Redrawing Spatial Color Lines: Hispanic Metropolitan Dispersal, Segregation and Economic Opportunity

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> *In what might be a first for Georgia, students from one high school will attend three separate proms. Toombs County's dubious distinction demonstrates the evolving arithmetic of race in America, where white plus black plus brown doesn't add up to 'one nation under God, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all.' (Chapman, April 12, 2004)*

Toombs County, Georgia—a little town, about 200 miles southeast of Atlanta—made national news when its local high school sponsored three senior proms instead of the usual two.[1] Principal Ralph Hardy, who is black, insisted that racism is not a serious problem at his school; and that segregated proms are a matter of taste: "Latinos, blacks, and whites all prefer their own music and food." A prime example of communities, mostly in the South, that have experienced unprecedented Hispanic population growth, Toombs instantiates the continued struggle for racial integration and its growing complexity as newcomers from Mexico, Central and South America are redrawing color lines, perhaps forcing multiculturalism in places previously colored black and white.

Introduction

[1] Several counties in Georgia allow their students to plan their own proms independent of the school, in part to avoid problems arising from interracial dating. Hispanics students exercised their right to hold a separate prom because of what they described as a racist environment in the school and the ambiguity of choosing between the black and white proms. In 2004, whites comprised just over half of the student population (56 percent); blacks just under one third, and Hispanics the remainder (about 12 percent).

More than any time in the past, Hispanics have consolidated their national presence because of their growing numbers and unprecedented geographic dispersal. Historically concentrated both regionally and in a few large metropolitan areas (Bean and Tienda, 1987), since 1980, but with intensified force during the 1990s, Hispanics have scattered to nontraditional places, redrawing ethno-racial landscapes and reconfiguring segregation patterns along the way (Durand, et al., this volume; Fischer, et al., 2004; Logan, et al., 2002). Buttressed by high levels of immigration from Mexico, Central, and South America, Hispanics' geographic dispersal presents the paradox of rising levels of regional and national integration coupled with resegregation of old gateway cities and spatial separation in several new destinations (Alba and Nee, 1999; Logan, et al., 2004).

Residential location is a powerful indicator of social position that affects life chances because many economic opportunities and social resources—notably affordable housing, quality schools, and jobs that pay family wages—are unequally distributed geographically. Access to transportation, quality health care, public safety, and myriad recreational and social amenities also are dependent on residential location. Spatial segregation accentuates class divisions and, in its extreme forms, creates and perpetuates an urban underclass (Massey and Denton, 1993).

Although Hispanics overall have experiences stable and moderate levels of segregation from whites since 1980, the segregation levels for specific metros reveal a spatial paradox: Hispanic segregation from whites actually *increased* in 124 metros, while Hispanics became more integrated in 86 metros (Logan, et al., 2004). Although black-white residential segregation levels remain consistently above those of Hispanics nationally and in most metro areas, in 240 out of 265 metro areas, blacks became more

spatially integrated with whites (Logan, et al., 2004).[2] To evaluate whether and in what ways the Hispanic dispersal that accelerated during the 1990s reconfigured spatial arrangements, we use multi-ethnic measures of segregation to assess trends and differentials across the largest 100 metropolitan areas.

Using a typology developed by Suro and Singer (2002) to characterize the new Hispanic dispersal, we first summarize changes in the metropolitan distribution of Hispanics. Subsequently we trace changes in segregation levels among the top 100 largest metropolitan areas, comparing large and small, rapidly growing and stable metro areas based on multi-group measures of metropolitan diversity. Throughout we systematically compare Hispanics with blacks in order to understand whether, where and how their new urban choices alter black spatial arrangements. Finally we consider the social, cultural, and economic implications of the Hispanic scattering by examining linguistic segregation, home ownership rates, and employment patterns.

Residential Dispersion and Metropolitanization

Although Hispanics have always been highly concentrated regionally according to national origin, their residential patterns differ from those of blacks and whites in another important way, namely their high levels of urbanicity. As early as 1970, four out of five Hispanics resided in metropolitan areas, mostly in central cities (Bean and Tienda, 1987:146-7). Hispanics' highly urbanized residential history differentiates them from non-Hispanic whites, whose nonmetro presence remains comparatively strong and their metropolitanization experience also differs from blacks, whose mass exodus from the

[2] In general, indices of dissimilarity below .3 are considered low, those between .3 and .6 moderate and those in excess of .6 high. Thus, while black segregation remains high, the .1 decline is highly appreciable.

rural South after World War II forged a distinct urban experience (Jaynes and Williams, 1989). Unlike blacks, Hispanics' forged their urban imprints through intra-metropolitan exchanges, including international flows.

