
| Central City | | | 0.99 | 0.91 *** |
| **Family Composition** | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | 2.11 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | 1.82 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | 1.64 *** |
| Married w/ children | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| **Constant** | 3.62 *** | 1.20 *** | 1.21 *** | 0.76 *** |
| -2 Log Likelihood (Do=90136.22) | 90049.22 | 87608.23 | 87579.14 | 86374.63 |
| Chi-square (block) | 87.00 | 2440.99 | 29.09 | 1204.50 |
| Chi-square (model) | 87.00 | 2527.99 | 2557.09 | 3761.59 |
| McFadden's Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.1% | 2.8% | 2.8% | 4.2% |
| % of Pseudo $R^2$ | 2.3% | 64.9% | 0.8% | 32.0% |
| n= | 85,967 | 85,967 | 85,967 | 85,967 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only respondents 55 years of age or less are included.

**Table 7.** Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Equations Predicting Labor Force Participation among Men*

| Race/Nativity | *Model 1* Exp(B) | *Model 2* Exp(B) | *Model 3* Exp(B) | *Model 4* Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 1.01 | 1.20 | 1.25 | 1.16 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 1.39 * | 1.34 * | 1.39 * | 1.54 ** |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 1.29 * | 1.23 * | 1.25 * | 1.39 ** |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 1.41 *** | 1.46 *** | 1.48 *** | 1.58 *** |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | 1.27 | 1.33 | 1.47 | 1.47 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 0.44 ** | 0.46 *** | 0.50 * | 0.63 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 1.07 | 1.18 | 1.28 | 1.47 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 0.61 *** | 0.71 *** | 0.77 *** | 0.90 * |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 0.38 *** | 0.46 *** | 0.50 *** | 0.54 *** |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | 2.65 *** | 2.65 *** | 2.51 *** |
| College Graduate | | 1.93 *** | 1.96 *** | 1.88 *** |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | 0.98 | 1.00 |
| Central City | | | 0.80 *** | 0.89 *** |
| **Family Composition** | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | 0.47 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | 0.51 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | 0.83 *** |
| Married w/ children | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| **Constant** | 9.01 *** | 3.16 *** | 3.24 *** | 4.49 *** |
| -2 Log Likelihood (Do=49671.92) | 48743.05 | 47258.93 | 47207.86 | 46505.62 |
| Chi-square (block) | 928.87 | 1484.13 | 51.06 | 702.244 |
| Chi-square (model) | 928.87 | 2413.00 | 2464.06 | 3166.302 |
| McFadden's Pseudo $R^2$ | 1.9% | 4.9% | 5.0% | 6.4% |
| % of Pseudo $R^2$ | 29.3% | 46.9% | 1.6% | 22.2% |
| n= | 79,541 | 79,541 | 79,541 | 79,541 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only respondents 55 years of age or less are included.

**Table 8.** Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Equations Predicting Labor Force Participation among Women*

| | *Model 1* Exp(B) | *Model 2* Exp(B) | *Model 3* Exp(B) | *Model 4* Exp(B) | *Model 5* Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Race** | | | | | |
| Black | 0.94 ** | 0.94 ** | 1.11 *** | 1.12 *** | 0.99 |
| White | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| **Nativity** | | | | | |
| First Generation (45-69) | | 0.78 * | 0.88 | 0.91 | 0.94 |
| Second Generation (25-39) | | 1.03 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 1.05 |
| 2.5 Generation (25-39) | | 1.06 | 0.98 | 0.99 | 1.12 |
| Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | | 1.06 ** | 1.03 | 1.03 | 1.20 *** |
| Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | | 2.92 *** | 2.93 *** | 3.15 *** |
| College Graduate | | | 1.64 *** | 1.65 *** | 1.67 *** |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | | 0.82 *** | 0.82 *** |
| Central City | | | | 0.99 | 0.91 *** |
| **Family Composition** | | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | | 2.11 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | | 1.84 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | | 1.65 *** |
| Married w/ children | | | | | Referent |
| **Constant** | 3.62 *** | 3.51 *** | 1.16 *** | 1.17 *** | 0.74 *** |
| -2 Log Likelihood (Do=90136.22) | 90129 | 87653 | 86403 | 87625 | 86403 |
| Chi-square (block) | 7 | 19 | 2457 | 28 | 1222 |
| Chi-square (model) | 7 | 26 | 2483 | 2511 | 3733 |
| McFadden's Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.8% | 2.8% | 4.1% |
| % of Pseudo $R^2$ | 0.2% | 0.5% | 65.8% | 0.8% | 32.7% |
| n= | 85,967 | 85,967 | 85,967 | 85,967 | 85,967 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only respondents 55 years of age or less are included.

