The Impact of Marriage Payments on Leisure, Housework and Abuse of Young Wives: Evidence from Rural Bangladesh

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Abstract

Using detailed time use data from an adolescent study in rural Bangladesh, this paper examines determinants of time use during the early years of marriage to explore the role of marriage strategies in determining the quality of life of young women. Measures of marriage strategy are payment of dowry and the relative status of natal versus marital family (hypergamy). The data were collected in three rural districts in 2001 and 2003. Using multivariate Tobit regression analysis, the results show that time spent in domestic work, leisure and self-care are significantly associated marriage strategy variables. Those who paid dowry spend more time in domestic work and less time in self-care and leisure relative to those who did not pay dowry. Similarly, girls who married up spent more time in domestic work and less time in leisure and self-care activities. Domestic violence is similarly associated with more domestic work, less leisure, less childcare and sleep. These effects are strongly conditioned by childcare responsibilities and are strongest when a young woman does not have childcare responsibilities.

Introduction

In rural Bangladesh families invest heavily in marriage as a way of ensuring the well-being of their daughters. Making a good match often receives priority over a good education or success in the labor market. A good marriage is a function of many factors—family wealth, good reputation, good connections and the availability of grooms. In recent decades, dowry has become an increasingly important factor as dowry demands have escalated considerably (Cain and Amin, 1997; Huq and Amin, 2001). This paper follows on earlier work by the authors to explore how well these marriage investments deliver on the promise of a good life for young women.

Contrary to a widely reported perception that dowry is given to ensure better treatment of girls in marriage, Suran, Amin, Huq and Chowdhury (2005) found that the payment of dowry is associated with an increased likelihood of domestic violence. They find the relationship to be non-linear – while it is true that among those who pay dowry, more dowry is associated with less violence, marriages that take place with no dowry are associated with less violence than those that paid the highest dowries. The present paper seeks to shed light on this complex relationship between marital well-being and marriage payments. We explore everyday activities reported by respondents such as the amount of time spent in domestic work, personal care, productive work and sleep in relation to marriage strategy variables on the one hand and to the experience of violence on the other. The objective of the paper is to understand the implications of marriage decisions for the day-to-day lives of young married women. We also explore how domestic work burdens, adequacy of sleep, amount of leisure, and amount of time available for personal

care correlate with the more known measures of wellbeing such as freedom from violence.

These measures of young women's well-being or status allow us to comment on and better understand the phenomenon of marriage payments and other strategies to promote good marriages. If dowry is a form of bequest bestowed on young women by their natal families to ensure their wellbeing, then more dowry should be associated with more leisure, less work and more rest. Hypergamy, or marrying a groom from a wealthier family, would also work in a similar fashion—usually associated with dowry, marrying into a wealthier family should ensure a better life for young women.

While there is now a substantial literature on domestic violence and its correlates (see a recent volume of International Family Planning Perspectives on Violence among others), there are relatively few examples of detailed analysis of time use data as a measure of the quality of life as has been attempted in the present study. Studies of time use that focus on the length of the workday find important differences in time use patterns by age, gender and socio-economic status (Cain, 1980). Larson and Verma's (1999) review of time use literature points to the importance of studying free time or leisure.

The promise of time use data as a quality of life measure finds support in the women's status literature. It is increasingly recognized that status has multiple dimensions. While it is common to measure status in terms of knowledge and attitude variables measuring contributions to the household and other forms of altruistic behavior, there is now increasing recognition that status as reflected in more self-indulgent behaviors may have important implications for women's status, particularly as a

determinant of her own health (Basu and Koolwal, 2004). The present study follows that logic and explores correlates of time spent in three types of non-work time use—sleep, self-care and leisure—in addition to productive and domestic work as measures of the complex marriage environment. This study explores the connections between domestic violence and time use in order to better understand associations between these two indicators of marital welfare, if they indeed exist.

Data and Method

As part of a project on adolescent livelihoods[1], survey data was collected in 2001 and 2003 from adolescents between the ages of 13 and 22 that were chosen randomly from 90 villages in three districts of rural Bangladesh. 5,024 were contacted successfully and completed the initial interviews. A follow-up survey was conducted from January to June of 2003 in which 2,386 female respondents who had been successfully interviewed in the baseline survey were contacted for a follow-up interview, and 2,214 of these respondents were successfully interviewed.[2]

Detailed time use data were collected from respondents in both surveys. Time use data were collected for the day prior to the interview using a sequential recall of activities. Time use patterns were recorded in an open-ended format and later coded into detailed activity lists. A total of 68 different type of activity was later classified into

[1] This project, entitled *Kishori Abhijan*,('Adolescent Girls Adventure'), was a UNICEF-funded initiative on adolescent livelihoods was implemented by two development NGOs, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and Centre for Mass Education in Science (CMES), in three districts of rural Bangladesh. The Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies in collaboration with Population Council, conducted a two and a half year investigation to document the project and its implementation.

[2] 584 of the 2386 respondents with whom follow-up interviews had been attempted had migrated, mostly due to marriage. Interviewers asked about the new location of these migrated respondents, and 476 were successfully interviewed because they had relocated to village within the district and could be reinterviewed.

productive work, domestic work, self-care, social maintenance, sleep and leisure. Respondents reported the start time and end time of their activities and this data was converted into hours and minutes.