Even as Latin American immigrants destined to established 'port of entry' cities fueled the growing Hispanic presence in Texas and California's largest cities (Frey 1995), and as Chicago, New York, and Miami continued to serve as prominent gateways to U.S. job and housing markets, Census 2000 confirmed what many local school boards and governments already knew: that Hispanics are making new urban choices. Using the largest 100 metropolitan areas, Suro and Singer (2002) characterized the changing metropolitan distribution of the Hispanic population from 1980 to the present using a classification scheme that distinguishes among four types of metropolitan areas.[3] These are: (1) *Established Metros*, dubbed the "Hispanic Heartland," which consists of 16 major metro areas, including the top immigrant gateway cities where Hispanics have traditionally resided; (2) *New Destination Metros*, include 51 urban areas with relatively small Hispanic populations in 1980 that witnessed very rapid growth; (3) *Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs* represent 11 metro areas with large 1980 populations that grew at above-average rates over the next two decades; and (4) *Small Hispanic Places* include 22 metro areas sidestepped by the Hispanic urban revival[4].

Table 1 summarizes and supplements their results for the 100 largest metro areas by portraying the complete metro-nonmetro distribution for the total U.S. and the

[3] Their four-fold classification allocates metro areas according to whether their Hispanic base population exceeded or was lower than the 1980 national average (8 percent) and whether their Hispanic population growth was higher or lower than the 145 percent average for the 100 largest metro areas.

[4] Although the so-called "new" destinations are not entirely brand-new to Hispanics, the growth of the Hispanic population in these areas is unprecedented. Suro and Singer (2002) calculate that from 1980 to 2000 the Hispanic population grew 303% in the *New Hispanic Metros* and 235% in *Fast Growing Hispanic Hubs.*

Hispanic populations. Also displayed is the ethno-racial composition of each stratum, which is crucial to appreciate where Hispanics potentially are redrawing spatial color lines. Although metropolitanization of the total U.S. population inched up over the past two decades, Hispanics are still more likely to live in metro areas than the typical U.S. resident. Already in 1980, over three-in-four Hispanics lived in the largest metropolitan areas, while only 62 percent of all U.S. residents did so even by 2000. An additional 13 percent of all Hispanics resided in metro areas that were not among the largest 100 compared with 19 percent of the total population. Only 11 percent of Hispanics lived in nonmetro areas in 1980 compared with nearly one-fourth of all US residents; by 2000, these shares fell, respectively, to 9 and 20 percent.

(Table 1 About Here)

Rapid growth relative to native whites and blacks permitted the Hispanic population share to rise in all of the top 100 metropolitan areas, but this process was hardly uniform. In the *Established Metros,* Hispanic population shares rose from 20 to 32 percent over the past two decades, while the black share remained stable, around 14 percent of the stratum total. Hispanicization of the *Established Metros* is all the more impressive because many of these cities grew substantially during the period, with immigration being a powerful motor driving up the foreign-born share of the population from 17 to 27 percent.[5] *Fast Growing Hispanic Hubs* experienced the most dramatic ethno-racial recomposition over the last 20 years: their Hispanic population share doubled, from 14 to 28 percent, while the black population share hovered around 9-10

[5] Unfortunately, the Geolytics Census CD Neighborhood Change Database lacks tables by birthplace for Hispanics. Therefore, we are unable to examine the growth of Hispanic immigrants across metro area types. However, for the *New Destinations* and *Fast Growing* hubs, Hispanics comprise the majority of the foreign-born and new arrivals in particular.

percent. Immigration fueled the rising Hispanic presence in these hubs, as the foreign-born share of the population more than doubled, rising from eight to 18 percent.

Especially interesting is the sheer number of *New Hispanic Metros*—"so many across so many states amounts to a demographic phenomenon of some consequence" (Suro and Singer, 2002: 5). Unlike the *Established* or *Fast Growing* metros, where Hispanics' were numerically dominant in 1980 and became more so over time, blacks remain the numerically and proportionately dominant in both the *New Hispanic Destinations* and the *Small Hispanic Places*. However, Hispanics have carved out a presence in both metro area types. For example, in 1980, blacks outnumbered Hispanics by a ratio of 6.5 to 1 in the *New Hispanic Destinations*, but by 2000, the ratio plummeted to 2:1. By comparison, the black to Hispanic ratio in the *Small Hispanic Places* was higher both at the outset and end of the period—8.5:1 in 1980 versus 4.5:1 in 2000—but the direction and magnitude of change is clear. *New Destination Metros* and *Small Hispanic Places* differ in another important way, namely the salience of immigration in population diversification: in for the former the immigrant share doubled (from 5 to 10 percent of the total), while in the latter, the foreign-born share inched up from five to six percent in 20 years.