**Table 9.** Exponentiated Beta Coefficients from Logistic Regression Equations Predicting Labor Force Participation among Men*

| Race | *Model 1* Exp(B) | *Model 2* Exp(B) | *Model 3* Exp(B) | *Model 4* Exp(B) | *Model 5* Exp(B) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Black | 0.41 *** | 0.41 *** | 0.48 *** | 0.52 *** | 0.56 *** |
| White | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| **Nativity** | | | | | |
| First Generation (45-69) | | 1.33 | 1.44 * | 1.50 * | 1.38 * |
| Second Generation (25-39) | | 1.35 * | 1.28 * | 1.32 * | 1.47 ** |
| 2.5 Generation (25-39) | | 1.37 *** | 1.29 *** | 1.31 *** | 1.45 *** |
| Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | | 1.45 *** | 1.48 *** | 1.49 *** | 1.59 *** |
| Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | | 2.65 *** | 2.66 *** | 2.52 *** |
| College Graduate | | | 1.93 *** | 1.96 *** | 1.88 *** |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | | 0.99 | 1.00 |
| Central City | | | | 0.80 *** | 0.89 *** |
| **Family Composition** | | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | | 0.47 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | | 0.51 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | | 0.83 *** |
| Married w/ children | | | | | Referent |
| **Constant** | 10.89 *** | 8.87 *** | 3.13 *** | 3.22 *** | 4.46 *** |
| -2 Log Likelihood (Do=49671.92) | 48985 | 48760 | 47268 | 47216 | 46513 |
| Chi-square (block) | 687 | 225 | 1492 | 51 | 703 |
| Chi-square (model) | 687 | 912 | 2404 | 2456 | 3159 |
| McFadden's Pseudo $R^2$ | 1.4% | 1.8% | 4.8% | 4.9% | 6.4% |
| % of Pseudo $R^2$ | 21.7% | 7.1% | 47.2% | 1.6% | 22.3% |
| n= | 79,541 | 79,541 | 79,541 | 79,541 | 79,541 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only respondents 55 years of age or less are included.

**Table 10.** Model Fit Statistics for Eight Logistic Regressions Predicting Employment

| | *Model 0* No Independent Variables | *Model 1* Race-Nativity Variables | *Model 2* Education Variables | *Model 3* Residence Variables | *Model 4* Family Status Variables |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Women*** | | | | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 23762 | 23316 | 22802 | 22784 | 22585 |
| Reduction in -2 LL | | 446 | 514 | 18 | 199 |
| Cumulative Reduction in -2 LL | | 446 | 960 | 978 | 1177 |
| Pseudo R2 (McFadden's) | | 1.9% | 4.0% | 4.1% | 5.0% |
| % of Explained Variance | | 37.9% | 43.7% | 1.5% | 16.9% |
| ***Men*** | | | | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 28864 | 28506 | 27871 | 27850 | 27400 |
| Reduction in -2 LL | | 358 | 635 | 20 | 450 |
| Cumulative Reduction in -2 LL | | 358 | 993 | 1014 | 1463 |
| Pseudo R2 (McFadden's) | | 1.2% | 3.4% | 3.5% | 5.1% |
| % of Explained Variance | | 24.5% | 43.4% | 1.4% | 30.7% |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey

*Only labor force participants are included in this analysis.