Given the nature of the questions we are interested in exploring, we limited the population to include only currently married respondents (N=1,331[3]). The data used was taken from the 2003 survey rather than the 2001 survey since the latter contained a greater number of married females. The questionnaire also included detailed information concerning the circumstances surrounding marriage, including dowry, marriage timing, and the characteristics of husbands and natal families.

Due to differences in the reference period on our data on time use and domestic violence (respondents reported all activities performed during the previous twenty-four hours while domestic violence was reported for the previous year), we are not seeking to suggest any causal relationships between domestic violence and time allocation. Rather, we seek to investigate the presence of any associations between domestic violence and time use to determine how time allocation differs between married women who reported domestic violence versus those that did not.

Results

Table 1 contains data on the explanatory variables used in the analysis. Approximately 20 percent of respondents reported experiencing domestic abuse in the previous year, coinciding with other studies of marital violence in Bangladesh (Schuler et al. 1996). Since the original sample was adolescents aged between 13 and 21, the study

[3] One of the married respondents did not reply to the survey question concerning domestic violence. Thus, we were left with a population of 1,330.

is limited to relatively young women. The mean age of the respondents is 20.1 years. The mean age at marriage for the sample is 15.3 years and more than 75 percent of them had ever attended school for an average of 4.7 years. Almost 40 percent were married into families of similar status as their natal family, and approximately equal proportions of the remainder of respondents married down or up. Three out of every four marriages involved a dowry payment (marriage payment made to the groom and his family by the bride's family),which average about 10023 taka.[4] 42.5 percent of respondents reported ever working for pay and 23.6 percent have taken out a loan (the large majority from microcredit organizations that provide loans to rural women in the area). On average, the respondents have 1.1 children. Most of the respondents (37.4 percent) lived in the district of Chapainawabganj, folllowed by Sherpur (36.3 percent), and Chittagong (26.3 percent).

Since wealth inequality in marriage is a variable of interest in the analysis, and since relative wealth is correlated with absolute wealth measures, we did not include any other wealth measure in the model. Among those who paid dowry, it is also introduced as a relative rather than an absolute measure. Five categories of dowry payments have been defined—no dowry is used as the reference category. Among those who paid some dowry, respondents were categorized into relative dowry quartiles within their district. Dowry is measured as a district-specific variable both because marriage markets are local, and because the overall level of dowry varied considerably from district to district reflecting local variations in marriage practices.

Other variables considered are age of the respondents, her years of education, whether she had ever worked for pay, whether she had taken a loan (usually from an micro-credit agency), the number of children borne by the respondent and whether the

[4] US$1 = 59 Bangladeshi taka.

respondent reported being beaten in the past year.

Table 1. Summary statistics of explanatory variables (2003).			
	Variable Type	**Mean**	**Std. Dev.**
Domestic violence	Binary	20.3	0.4
Age	Continuous	20.1	2.8
Years of education	Continuous	4.7	3.7
Percent paid dowry at marriage	Binary*	75.6	0.43
Mean dowry	Continuous	10023	15847
Percent ever worked for pay	Binary	42.5	0.5
Percent ever taken out loan	Binary	23.6	0.4
Percent with children	Binary*	70.8	0.45
No. of children	Continuous	1.1	0.9
Percent randomly sampled[5]	Binary	80.1	0.34
Geography	Categorical		
% from Chapainawabganj		37.4	
% from Chittagong		26.3	
% from Sherpur		36.3	
Wealth differences betw. husb. and wife	Categorical		
w.wealth=h.wealth		38.5	
w.wealth<h.wealth		32.5	
w.wealth>h.wealth		29.0	

* Not included in model—shown for descriptive purposes only.

We ran a series of Tobit regressions using various categories of time use as the dependent variable. Given that the time use diary format allowed respondents to note whether or not child care was performed during each activity listed, we examined time use categories overall and then looked at the time spent in each category (a) while child care was simultaneously performed, and (b) while child care was *not* being performed. In other words, for each category of time use examined, we look at (i) overall time spent in

[5] To ensure that enough respondents would join a program, researchers purposively sampled girls who were thought to be more likely to join a program (i.e. younger girls with parents who had a history of involvement in NGOs). Since weights cannot be used with Tobit regressions in the statistical package (STATA) used, we created a binary variable equaling 1 if the respondent was randomly sampled and 0 otherwise and entered this variable in all models.

category X, (ii) time spent in category X while child care was performed, and (iii) time spent in category X while child care was not performed.[6]

Before we present the results we should mention several important cautions and caveats. Most importantly, although we use causal models we are aware that many of the factors that we consider in our analysis are driven by common factors. The same factors that determine marriage strategies may also determine time use and violence related factors. The purpose of our analysis is not to suggest causal models but to demonstrate how variable clusters or group together to form patterns. Second, since the sample is drawn from a relatively young cohort of women, only those who married and began having children relatively young would be included in the analysis of women who were performing childcare. The potential of relatively early marriage and childbearing creating a selection bias for this subgroup needs to be taken into account in the interpretation of these results.