Ethno-racial profiles of nonmetro and small metro areas were also reconfigured as the Hispanic and black shares evened out, but the balancing was driven by the rising Hispanic presence—from 5 to 9 percent in the remaining metro areas and from three to six percent in nonmetro areas. Whether the Hispanicization of metropolitan America redraws spatial color lines in urban places long divided into black and white into three-way splits is an empirical question with far reaching implications for integration.

Although available data precludes a rigorous assessment of the tenet that Hispanics are redrawing color lines by sharing social space with blacks, whites, and Asians, our systematic description of trends and differentials in residential segregation, social isolation, and spatially constructed class divisions provides compelling descriptive evidence.

Because much of the Hispanic urban dispersal is occurring in a multi-ethnic context and against the backdrop of mass immigration, to address whether and how Hispanics' residential contours facilitate or impede the integration of black, Asian and white populations must be factored in the analyses. It is not clear, for example, whether the decline in black segregation levels result because Hispanics' are sharing space with them, or with whites, or both. Accordingly, we use measures suited to portray spatial separation patterns in multi-ethnic contexts. Considering how Hispanics' urban dispersal plays out in cultural isolation and income segregation patterns provides further clues about their socioeconomic integration prospects in old and new settings.

Metropolitan Diversification and Multi-ethnic Segregation

Segregation, the uneven spatial distribution of groups, is produced by two countervailing forces—assimilation and succession—which depend on migration patterns and economic opportunities. Before the onset of mass immigration during the 1970s, spatial assimilation trumped residential succession as the dominant mechanism driving Hispanic residential segregation. According to Massey (1979a; 1979b; 1981), with the exception of Puerto Ricans living in New York, in 1980 Hispanics were only moderately

segregated from Anglos—in sharp contrast with the apartheid levels experienced by blacks (Massey and Denton, 1993).[6]

Two forces that shape segregation patterns began to change during the 1970s. First, the economic restructuring following the oil-embargo of the mid-1970s was accompanied by higher returns to education following several decades of wage convergence between college and high-school-educated workers (Danziger and Gottschalk, 1995). Second, a new wave of mass migration was unleashed, which gained momentum during the 1980s and continued through the 1990s. Residential segregation tends to rise when the economy goes sour because immigrants and poor ethnics cluster into established neighborhoods and falling incomes undermine spatial assimilation. Massey and Denton (1987) found lower Hispanic segregation from whites between 1970 and 1980 compared with blacks for 60 largest metro areas. Although the average segregation level across the 60 largest metro areas remained moderate, around .44 in both 1970 and 1980, segregation rose in metros where Hispanic immigrants settled. For example, by 1980, the spatial separation of Hispanics from Anglos in Los Angeles approached that of New York City, traditionally the most segregated Hispanic city. Chicago's Hispanics also became more segregated from whites during the 1970s (Bean and Tienda, 1987). Increased Hispanic segregation was accompanied by lower levels of exposure to and contact with Anglos.

Several studies of post-1980 trends reveal lower levels of racial segregation in the more diverse metro areas, although without exception, blacks remained more spatially separated from whites than either Hispanics or Asians. For example, Frey and Farley

[6] In general, indices of dissimilarity below .3 are considered low, those between .3 and .6 are considered moderate and those in excess of .6 are high.

(1996) examined segregation in 18 multi-ethnic metro areas during the 1980s and show that black as well as Asian and Hispanic segregation declined more rapidly in these contexts, as it did in places experiencing rapid growth in minority populations. Analyzing a much larger number of metro areas, Logan and colleagues (2004) showed a continuing decline in black-white segregation during the 1990s. Of the 255 metro areas they examined, black-white segregation fell in all but 15 between 1980 and 2000. Yet, and by contrast, aggregate Hispanic-white segregation remained relatively unchanged, except for a slight increase during the 1990s. However, this apparent stability concealed highly diverse experiences across metro areas: Hispanic-white segregation *rose* in 124 of 210 metro areas examined, but it fell in 86.[7] That their assessment is based on segregation measures that make binary comparisons without regard to the presence or relative size of other groups leaves unanswered questions about whether and how color lines may be changing, and in particular, whether the growing Hispanic presence softens, if not redraws, color boundaries in social space.

Alternative segregation measures yield different insights about inter-group relations. For example, Iceland and his colleagues (2002) show that Hispanics (and Asians) experienced increases in three types of segregation between 1980 and 2000, namely evenness (dissimilarity), exposure (p* isolation index), and clustering (spatial proximity). This confirms that, despite sustained declines over two decades, black segregation remains above that of Hispanics and Asians in all three dimensions. Moreover, the drop in black segregation was insufficient to alter hypersegregation,

[7] Logan et al. 2004 required a minimum of 2500 minority group members to consider an SMSA for inclusion in their analysis. Therefore, their final sample includes 255 metro areas for the analysis of black-white segregation; 210 for the analysis of Hispanic-white segregation; and 166 for the analysis of Asian-white segregation.

defined as high levels of segregation on several dimensions, including evenness, centralization, concentration, exposure, and clustering. In 2000, Blacks were hypersegregated in 29 metro areas compared with only two for Hispanics, namely Los Angeles and New York City (Wilkes and Iceland, 2004). Except for Chicago, few of the black hypersegregated metro areas have large Hispanic populations.