**Table 11.** Model Fit Statistics for Ten Logistic Regressions Predicting Employment

| | *Model 0* No Indepndnt Variables | *Model 1* Race Variable | *Model 2* Nativity Variables | *Model 3* Education Variables | *Model 4* Residence Variables | *Model 5* Family Status Variables |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ***Women*** | | | | | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 23762 | 23462 | 23342 | 22831 | 22814 | 22606 |
| Reduction in -2 LL | | 300 | 120 | 511 | 18 | 207 |
| Cumulative Reduction in -2 LL | | 300 | 420 | 931 | 948 | 1156 |
| Pseudo R2 (McFadden's) | | 1.3% | 1.8% | 3.9% | 4.0% | 4.9% |
| % of Explained Variance | | 26.0% | 10.4% | 44.2% | 1.5% | 17.9% |
| ***Men*** | | | | | | |
| -2 Log Likelihood | 28864 | 28601 | 28521 | 27896 | 27876 | 27424 |
| Reduction in -2 LL | | 263 | 80 | 625 | 20 | 452 |
| Cumulative Reduction in -2 LL | | 263 | 343 | 968 | 988 | 1440 |
| Pseudo R2 (McFadden's) | | 0.9% | 1.2% | 3.4% | 3.4% | 5.0% |
| % of Explained Variance | | 18.2% | 5.6% | 43.4% | 1.4% | 31.4% |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only labor force participants are included in this analysis.

**Table 12.** Industries in which Black and White Immigrants are Overrepresented*

| *Black Immigrant Women* | Ratio |
|---|---|
| **Hospital** | 3.0 |
| **Medical, non-hospital** | 2.3 |
| **Private Household** | 1.8 |
| **Transportation** | 1.8 |
| **Utilities and Sanitary Services** | 1.5 |

| *Black Immigrant Men* | Ratio |
|---|---|
| **Social Services** | 5.0 |
| **Hospital** | 3.1 |
| **Transportation** | 2.0 |
| **Medical, non-hospital** | 1.9 |
| **Educational** | 1.6 |
| **Finance, Insurance and Real Estate** | 1.6 |
| Communications | 1.4 |
| Business and Repair Services | 1.3 |

| *White Immigrant Women* | Ratio |
|---|---|
| **Manufacturing-Durable Goods** | 1.5 |
| **Personal Services** | 1.5 |
| Entertainment professional and | 1.4 |
| Private household miscellaneous | 1.4 |
| Manufacturing-nondurable goods | 1.3 |
| Retail trade | 1.3 |
| Medical, except hospital | 1.2 |
| Hospital | 1.2 |

| *White Immigrant Men* | Ratio |
|---|---|
| **Medical, non-hospital** | 1.8 |
| **Other Professional** | 1.7 |
| Retail trade | 1.4 |
| Educational | 1.4 |
| Hospital | 1.3 |
| Personal services, except | 1.2 |
| Manufacturing-durable goods | 1.2 |
| Manufacturing-nondurable goods | 1.1 |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey

*1.5 is used here as the criterion for determining overrepresentation

**Table 13.** Beta Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares Regression Equations Predicting Occupational Attainment (SEI)* among Women

| | *Model 1* | *Model 2* | *Model 3* | *Model 4* | *Model 5* | *Model 6* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Race/Nativity** | **β** | **β** | **β** | **β** | **β** | **β** |
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | -2.12 *** | -1.43 ** | -1.59 ** | -1.64 ** | -1.68 *** | -2.25 *** |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 3.62 *** | 0.61 | 0.38 | 0.41 | 0.44 | -0.26 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 2.93 *** | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.45 | 0.68 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 0.25 * | -0.53 *** | -0.54 *** | -0.55 *** | -0.55 *** | -0.67 *** |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | -4.29 ** | -3.66 *** | -4.46 *** | -4.33 *** | -4.81 *** | -3.00 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 3.80 * | 0.02 | -0.69 | -0.37 | -0.43 | -1.47 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | -0.45 | -1.12 | -1.43 | -1.05 | -1.08 | -0.33 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | -4.46 *** | -2.82 *** | -3.06 *** | -2.64 *** | -2.68 *** | -2.42 *** |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | -4.41 *** | -2.33 *** | -2.60 *** | -2.38 *** | -2.54 *** | -1.77 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | 8.68 *** | 8.68 *** | 8.55 *** | 8.52 *** | 8.49 *** |
| College Graduate | | 16.09 *** | 16.02 *** | 15.95 *** | 16.00 *** | 15.98 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | 0.95 *** | 0.96 *** | 0.96 *** | 0.99 *** |
| Central City | | | 0.69 *** | 0.83 *** | 0.85 *** | 0.86 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Family Composition** | | | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | -1.04 *** | -0.99 *** | -0.98 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | -1.79 *** | -1.78 *** | -1.76 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | -0.34 ** | -0.27 * | -0.26 * |
| Married w/ children | | | | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| **Black Niche Employment** | | | | | | |
| Black Niche Industries | | | | | 1.59 *** | 1.59 *** |
| Other Industries | | | | | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| **Black Niche Interactions** | | | | | | |
| Wht First Generation (45-69)*niche | | | | | | 2.27 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | 3.12 ** |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | -0.97 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*niche | | | | | | 0.50 * |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*niche | | | | | | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69)*niche | | | | | | -3.48 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | 3.79 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | -2.95 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*niche | | | | | | -1.00 * |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*niche | | | | | | -2.35 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Constant** | 38.68 | 25.77 | 25.65 | 26.30 | 25.90 | 25.92 |
| | | | | | | |
| $R^2$ | 1.3% | 31.9% | 32.0% | 32.2% | 32.4% | 32.4% |
| n= | 75,733 | 75,733 | 75,733 | 75,733 | 75,733 | 75,733 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only labor force participants are included in this analysis.