The five categories of time use examined are as follows: leisure, domestic work, productive work, self-care, and sleep[7]. The list of activities that comprise each category can be found in Appendix 1. Overall, all respondents reported some time spent in sleep, self-care and domestic work. Only 72 percent reported activities that we could classify as leisure and 40 percent reported activities that we could classify as productive work. [8]

[6] It is possible that a respondent could perform an activity report the same activity both with and without performing childcare in the same day (i.e. the same activity was performed at different times of the day).

[7] The respondent was asked to report all activities she engaged in the 24 hour period prior to the interview. After this listing was completed she was asked if a child was in her care during the activities reported. Thus, a women could report child care during sleep. In fact, a substantial percentage of respondents reported performing childcare during sleep in both 2001 (39.8) and 2003 (48.4 percent). Another possibility is that mothers who did not report child care during sleep may have relatives or other persons living in the household who also take care of children.

[8] Given that many activities in a woman's life is related to subsistence activities, we used our knowledge of the local economy and previous analysis of time use in rural Bangladesh conducted by Cain (1978), Amin

Table 2: Percent of Respondents who reported time spent in various time use categories, Bangladesh 2003				
	% Reporting	Average hours	% Reporting Time with child in care	% Reporting Time without child in care
Leisure	72.2	1.29	54.8	17.5
Domestic work	99.3	6.79	68.0	31.4
Productive Work	60.6	1.41	40.9	19.7
Self-care	100.0	4.94	68.0	32.0

Domestic work

Table 3 shows correlates of domestic work from a Tobit regression analysis (model 1). The dependent variable is the number of hours spent in domestic activities. Close to 100 percent of women reported some domestic work. On average, women spent 4.94 hours in such chores (Table 2). The amount of domestic work increases with number of children and decreases if the respondent is performing paid work in all models. Time spent in domestic work is significantly higher by 0.32 hours when respondent's natal family wealth is lower than her husband's family wealth. Thus, hypergamy or marrying a wealthier husband is associated with a significantly higher burden of domestic work. Overall, relative to women who paid no dowry, those who paid dowry spent significantly more time in domestic work—relative to those who paid no dowry, the lowest dowry quartile is associated with 0.43 hours more domestic work, followed by 0.59 hours for the 2nd lowest quartile. Higher dowry quartiles are associated with higher domestic work as well.

These results are consistent with time use patterns reported from rural Bangladesh in other studies where women in wealthier families have longer work hours particularly in agricultural households. This is usually because it is uncommon for wealthy

(1996) and others to classify particular tasks around the house as productive. Tasks that are not directly remunerative may nevertheless may be thus classified they they represent a cost saving activity.

landowners to hire help for domestic work even though they might do so for agricultural work (Cain, 1978; Amin, 1995). Hired agricultural workers increase the domestic burden for women who have to do food preparation for hired hands who are paid in cash and meals. Among women with no simultaneous childcare responsibilities, domestic violence is associated with less domestic work.

Productive work

Table 5 shows correlates of productive work. Forty percent of respondents reported some productive work of which approximately half was done in combination with child care. On average respondents reported 1.41 hours of productive work (Table 2). Productive work increases significantly with age and decreases significantly with education in all models. Productive work decreases significantly with number of children, by far the most important factor associated with productive work. Dowry and relative wealth of the natal and marital families are not significant predictors of productive work. Domestic violence is associated with less productive work for those who do not report childcare.

District of residence has a strong influence on the amount of productive work reported by respondents. Women in Chapainawabganj spend more time in productive work relative to Sherpur (the poorest district) and Chittagong (the wealthiest and most conservative district). Chittagong is also characterized by a higher mean age at marriage and a higher rate of domestic violence and other indicators of women's autonomy suggest that women are less empowered there. District is an important determinant pointing to the importance of overall context in explaining individual behavior.

Amount of time spent is self-care

Table 6 shows the amount of time spent in self-care. The average respondent spent 4.94 hours in self-care activities during the day. Our knowledge of the local culture leads us to interpret more time spent in self-care, in the presence of appropriate controls, as one of the ways that a person can pamper herself, i.e. a form of self-indulgence. It may be frowned upon, and it is common for a young women to be chastised by her mother-in-law for spending too much time doing nothing but oiling her hair, but it is an activity that is allowed nevertheless. Also, a husband may express his appreciation of his new bride by buying her fragrant soap, shampoo and hair oil, so that she may indulge herself in these ways. These little rituals also make time spent in self-care a public statement of higher status. Thus, this indicator is perhaps the most sensitive time-related status indicator. In a setting where women's time is strongly dictated by the needs of the household and by restrictions on mobility outside the home, taking extra time to bathe, groom, or simply rest because they are feeling unwell are some of the limited ways in which young women can legitimately pamper themselves. Amount of time spent in self-care decreases slightly but significantly with age and increases slightly but significantly with education. Women in Chittagong spend more time in self-care relative to women in Chapainawabganj and women in Sherpur spend less time in self-care. Women who are married into wealthier households are also less likely to spend time in self-care—relative to a woman who is married into a household of similar economic status, a woman who married into a wealthier family spends 0.4 hours less on self-care. In this regard women who married down are not significantly different from women who married a husband of equal status.