It is conceivable that, except for the black hypersegregated metro areas, population diversification facilitated the decline in racial residential segregation, particularly in locations that became more ethnically diverse. This is difficult to discern using segregation measures based solely on binary comparisons. Therefore, several researchers have used multi-group entropy indices to examine the relationship between growing diversity of places and segregation patterns. For example, based on entropy indices of overall diversity and segregation for all US cities, Iceland (2003) concludes that increases in metro area diversity between 1980 and 2000 resulted in *higher* segregation for all groups except blacks, which he (like Frey and Farley, 1996) interprets as evidence of a weakened racial divide.[8]

In multi-ethnic contexts, such as those increasingly inhabited by Hispanics, the advantage of entropy indices over conventional segregation measures is obvious. Because we are interested in understanding the consequences of Hispanics' urban dispersal for patterns of spatial separation, we use entropy indices that measure the mutual segregation among multiple racial groups. The following section first portrays how Hispanic

[8] Not everyone finds increasing segregation for Hispanics. For instance, Fischer (2003) finds declining Hispanic segregation levels based on the 50 largest metro areas plus 10 areas of high Hispanic concentration. The inconsistent conclusions of these two studies reflect differences in the sample of cities used (all cities versus the largest 60) and the methods. Fischer used the family income tables to calculate bivariate race and class multi-group entropy scores, while Iceland used the 100% person level data to regress diversity on segregation measures.

segregation patterns evolved since 1980 compared with blacks in the top 100 metro areas stratified according to the Suro-Singer typology, and subsequently considers the implications of spatial arrangements for social isolation and economic segregation.

Spatial Segregation by Types of Metro Areas

The segregation index, denoted by $\mathbf{H}_i$, summarizes both the number and relative size of groups in a metropolitan area; the maximum score is given by the natural log of the number of groups in the calculation, but this maximum is only achieved when all groups have equal representation, a condition seldom met.[9] Like most segregation indices, lower values indicate higher levels of integration, while higher values signify more segregation.[10] Our calculations are based on a maximum of four groups—Hispanics, blacks, whites and a residual "other" group. The four-group entropy index, $\mathbf{H}_M$, indicates the overall degree to which the four groups are separated from each other. We also compute a series of binary comparisons using the entropy index, $\mathbf{H}_H$, $\mathbf{H}_B$ **and** $\mathbf{H}_{FB}$, which depict how much overall segregation derives from spatial separation between Hispanics versus all others ($\mathbf{H}_H$) and blacks versus all others ($\mathbf{H}_B$). $\mathbf{H}_{FB}$ reveals how segregated the foreign born are from natives.[11] We also examine changes in ethnic diversity ($\mathbf{E}_D$), a calculation used to derive the entropy index that summarizes the overall race/ethnic mix in a metropolitan area. While this measure by itself is *not* a measure of

[9] See Iceland, Weinberg, and Steinmetz, 2002, Appendix B, "Measures of Residential Segregation."
[10] Reardon and Yun (2001) discuss the relationship between the scales on which the dissimilarity and entropy indices are based. Although the correlation between D and H is .9, absolute values of entropy indices are about half the size of those based on the dissimilarity index. Following the convention that .10 is a substantively meaningful change in segregation, a comparable change in segregation based on the entropy index is .05, which is roughly equivalent to a .10 change in D.
[11] Because our data do not allow us to disaggregate the foreign born into constituent race/ethnic groups, the foreign born can be of any race/ethnicity. The foreign born versus native entropy index therefore cannot be directly compared to the other entropy index calculations in Table 2 because there is not mutually exclusive relationship between the foreign born measures and the other race/ethnic categorizations in our data.

segregation, it is a useful summary description of the degree to which various groups are represented in a metropolitan area.

Table 2 portrays temporal and spatial variation in metropolitan diversification and Hispanic segregation levels for the four metro types and selected metro areas that illustrate the high, low and modal range within area types based on 2000 indices. Segregation indices for blacks and all foreign-born are presented for comparative purposes. Changes in the diversity index, $\mathbf{E}_{D}$, qualify the rising ethno-racial diversification of the largest metropolitan areas. Since 1980, as the Hispanic composition of the top 100 metro areas doubled (from 8 to 16 percent) and their immigrant composition rose from 9 to 15 percent, overall diversity increased 31 percent. However, the greatest diversification occurred in the *New Hispanic Destinations* and the *Fast Growing Hubs*, 46 and 33 percent respectively, compared with increases of 14 and 19 percent for the *Established* and *Small Hispanic Metros*, respectively. Although Hispanics are not the only group driving metropolitan diversification, in the *Fast Growing* and *New Destination* metros, their dispersion is the major force reshaping the urban landscape.