**Table 14.** Beta Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares Regression Equations Predicting Occupational Attainment (SEI)* among Men

| | *Model 1* | *Model 2* | *Model 3* | *Model 4* | *Model 5* | *Model 6* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Race/Nativity** | **β** | **β** | **β** | **β** | **β** | **β** |
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 0.78 | 0.65 | 0.32 | 0.21 | 0.21 | -0.67 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 1.84 *** | 0.75 | 0.35 | 0.73 | 0.75 | 0.62 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 0.54 | 0.01 | -0.15 | 0.25 | 0.26 | 0.30 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | -2.00 *** | -1.23 *** | -1.27 *** | -1.00 *** | -0.97 *** | -0.92 *** |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | -0.47 | -0.26 | -1.20 | -1.26 | -1.41 | -0.36 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 1.49 | 1.27 | 0.36 | 1.29 | 1.18 | -0.04 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | -2.05 | -0.16 | -0.78 | -0.07 | -0.06 | -0.59 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | -7.62 *** | -4.40 *** | -4.84 *** | -4.20 *** | -4.24 *** | -4.03 *** |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | -6.95 *** | -3.48 *** | -3.91 *** | -3.65 *** | -3.71 *** | -3.30 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | 6.34 *** | 6.30 *** | 6.18 *** | 6.18 *** | 6.18 *** |
| College Graduate | | 16.79 *** | 16.68 *** | 16.54 *** | 16.55 *** | 16.53 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | 1.20 *** | 1.25 *** | 1.23 *** | 1.25 *** |
| Central City | | | 1.21 *** | 1.62 *** | 1.61 *** | 1.62 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Family Composition** | | | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | -2.82 *** | -2.82 *** | -2.82 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | -3.17 *** | -3.18 *** | -3.17 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | -0.50 *** | -0.49 *** | -0.49 *** |
| Married w/ children | | | | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| **Black Niche Employment** | | | | | | |
| Black Niche Industries | | | | | 0.98 *** | 1.34 *** |
| Other Industries | | | | | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| **Black Niche Interactions** | | | | | | |
| Wht First Generation (45-69)*niche | | | | | | 6.78 *** |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | 1.28 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | -0.38 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*niche | | | | | | -0.47 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*niche | | | | | | Referent |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69)*niche | | | | | | -4.02 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | 4.73 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | 4.18 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*niche | | | | | | -1.38 ** |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*niche | | | | | | -2.42 *** |
| | | | | | | |
| **Constant** | 40.29 | 28.43 | 28.27 | 29.16 | 29.05 | 29.00 |
| | | | | | | |
| R2 | 2.1% | 34.9% | 35.0% | 35.7% | 35.7% | 35.8% |
| n= | 83,097 | 83,097 | 83,097 | 83,097 | 83,097 | 83,097 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only labor force participants are included in this analysis.

**Table 15.** Beta Coefficients from Ordinary Least Squares Regression Equations Predicting Occupational Attainment (SEI)*