Paying dowry is related to less time spent in self-care. Relative to women who paid no dowry, those in the 2nd lowest dowry quartile spent 0.5 hours less in self-care. Women who were in the highest dowry quartile spent 0.33 hours less in self-care.

Domestic violence adds significant additional predictive power to the model. The addition of domestic violence to the model does not change the dowry effect which remains negatively associated with amount of time spent in self-care. Overall, those who report domestic violence spent less time (-0.37 hours) in self-care. However the effect is modified by the presence of child care responsibilities. Women who have children in their care and reported experiencing domestic violence spent slightly more time (0.08 hours) in self-care while women who have no children in their care and reported domestic violence spend approximately 0.36 hours less in childcare relative to women who reported no violence.

Leisure

For the purposes of this analysis, we have defined leisure as another, more familiar form of self-indulgence. Any time spent playing, visiting, attending social ceremony or time spent hanging out with friends and relatives in the absence of other activities is included in this category and average out to be 1.29 hours. The acceptability of these activities vary even within the study area. In the rural Bangladeshi context, these are bolder ways of indulging oneself for young, married women and thus are qualitatively different from self-care in how they should be interpreted. Correlates of leisure time are shown in Table 4. Our estimates show that young women have more leisure in Chittagong and Sherpur relative to Chapainawabganj. Women who worked for pay report

less leisure time. Leisure time also increases with the number of children a young women has. Women report less leisure as they age and leisure time increases with the level of education. Since women who have children have more opportunities to spend time playing with children, childcare is associated with more leisure. Domestic violence is associated with considerably less leisure in the absence of child care responsibilities. The relative wealth of natal versus marital family is not associated with leisure. Dowry payments are also not associated significantly with the amount of leisure time reported.

Association between domestic violence, child-care and time use

Overall relative wealth status and dowry are not strong predictors of time spent in productive work but there is a significant association with leisure, self-care and domestic work–relative to those who paid no dowry, higher dowry is associated with more domestic work, less time in self-care and less leisure (only for those without childcare responsibilities). We find a general pattern of association between domestic violence and time spent in various activities in that domestic violence significantly affects time use only for those who do not have children in their care. The coefficients for the domestic violence variable tend to be positive in the models using time spent while child care was performed and negative for time spent while child care was *not* performed. In addition, the domestic violence variable tends to be insignificant in the models of overall time use but is very often significant in the models of time use spent without performing childcare and, to a lesser extent in the models limited to time spent during childcare. For example, those who reported a beating spent 0.03 less hours in overall leisure time (p-value=0.85),

0.19 more hours in leisure with childcare (p-value=0.16), and 1.10 less hours in leisure without childcare (p-value =0.01).

- **Domestic work:** Respondents who reported a beating spent 0.08 more hours in domestic work overall (p-value=0.61), 0.07 more hours in domestic work while performing childcare (p-value=0.17), and 0.34 less hours in domestic work without childcare (p-value=0.00).
- **Productive work:** Those who reported a beating spent 0.04 more hours in productive work overall (p-value=0.85), 0.21 more hours in productive work while performing childcare (p-value=0.26), and 1.25 less hours in productive work without performing childcare (p-value=0.00).
- **Self-maintainance:** Respondents who reported a beating spent 0.37 less hours in self-maintainance overall (p-value=0.02), 0.08 more hours in self-time while performing childcare (p-value=0.09), and 0.36 less hours in self-maintainance without childcare (p-value=0.00).
- **Sleep:** Those who reported a beating spent 0.26 more hours in sleep overall (p-value=0.00), 1.12 more hours in sleep with childcare (p-value=0.00), and 3.08 less hours in sleep without performing childcare (p-value=0.00).

Discussion and Conclusion

Women who pay dowry or marry into wealthier families reported more domestic work, less leisure and spent less time on self-care activities. If dowry is given with the expectation that daughters will lead a better life then the data do not bear out that

expectation. The data suggest that marrying up also comes with more domestic responsibilities and less leisure and time for self-care.

It is noteworthy that productive work, although varying significantly at the district level, was not associated with marriage investments. The pattern of variation at the district level suggests that women's participation in work that is not traditionally considered to be in the female domain is determined more by community normative environment rather than by household or individual level factors. The district of Rajshahi which is known to be less conservative where women have relatively more freedom for long term historical reasons (See Amin, Basu and Stephenson, 2001) also has higher levels of productive work relative to the more conservative district of Chittagong and the poorer district of Sherpur.

We introduced domestic violence in models containing other individual and household characteristics to see if adding domestic violence improved the fit of the model overall and whether it changed the coefficients estimated on other variables, specifically the coefficients related to marital investments. Two factors stand out in this analysis—the marital investments variables are undiminished after the introduction of the domestic violence variable and domestic violence proved to be working to affect time use patterns only for women who did not have child care responsibilities. Thus it appears that violence has a strong lifecycle dimension and is associated with time use only during those stages of the lifecycle when women do not yet have significant childcare responsibilities.