(Table 2 About Here)

Overall segregation, indexed by $\mathbf{H}_{M}$, declined 22 percent between 1980 and 2000 in the largest 100 metro areas. However, the extent to which groups were spatially separated from each other declined unevenly among the metro strata. The greatest drop in overall segregation occurred in the *New Hispanic Destinations*, where $\mathbf{H}_{\mathbf{M}}$ fell .096 index points, or roughly twice the level that represents a significant entropy decline. Specific new destination metro areas, such as Atlanta and Raleigh-Durham, registered larger declines—circa 35 percent—during the two decade period. By comparison, the drop in

overall segregation in the *Fast Growing* and *Established Hispanic Metros* was more moderate, 15 to 17 percent, respectively, although high Hispanic density metros, such as Austin and San Antonio, registered appreciable declines in overall segregation—on the order of 30 to 35 percent. That even the *Small Hispanic Places* witnessed a sizeable drop in overall segregation (18 percent) implicates both secular and group specific shifts in the reconfiguration of social space.

Trends in overall segregation reflect the net change in spatial separation of the constituent groups, whose shifting spatial arrangements often pull in opposed directions, as the group-specific comparisons reveal. Hispanic segregation from other groups, indexed by $\mathbf{H}_{H}$, is of special interest. For the largest 100 metro areas, this metric indicates a moderate overall *increase* (16 percent) in the level of Hispanic segregation—most of which occurred during the 1990s—yet there was enormous variation in both the magnitude and pattern of change among area types and specific metro areas. For example, Hispanic segregation from other groups rose 33 percent in the *New Destinations*, mainly during the 1990s. In the *Established* metros, however, Hispanics became modestly integrated spatially during the 1980s, but not uniformly across specific metros. By comparison, changes in black segregation were almost uniformly negative, albeit of differing magnitude, with the *Fast Growing Hubs* registering the largest average decline of 48 percent.

Among the *Established Metros*, Hispanics became more spatially integrated over the two decades both in San Antonio (25 percent) and Miami (10 percent). Yet, Los Angeles, currently the fourth largest Mexican city in the world—the 2nd largest if the LA-Riverside-Orange County metropolitan area is considered—witnessed a 5 percent

increase in Hispanic segregation since 1980 even as black segregation fell 44 percent. Atlanta and Raleigh-Durham, two prominent *New Hispanic Destinations* also, recorded substantial increases in Hispanic segregation—over 200 and 88 percent, respectively, even as black segregation dropped by a third in each. The moderate increase in Hispanic segregation in the *Fast Growing Hubs* also conceals opposed trends among specific California and Texas metro areas. Orange County's 45 percent increase in Hispanic segregation contrasts with modest integration of Hispanics in Austin, yet blacks became more residentially integrated in both metros. In *Small Hispanic Places*, the modest average rise in Hispanic segregation belies the 47 percent increase in Detroit (.07 entropy points) when blacks became slightly more integrated.

That increased segregation in the *New Destinations* and the *Small Hispanic* places mainly involved greater spatial distances between Hispanics and all other groups combined implicates immigration as a key social force that reconfigured spatial divisions because of the higher propensity of the foreign born, and particularly new arrivals, to settle in neighborhoods with their compatriots.[12] Logan's (2003) finding that immigrants contributed disproportionately to suburban growth during the 1990s is consistent with evidence in Table 2 regarding Hispanic re-segregation the *New Destinations* and *Fast Growing Hubs*. During the past two decades, the largest 100 metro areas registered a 44 percent increase in immigrants' segregation from others—more than double the overall average for Hispanics—but the patterns and levels differ across metro areas. Reflecting historical trends in immigrant settlement, in 1980 immigrants' spatial separation from

[12] Unfortunately, the Neighborhood Change Database does not tabulate immigrant status by Hispanic origin, therefore our inferences for the foreign-born population do not apply exclusively to Hispanics. However, most of the foreign born residing in the *New Destination* and the *Fast Growing Metros* are Hispanic.

other groups was highest in the *Established Metros* and lowest in the *New Hispanic Destinations*[13].

Of greater interest than the average values of the entropy index are their valences across areas and evolution over time. For example, among the *Established Areas*, immigrants' segregation rose 18 percent in Chicago, but fell 25 and 40 percent, respectively, in Los Angeles and Miami. Even more dramatic are the changes in spatial arrangements of immigrants destined to *New Hispanic Areas.* Atlanta witnessed a 95 percent upsurge in segregation of immigrants from other groups, yet in Raleigh-Durham the foreign born became more spatially integrated during the 1990s. The *Fast Growing Hubs* also registered increased segregation of immigrants, but the 41 percent average increase masks wide ranging levels of resegregation, from 14 percent in Houston to 100 percent in Austin. In the metro areas where Hispanics comprise but a small population share, segregation of the foreign-born rose 82 percent in Detroit, yet by very modest amounts in the *Small Hispanic Places*.