| Race/Nativity | *Model 1* β | *Model 2* β | *Model 3* β | *Model 4* β | *Model 5* β | *Model 6* β | *Model 7* β |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | -0.71 | -0.70 | -0.38 | -0.62 | -0.70 * | -0.72 * | -1.39 *** |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 2.66 *** | 2.66 *** | 0.68 * | 0.37 | 0.52 | 0.55 | 0.18 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 1.67 *** | 1.67 *** | 0.22 | 0.10 | 0.23 | 0.25 | 0.36 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | -0.96 *** | -0.95 *** | -0.92 *** | -0.94 *** | -0.89 *** | -0.87 *** | -0.92 *** |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | -2.38 * | -2.37 * | -1.93 * | -2.81 *** | -2.78 *** | -3.08 *** | -1.34 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 2.65 * | 2.69 * | 0.43 | -0.40 | 0.14 | 0.05 | -1.00 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | -1.31 | -1.27 | -0.82 | -1.26 | -0.77 | -0.78 | -0.54 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | -6.00 *** | -5.97 *** | -3.56 *** | -3.90 *** | -3.46 *** | -3.50 *** | -3.33 *** |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | -5.69 *** | -5.66 *** | -2.91 *** | -3.27 *** | -2.98 *** | -3.09 *** | -2.54 *** |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Sex** | | | | | | | |
| Male | | 0.29 *** | 0.26 *** | 0.26 *** | 0.10 | 0.27 *** | 0.28 *** |
| Female | | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Educational Attainment** | | | | | | | |
| High School Graduate | | | 7.31 *** | 7.29 *** | 7.17 *** | 7.15 *** | 7.14 *** |
| College Graduate | | | 16.47 *** | 16.39 *** | 16.31 *** | 16.33 *** | 16.32 *** |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Place of Residence** | | | | | | | |
| New York CMSA | | | | 1.07 *** | 1.11 *** | 1.10 *** | 1.13 *** |
| Central City | | | | 0.95 *** | 1.23 *** | 1.23 *** | 1.24 *** |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Family Composition** | | | | | | | |
| Single w/o children | | | | | -2.07 *** | -2.05 *** | -2.05 *** |
| Single w/ children | | | | | -2.24 *** | -2.24 *** | -2.22 *** |
| Married w/o chlidren | | | | | -0.50 *** | -0.46 *** | -0.46 *** |
| Married w/ children | | | | | Referent | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Black Niche Employment** | | | | | | | |
| Black Niche Industries | | | | | | 1.37 *** | 1.44 *** |
| Other Industries | | | | | | Referent | Referent |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Black Niche Interactions** | | | | | | | |
| Wht First Generation (45-69)*niche | | | | | | | 3.54 *** |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | | 2.30 * |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | | -0.70 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*niche | | | | | | | 0.25 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*niche | | | | | | | Referent |
| | | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69)*niche | | | | | | | -4.45 ** |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | | 3.97 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39)*niche | | | | | | | -1.24 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39)*niche | | | | | | | -0.83 ** |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69)*niche | | | | | | | -2.12 *** |
| | | | | | | | |
| **Constant** | 39.55 | 39.39 | 27.18 | 27.04 | 27.98 | 27.65 | 27.64 |
| | | | | | | | |
| $R^2$ | 1.5% | 1.5% | 33.4% | 33.5% | 33.9% | 34.0% | 34.1% |
| n= | 158,831 | 158,831 | 158,831 | 158,831 | 158,831 | 158,831 | 158,831 |

* p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Only labor force participants are included in this analysis.

**Table 16.** Mean Occupational Attainment (SEI) Race, Nativity, Gender and Level of Education*

| | *Women* | | | *Men* | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| **Race/Nativity** | College Graduates | High School Graduates | Non-Graduates | College Graduates | High School Graduates | Non-Graduates |
| Wht First Generation (45-69) | 48 | 34 | 23 | 54 | 34 | 29 |
| Wht Second Generation (25-39) | 51 | 35 | 30 | 53 | 35 | 28 |
| Wht 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 51 | 35 | 26 | 52 | 34 | 28 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 50 | 34 | 26 | 51 | 33 | 28 |
| Wht Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 51 | 34 | 25 | 51 | 35 | 28 |
| | | | | | | |
| Blk First Generation (45-69) | 49 | 30 | 23 | 52 | 33 | 31 |
| Blk Second Generation (25-39) | 52 | 33 | 29 | 56 | 34 | 25 |
| Blk 2.5 Generation (25-39) | 48 | 34 | 26 | 52 | 35 | 26 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Youth (25-39) | 48 | 31 | 24 | 47 | 30 | 25 |
| Blk Third+ Generation Parents (45-69) | 50 | 32 | 22 | 48 | 31 | 25 |

Data Source: 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002 Current Population Survey
*Levels of education are mutally exclusive categories.