Although this analysis shows interesting and consistent patterns of variations the results pose more questions than they answer. We have not been able to shed light on

why dowry payments persist and continue to rise when there is no evidence that girls who marry with dowry are better off? In order to address that question we need to understand which parents can choose to not pay dowry who not only suffer the lowest violence, but also do better in terms of they spend their time after marriage. We have demonstrated that dowry and hypergamy (the preferred kind of marriage in Bengali tradition) work in similar ways in terms of their association with violence and time use patterns. This suggests that they are both related to the ability to break from societal norms and prescriptions.

Policy makers are paying considerable attention to the phenomenon of rising dowry in contemporary Bangladesh. This analysis while offering substantial evidence that dowry is NOT related to improved well-being at the household level, offers little my way of policy recommendations other than to suggest that the effects of marital investments operate within family dynamics in the household level and may be quite immune to outside interventions.

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Appendix 1. Activities recorded in 24 hour time recall.

Domestic Work	**Productive Work**
Cooking/washing utensils	Cleaning/weeding/planting/irrigation/fe
Cleaning courtyard/house	Look after field
Collecting water	Look after poultry/livestock
Collecting firewood	Harvesting/carrying crop
Washing/drying clothes	Threshing/drying/husking
Repairing house	Selling crop
Drying cowdung for fuel	Collecting vegt. & fruits
Attending sick person	Processing of harvests
Other householdworks	Separating jute fibre
Breastfeeding	Catching and drying fish
Other intensive feeding	Processing of fish
Bathing children	Fishing
Nursing sick child	Feeding fish
Purchasing food and other items	Selling fish
Purchasing non-food items only	Day labour (agri)
Self-Care	Day labour (non-agri)
Rest	Contract labour
Self care	Other labour
Sick	Cottage industry
Eating	Carpenter

Leisure	Private tutor
Playing with child	Pulling rickshaw/van
Playing	Driving motor vehicle
Visiting other district	Begging
Moving around	Repairing farm equipments
Attending social ceremony	Helping business work
Visiting friends/relatives	Slaughtering animal
	Teaching
	Moving around
	Other mechanical work
	Tailoring
	Cutting tree/bamboo

Appendix 2. Results of tobit regressions.

Table 3. Coefficient estimates from tobit regression analysis of time spent in domestic work, Bangladesh, 2003.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
	Dom. Work			Dom. work			Dom. work (CC)			Dom. work (CC)			Dom. work (no CC)			Dom. work (no CC)		
	No DV var.			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*		
	Coef.	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**
Dom. violence				0.08	0.16	0.61				0.07	0.05	0.17				-0.34	0.09	0.00
District:																		
Chapainawanbganj (base)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chittagong	0.28	0.19	0.14	0.27	0.20	0.16	0.14	0.06	0.02	0.13	0.06	0.03	-0.35	0.09	0.00	-0.33	0.09	0.00
Sherpur	0.01	0.14	0.94	0.01	0.14	0.97	0.00	0.04	0.92	-0.01	0.04	0.83	-0.18	0.06	0.01	-0.16	0.06	0.01
Age	0.08	0.03	0.01	0.08	0.03	0.01	-0.01	0.01	0.26	-0.01	0.01	0.25	0.04	0.01	0.00	0.04	0.01	0.00
Wealth dif. betw. husb & wife																		
w.wealth=h.wealth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
w.wealth<h.wealth	0.32	0.15	0.04	0.31	0.15	0.04	-0.05	0.05	0.24	-0.06	0.05	0.21	0.02	0.07	0.76	0.04	0.07	0.62
w.wealth>h.wealth	-0.05	0.16	0.77	-0.04	0.16	0.78	-0.02	0.05	0.62	-0.02	0.05	0.65	0.07	0.07	0.27	0.07	0.07	0.32
Years of educ	-0.03	0.02	0.19	-0.03	0.02	0.21	0.01	0.01	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.03	-0.04	0.01	0.00	-0.04	0.01	0.00
Dowry payment:																		
no dowry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
dowry (lowest quar.)	0.43	0.22	0.05	0.42	0.22	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.46	0.04	0.06	0.54	-0.04	0.10	0.67	-0.01	0.11	0.96
dowry (2nd lowest quar.)	0.59	0.20	0.00	0.58	0.20	0.00	0.02	0.06	0.71	0.02	0.06	0.79	-0.05	0.09	0.53	-0.02	0.09	0.77
dowry (3rd lowest quar.	0.30	0.20	0.12	0.30	0.20	0.13	0.00	0.06	0.94	-0.01	0.06	0.89	-0.07	0.09	0.38	-0.05	0.09	0.53
dowry (highest quar.)	0.38	0.19	0.04	0.38	0.19	0.05	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.09	0.06	0.14	0.04	0.08	0.65	0.05	0.08	0.51
Worked for pay?	-0.10	0.13	0.47	-0.10	0.14	0.45	0.03	0.04	0.39	0.03	0.04	0.45	-0.10	0.06	0.10	-0.08	0.06	0.17
Taken loan?	0.20	0.16	0.20	0.19	0.16	0.22	0.04	0.05	0.42	0.02	0.05	0.49	0.02	0.08	0.82	0.04	0.08	0.56
No. children	0.91	0.09	0.00	0.91	0.09	0.00	0.45	0.03	0.00	0.44	0.03	0.00	-1.07	0.06	0.00	-1.07	0.06	0.00
Sample type	-0.72	0.20	0.00	-0.72	0.20	0.00	-0.20	0.06	0.00	-0.20	0.06	0.00	0.07	0.08	0.34	0.06	0.08	0.42
Constant	4.59	0.65	0.00	4.59	0.65	0.00	0.04	0.20	0.86	0.03	0.20	0.14	-0.02	0.27	0.94	-0.06	0.27	0.82
P-value for addt'l (DV) var.	*0.61*						*0.17*						*0.00*					