Although both blacks and Hispanics became more spatially integrated in many metro areas, such as Gary, Indiana, or Newark, New Jersey, the generally steeper reductions in black compared with Hispanic segregation suggests the plausible hypothesis that the Hispanic dispersal is softening established color lines and weakening established race and class divisions (Morenoff and Tienda, 1997; Logan, 2003). Logan (2003) and others have dubbed this phenomenon the "buffer hypothesis." For example, Morenoff and Tienda (1997) showed that growth and residential concentration of Mexican immigrants in Chicago's inner city transformed several inner-city neighborhoods

[13] The low index values partly reflect relative group sizes and the fact that foreign-born Hispanics contribute both to the numerator and denominator of the calculation.

experiencing succession into working class hubs rather than underclass ghettos. Changing exposure of blacks and Hispanics to other groups lends support to the buffer hypothesis because as the Hispanic presence in a city increases (and, consequently, ethnic diversity), segregation among all groups and segregation experienced by blacks from all others decline.

Table 3 reports (P*) indices depicting the exposure of Hispanics and blacks to whites, blacks, Hispanics and others from 1980 to 2000, averaged for the area types examined throughout this chapter. The exposure index indicates the probability of sharing a tract with a member of a given race group, but when all possible combinations are represented, it reveals the average share of each group present in the typical neighborhood for that group. For instance, the exposure of Hispanics to whites at a level of .299 in *Established Hispanic* metros indicates that in 2000, the typical Hispanic in these metropolitan areas lived in a neighborhood that was 30 percent white.

(Table 3 About Here)

Overall, Table 3 lends support to the hypothesis that the rising Hispanic presence not only has forged new spatial imprints, but also has redrawn color lines by driving a wedge in the black/white residential dichotomy. However, it is important to note that we draw these inferences as descriptive rather than causal outcomes. Although black segregation declined in most metro areas during the past two decades—in many places rather dramatically—their spatial integration was not due to increased contact with whites. Rather, blacks have, on average, reduced their contact with whites in *Established* and *Fast Growing* metros because their overall segregation has declined through greater contact with Hispanics and, to a lesser extent, Asians. In fact, the correlation between

black segregation and the percent Hispanic is -.305. Hispanics also experienced declining exposure to whites across *all* metro types because they were more likely to share a neighborhood with co-ethnics in 2000 compared with 1980. In fact, over the last two decades, Hispanics grew more isolated in *Established* and *Fast Growing Metro* areas. For example, in 2000 the average neighborhood composition for Hispanics in *Established* metropolitan areas was 55 percent Hispanic, 30 percent white, 7 percent black, and 8 percent other. However, in the *New Destinations* and *Small Hispanic* metros, Hispanics have much higher exposures to both whites and blacks.

The bewildering diversity of metropolitan transformation lends itself to several generalizations supporting the claim *that the Hispanic dispersal was largely responsible for the ethno-racial reconfiguration of social space* since 1980, but particularly during the 1990s. First, with very few exceptions, the largest metro areas became more diverse since 1980, but the greatest ethno-racial diversification occurred during the 1990s and in the *Fast Growing* and *New Hispanic Destinations*. In general *Established Hispanic Metros* featured the highest levels of diversity through 1990, but in 2000 the *Fast Growing Hubs* averaged higher diversity indices. Second, multi-group segregation levels were uniformly lower in 2000 compared with 1980, and the range of variation in overall levels of spatial separation among metro areas contracted as well.[14] Third, immigration has accentuated Hispanic resegregation patterns, but not uniformly among metro areas because this impact depends on the highly variable sizes of the black and Hispanic populations before the upsurge in migration. Finally, widespread declines in overall black segregation by any measure used, but particularly in areas where the Hispanic presence

[14] The standard deviation for the four group entropy index for the 100 metros declined from 0.12 in 1980 to 0.09 in 2000.

rose dramatically, lend support to the "buffering" hypothesis. This inference is buttressed by evidence that falling black segregation is associated with an increased probability of contact with Hispanics and other nonwhites, which is enabled by the increased presence of these groups.

If rising metropolitan diversity lowers intra-group segregation levels either because it triggers succession, is accompanied by greater suburbanization, and/or modifies relative group sizes, it does not necessarily follow that other forms of spatial separation, including school segregation, will be avoided. Because spatial arrangements have broad reaching implications for the nature and pace of social and economic integration, the final section illustrates how the Hispanic dispersion is transforming metropolitan areas in cultural, social and economic terms.

Social and Economic Transformation of Urban Spaces

The social significance of the Hispanic scattering transcends physical space in multiple arenas, including housing, schooling, and labor markets. Residential clustering results either when newcomers choose to live near ethnic compatriots, or when groups are systematically excluded from selected neighborhoods and school districts via housing discrimination and discriminatory lending policies. In this section we examine several correlates of residential segregation including social and cultural isolation, school and social class segregation, and labor force activity.

Social and Cultural Isolation

Cultural and social isolation may remain salient for Hispanics, and the foreign-born in particular, who tend to congregate in high density immigrant neighborhoods until

they become familiar with U.S. institutions and acquire proficiency in English. Using two measures of segregation—the dissimilarity and isolation indices—Iceland and Lake (2004) show that Hispanic segregation from whites differs by nativity status and according to nationality. Their empirical support for the spatial assimilation hypothesis is bolstered by evidence that native-born Hispanics are less segregated from whites than their foreign-born counterparts, and that recent immigrants are more segregated than longer-term residents. Although binary comparisons based on measures of evenness are less informative by themselves because increasingly Hispanics reside in multi-ethnic urban places, they indicate that immigrants are more socially segregated from whites than the native born, confirming findings of many prior studies.

Language is a powerful reason immigrants, especially recent arrivals, huddle in ethnically dense neighborhoods. By Logan's (2003) calculations, in 2000 the typical Hispanic immigrant resided in a neighborhood where more than one-third (37 percent) of the residents were themselves foreign-born and where over half (58 percent) of the neighbors spoke a language other than English at home. These averages compare with 28 and 50 percent, respectively, for native born Hispanics. Using the four-fold metropolitan area typology to examine changes in social isolation that result from the Hispanic dispersion, Table 4 portrays the evolution of social isolation of Hispanics and immigrants, as well as the trajectory of linguistic isolation.

Hispanics became increasingly isolated in all metropolitan areas during the 1980s and 1990s, but there are large differences in the *degree* of isolation experienced across metros. For instance, in 2000 the average Hispanic isolation in *Established Hispanic Metros* (.549) 2000 was over four times greater than the average for *Small Hispanic*

Places (.105); in 1980 the comparable ratio was six-fold. Even within metro types, there is considerable variability in isolation levels. In Miami, one of the larger *Established Metros*, the average Hispanic lived in a neighborhood that was 71 percent Hispanic in 2000—up from .583 in 1980—while the average Hispanic in Chicago lived in a neighborhood that was only 48 percent Hispanic. Social isolation also rose in *Fast Growing Hubs,* such that in 2000 Hispanic residents lived in neighborhoods that were 42 percent Hispanic, but in 1980 the average isolation level was only 29 percent. Partly because Hispanics comprise relatively small population shares in the *New Destinations* and especially in the *Small Hispanic Places*, their social isolation is considerably lower there: on average, their Hispanic compatriots comprised well below 20 percent of the neighborhood.

(Table 4 About Here)

In most metro areas, Hispanic residential and linguistic isolation is most pronounced for immigrants relative to the population as a whole. Moreover, immigrants became more socially isolated during the 1990s, following relative stability and some declines in social isolation during the 1980s. The foreign born were most isolated in *Established Hispanic Metros:* in 2000 the average immigrant lived in a neighborhood where almost one in three residents were foreign born. Immigrant isolation was even higher in some *Established Metros,* such as Miami, where the average neighborhood was over half foreign born. By contrast, in *Small Hispanic Places* and *New Hispanic Destinations,* only around 10 percent of the average immigrant resident's neighborhood was also foreign born in 2000.

Since 1980, linguistic isolation nearly trebled in the largest metro areas, but the *Small Hispanic Places* are an exception.[15] Over the short to medium term, the residential clustering of immigrants with poor English skills may impede language acquisition, which in turn slows the process of social assimilation and economic incorporation. In the *Established Metros* and *Fast-Growing Hubs,* typical residents live with neighbors among whom over one-quarter percent speak little or no English. Linguistic isolation is particularly marked in Miami, where in 2000 the average resident lacking English proficiency shared a neighborhood where 40 percent of the residents spoke English poorly or not at all. By contrast, in *New Destinations,* less than 10 percent of the typical resident's neighbors also lack proficiency in English. The *New Destination* and *Fast Growing Metros,* where the presence of immigrants surged since 1980, exhibit appreciable variation in the level and evolution of linguistic isolation. In Atlanta, for example, where linguistic isolation was virtually non-existent (.008) in 1980, linguistic jumped to .284 by 2000. Austin and Houston also witnessed large increases in linguistic isolation.