Table 4. Coefficient estimates from tobit regression analysis of time spent in leisure activities, Bangladesh, 2003.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
	Leisure			Leisure			Leisure (CC)			Leisure (CC)			Leisure (no CC)			Leisure (no CC)		
	No DV var.			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*		
	Coef.	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**
Dom. Violence				-0.03	0.15	0.85				0.19	0.13	0.16				-1.10	0.40	0.01
District:																		
Chapainawanbganj (base)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chittagong	0.39	0.18	0.03	0.39	0.18	0.03	0.82	0.16	0.00	0.79	0.16	0.00	-1.93	0.46	0.00	-1.89	0.46	0.00
Sherpur	0.70	0.13	0.00	0.70	0.13	0.00	0.57	0.12	0.00	0.55	0.12	0.00	0.18	0.26	0.50	0.24	0.26	0.36
Age	-0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.08	0.03	0.00	-0.08	0.03	0.00	0.09	0.05	0.08	0.10	0.05	0.05
Wealth dif. betw. husb & wife																		
w.wealth=h.wealth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
w.wealth<h.wealth	0.02	0.14	0.87	0.02	0.14	0.86	0.18	0.13	0.15	0.17	0.13	0.17	-0.15	0.30	0.61	-0.10	0.30	0.73
w.wealth>h.wealth	-0.04	0.14	0.79	-0.04	0.14	0.79	-0.04	0.13	0.76	-0.04	0.13	0.79	0.09	0.28	0.75	0.07	0.28	0.79
Years of educ.	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.12	0.03	0.02	0.09	0.01	0.04	0.86	0.00	0.04	0.99
Dowry payment:																		
no dowry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Dowry (lowest quar.)	-0.06	0.19	0.75	-0.06	0.19	0.76	-0.16	0.18	0.38	-0.18	0.18	0.33	0.41	0.41	0.32	0.53	0.42	0.20
Dowry (2nd lowest quar.)	-0.20	0.18	0.26	-0.20	0.18	0.27	0.18	0.17	0.29	0.16	0.17	0.34	-0.86	0.40	0.03	-0.75	0.40	0.06
Dowry (3rd lowest quar.	-0.14	0.18	0.42	-0.14	0.18	0.43	0.04	0.17	0.81	0.03	0.17	0.86	-0.57	0.36	0.11	-0.49	0.36	0.17
Dowry (highest quar.)	-0.26	0.17	0.14	-0.26	0.17	0.14	0.16	0.16	0.33	0.16	0.16	0.33	-0.93	0.34	0.01	-0.88	0.34	0.01
Worked for pay?	-0.26	0.12	0.03	-0.26	0.12	0.03	-0.20	0.11	0.08	-0.21	0.11	0.06	-0.39	0.26	0.13	-0.34	0.26	0.18
Taken loan?	-0.20	0.14	0.16	-0.20	0.14	0.16	-0.18	0.13	0.16	-0.20	0.13	0.14	-0.10	0.32	0.76	-0.02	0.32	0.96
No. children	0.35	0.08	0.00	0.35	0.08	0.00	1.09	0.08	0.00	1.08	0.08	0.00	-2.92	0.25	0.00	-2.93	0.26	0.00
Sample type	0.32	0.18	0.08	0.31	0.18	0.08	-0.16	0.18	0.37	-0.15	0.18	0.41	0.63	0.31	0.04	0.59	0.31	0.06
Constant	1.47	0.59	0.01	1.47	0.59	0.01	0.19	0.57	0.73	0.17	0.57	0.76	-2.14	1.12	0.06	-2.25	1.11	0.04
P-value for addt'l (DV) var.	*0.85*						*0.16*						*0.00*					

Table 5. Coefficient estimates from tobit regression analysis of time spent in productive work, Bangladesh, 2003.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
	Pdtive. work			Pdtive. work			Pdtive. work (CC)			Pdtive. work (CC)			Pdtive. work (no CC)			Pdtive. work (no CC)		
	No DV var.			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*		
	Coef.	SE	P-value	Coef.	SE	P-value	Coef.	SE	P-value	Coef.	SE	P-value	Coef.	SE	P-value	Coef.	SE	P-value
Dom. violence				0.04	0.19	0.85				0.21	0.18	0.26				-1.25	0.40	0.00
District:																		
Chapainawanbganj (base)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chittagong	-0.68	0.23	0.00	-0.68	0.23	0.00	-0.40	0.23	0.08	-0.44	0.23	0.06	-1.58	0.42	0.00	-1.52	0.42	0.00
Sherpur	-0.47	0.17	0.01	-0.47	0.17	0.01	-0.16	0.17	0.34	-0.17	0.17	0.30	-1.01	0.28	0.00	-0.96	0.28	0.00
Age	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.07	0.03	0.05	0.07	0.03	0.04	0.12	0.05	0.03	0.13	0.05	0.02
Wealth dif. betw. husb & wife																		
w.wealth=h.wealth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
w.wealth<h.wealth	0.05	0.18	0.77	0.05	0.18	0.78	0.29	0.17	0.09	0.28	0.17	0.10	-0.19	0.30	0.53	-0.14	0.30	0.65
w.wealth>h.wealth	-0.32	0.18	0.08	-0.32	0.18	0.08	-0.13	0.18	0.48	-0.13	0.18	0.50	-0.46	0.30	0.12	-0.48	0.30	0.11
Years of educ.	-0.07	0.02	0.01	-0.06	0.02	0.01	0.00	0.02	0.89	0.00	0.02	0.98	-0.19	0.04	0.00	-0.20	0.04	0.00
Dowry payment:																		
no dowry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
dowry (lowest quar.)	-0.30	0.25	0.23	-0.30	0.25	0.23	-0.11	0.24	0.64	-0.14	0.24	0.56	-0.54	0.47	0.26	-0.40	0.47	0.40
dowry (2nd lowest quar.)	0.13	0.23	0.56	0.13	0.23	0.57	0.16	0.23	0.48	0.14	0.23	0.55	0.15	0.39	0.69	0.27	0.39	0.49
dowry (3rd lowest quar.	-0.18	0.23	0.43	-0.18	0.23	0.43	-0.01	0.23	0.95	-0.03	0.23	0.91	-0.18	0.38	0.64	-0.09	0.38	0.82
dowry (highest quar.)	-0.11	0.22	0.60	-0.12	0.22	0.59	-0.03	0.23	0.89	-0.04	0.23	0.87	0.20	0.36	0.57	0.26	0.36	0.46
Worked for pay?	1.47	0.16	0.00	1.47	0.16	0.00	1.07	0.15	0.00	1.06	0.15	0.00	0.96	0.26	0.00	1.03	0.26	0.00
Taken loan?	-0.15	0.18	0.40	-0.16	0.18	0.39	0.05	0.17	0.79	0.03	0.17	0.87	-0.51	0.33	0.12	-0.40	0.33	0.23
No. children	-0.32	0.11	0.00	-0.32	0.11	0.00	0.94	0.11	0.00	0.93	0.11	0.00	-3.69	0.27	0.00	-3.71	0.27	0.00
Sample type	0.47	0.23	0.04	0.47	0.23	0.04	-0.33	0.25	0.19	-0.32	0.25	0.22	0.51	0.33	0.12	0.48	0.33	0.15
Constant	-0.80	0.76	0.29	-0.81	0.76	0.29	-3.11	0.79	0.00	-3.16	0.80	0.00	-1.00	1.17	0.39	-1.18	1.17	0.31
P-value for addt'l (DV) var.	*0.85*						*0.26*						*0.00*					

Table 6. Coefficient estimates from tobit regression analysis of time spent in self-care, Bangladesh, 2003.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
	Self			Self			Self (CC)			Self (CC)			Self (no CC)			Self (no CC)		
	No DV var.			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*		
	Coef.	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**
Dom. Violence				-0.37	0.16	0.02				0.08	0.05	0.09				-0.36	0.10	0.00
District:																		
Chapainawanbganj (base)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chittagong	0.38	0.19	0.04	0.43	0.19	0.02	-0.01	0.06	0.91	-0.02	0.06	0.74	-0.30	0.10	0.00	-0.28	0.10	0.01
Sherpur	-0.54	0.14	0.00	-0.51	0.14	0.00	-0.08	0.04	0.06	-0.09	0.04	0.04	-0.32	0.07	0.00	-0.31	0.07	0.00
Age	-0.03	0.03	0.25	-0.03	0.03	0.27	-0.01	0.01	0.30	-0.01	0.01	0.30	0.03	0.01	0.02	0.04	0.01	0.01
Wealth dif. betw. husb & wife																		
w.wealth=h.wealth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
w.wealth<h.wealth	-0.40	0.14	0.01	-0.39	0.14	0.01	0.07	0.05	0.11	0.07	0.05	0.13	-0.02	0.08	0.78	-0.01	0.08	0.92
w.wealth>h.wealth	0.19	0.15	0.20	0.18	0.15	0.22	0.07	0.05	0.14	0.07	0.05	0.13	0.05	0.07	0.47	0.05	0.07	0.53
Years of educ.	0.06	0.02	0.00	0.05	0.02	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.00	-0.03	0.01	0.00
Dowry payment:																		
no dowry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
dowry (lowest quar.)	-0.11	0.21	0.59	-0.07	0.21	0.74	0.01	0.07	0.87	0.00	0.07	0.98	-0.12	0.11	0.31	-0.07	0.11	0.51
dowry (2nd lowest quar.)	-0.50	0.19	0.01	-0.46	0.19	0.02	0.01	0.06	0.89	0.00	0.06	0.99	-0.08	0.10	0.41	-0.05	0.10	0.61
dowry (3rd lowest quar.	-0.28	0.19	0.13	-0.26	0.19	0.17	0.05	0.06	0.42	0.05	0.06	0.46	-0.10	0.09	0.29	-0.07	0.09	0.42
dowry (highest quar.)	-0.33	0.18	0.07	-0.32	0.18	0.08	0.06	0.06	0.35	0.06	0.06	0.36	-0.06	0.09	0.47	-0.05	0.09	0.59
Worked for pay?	-0.62	0.13	0.00	-0.60	0.13	0.00	0.06	0.04	0.15	0.05	0.04	0.19	-0.10	0.07	0.12	-0.09	0.07	0.22
Taken loan?	-0.08	0.15	0.61	-0.05	0.15	0.75	-0.02	0.05	0.62	-0.03	0.05	0.53	0.02	0.08	0.81	0.05	0.08	0.56
No. children	-0.73	0.09	0.00	-0.72	0.09	0.00	0.52	0.03	0.00	0.52	0.03	0.00	-1.26	0.07	0.00	-1.26	0.07	0.00
Sample type	0.12	0.20	0.53	0.10	0.19	0.60	-0.25	0.07	0.00	-0.24	0.07	0.00	0.17	0.08	0.05	0.15	0.08	0.06
Constant	6.74	0.62	0.00	6.77	0.62	0.00	0.21	0.21	0.30	0.10	0.21	0.33	0.36	0.29	0.21	0.32	0.29	0.03
P-value for addt'l (DV) var.	*0.02*						*0.09*						*0.00*					

Table 7. Coefficient estimates from tobit regression analysis of time spent sleeping, Bangladesh, 2003.

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3			Model 4			Model 5			Model 6		
	Sleep			Sleep			Sleep (CC)			Sleep (CC)			Sleep (no CC)			Sleep (no CC)		
	No DV var.			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*			*No DV var.*			*DV var.*		
	Coef.	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**	**Coef.**	**SE**	**P-value**
Dom. violence				0.26	0.09	0.00				1.12	0.33	0.00				-3.08	0.75	0.00
District:																		
Chapainawanbganj (base)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Chittagong	-0.71	0.11	0.00	-0.74	0.11	0.00	0.23	0.40	0.58	0.06	0.40	0.89	-3.27	0.78	0.00	-3.07	0.78	0.00
Sherpur	0.28	0.08	0.00	0.27	0.08	0.00	0.97	0.30	0.00	0.89	0.30	0.00	-1.50	0.54	0.01	-1.34	0.53	0.01
Age	-0.03	0.02	0.04	-0.03	0.02	0.03	-0.07	0.06	0.28	-0.07	0.06	0.27	0.30	0.10	0.00	0.34	0.10	0.00
Wealth dif. betw. husb & wife																		
w.wealth=h.wealth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
w.wealth<h.wealth	0.04	0.08	0.61	0.03	0.08	0.70	0.22	0.31	0.49	0.17	0.31	0.59	0.20	0.59	0.73	0.33	0.59	0.57
w.wealth>h.wealth	-0.02	0.09	0.82	-0.01	0.09	0.87	-0.23	0.33	0.47	-0.20	0.32	0.53	0.42	0.58	0.46	0.36	0.57	0.53
Years of educ.	-0.09	0.01	0.00	-0.08	0.01	0.00	0.06	0.04	0.16	0.07	0.04	0.08	-0.34	0.08	0.00	-0.37	0.08	0.00
Dowry payment:																		
no dowry	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
dowry (lowest quar.)	0.10	0.12	0.42	0.07	0.12	0.58	0.28	0.44	0.53	0.15	0.44	0.73	-0.63	0.88	0.48	-0.28	0.88	0.75
dowry (2nd lowest quar.)	0.12	0.11	0.26	0.10	0.11	0.38	0.56	0.42	0.18	0.45	0.42	0.28	-0.34	0.77	0.65	-0.09	0.77	0.91
dowry (3rd lowest quar.	0.34	0.11	0.00	0.32	0.11	0.00	0.52	0.41	0.20	0.46	0.41	0.26	-0.32	0.72	0.66	-0.12	0.72	0.87
dowry (highest quar.)	0.23	0.10	0.03	0.23	0.10	0.03	0.69	0.40	0.08	0.67	0.40	0.09	-0.46	0.69	0.50	-0.32	0.68	0.64
Worked for pay?	-0.11	0.07	0.14	-0.12	0.07	0.10	0.23	0.28	0.41	0.16	0.28	0.55	-1.03	0.51	0.04	-0.86	0.51	0.09
Taken loan?	0.01	0.09	0.86	-0.01	0.09	0.94	0.27	0.32	0.40	0.18	0.32	0.57	-0.01	0.63	0.99	0.22	0.63	0.72
No. children	0.04	0.05	0.41	0.03	0.05	0.53	4.37	0.20	0.00	4.31	0.20	0.00	-10.97	0.52	0.00	-10.95	0.51	0.00
Sample type	0.00	0.11	0.98	0.02	0.11	0.87	-1.66	0.44	0.00	-1.58	0.43	0.00	1.30	0.65	0.05	1.20	0.65	0.06
Constant	9.89	0.36	0.00	9.88	0.36	0.00	2.17	1.37	0.12	2.05	1.37	0.13	3.40	2.24	0.13	3.09	2.23	0.17
P-value for addt'l (DV) var.	*0.00*						*0.00*						*0.00*					