Overall, *residential isolation for Hispanics, the foreign born, and those with limited English speaking abilities, is most pronounced in Established Hispanic Metros followed fairly closely by Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs.* That Hispanics comprised nearly one-third of the 2000 population in these areas partly explains the consistency of these results because prior segregation research shows that blacks and Hispanics are generally more segregated in cities where their absolute and relative numbers are higher. Although social and cultural isolation for Hispanics, the foreign born, and those with limited

[15] Linguistic isolation (P*) is defined as the probability of persons speaking poor or no English sharing a neighborhood with others of comparable English language fluency.

English ability is on the rise in *New Hispanic Destinations* and *Small Hispanic Places*, because their population shares remain relatively low compared with the *Established* or *Fast Growing Hubs*, their social isolation levels also are appreciably lower—at least for the time being.

Economic Segregation

Because social space is stratified economically as well as by race and ethnicity, the changes in residential segregation patterns produced by the Hispanic dispersal are closely associated with class integration. For example, Massey and Fischer (1999) compared 1990 black, Hispanic and Asian class segregation from nonHispanic whites using two indices of segregation—dissimilarity and exposure. Not surprisingly, they find that poor families experience least amount of contact with whites; that poor blacks and Hispanics experience higher spatial segregation than their affluent same race counterparts; and that these relationships are more rigid in central cities than the suburbs. In a follow-up study that used multi-group entropy measures, Fischer (2003) finds that poor Hispanics are nearly as segregated from other groups as are poor blacks, despite the secular decline in segregation of the poor from both groups.

These spatial divisions have profound implications for quality of life. Logan (2002) determined that disparities in neighborhood quality experienced by blacks and Hispanics compared with whites widened during the 1990s. Nor is the Hispanic-white disparity in average neighborhood quality explained by differences in individual income. Logan finds that during the 1990s, not only did the Hispanic-white income gap increase in 45 of the 50 metro areas with large Hispanic populations, but also that Hispanics' propensity to reside in less affluent areas rose relative to whites.

Table 5 summarizes changes in economic segregation using entropy indices that compare the spatial segregation of all poor persons, poor Hispanics, and poor blacks from all other urban co-residents. The most striking result is how much more segregated poor Hispanics and blacks are from others compared with the poor overall. Among the 100 largest metros collectively, poor Hispanics were 1.9 times more segregated from others than were the poor in general, while poor blacks were 2.6 times more segregated from others than the poor overall. Although poor blacks and Hispanics remain more highly segregated from others compared with the poor in general, both groups have become more integrated economically since 1980. Specifically, poor blacks and Hispanics witnessed a 20 and 13 percent decline, respectively, in economic segregation from other groups since 1980. Yet, during the same period, economic segregation of all poor from other groups rose by 8 percent across the 100 largest metro areas. These seeming inconsistencies derive from highly divergent patterns of economic segregation across metro types.

(Table 5 About Here)

The evolution of class segregation by race and Hispanic orgin depend on groups' spatial configurations at the beginning of the period. Between 1980 and 2000 class segregation was highest for both blacks and Hispanics in the *New Hispanic Destinations* and *Small Places*, where on average, Hispanics comprised fewer than five percent of the population. Although class segregation registered moderate to significant declines in both metro types, in 2000 the average entropy index value in *New Destinations* stood at .235 for poor Hispanics and .311 for poor blacks (compared with .274 and .401, respectively, in 1980). Class segregation was lower in the *Fast-Growing* and *Established Metros* for

both groups over the same time period. These general trends in class segregation run counter to those observed for social and linguistic isolation (Table 4), where Hispanics experienced greater isolation in the *Fast Growing* and *Established Metros.* Hispanics in these areas are more likely to live among their own group in these metro areas. Yet, in the *New Destinations* and *Small Places*, Hispanics have greater contact with blacks and the blacks in these cities themselves are more segregated. That Hispanics' economic segregation is significantly higher than their spatial separation by ethnicity in these cities is telling because generally racial divisions by space are higher than class divisions.

Poor Hispanics were *less* segregated in the *Established* and *Fast Growing Hubs* than in other places. For example, in Los Angeles, the entropy index value for poor Hispanics versus others in 2000 was only .182, which is well below that of blacks. In the *Fast-Growing* metropolis of Sacramento, poor Hispanics had an entropy index score of .182, slightly higher than the 1980 value of .159. And, for the Orange County metro area, the entropy index score of .226 was virtually unchanged over the two-decade period. By contrast, *New Destinations* like Milwaukee and Atlanta exhibited markedly higher levels of segregation for poor Hispanics in 2000 (.393 and .225, respectively), which converged with those of blacks over time. *Coupled with the fact that in the New Destination metros Hispanic segregation from other racial groups is, on average,* ***lower*** *than the segregation of their poor from all other groups, these trends in class segregation suggest that social boundaries are being redrawn along economic rather than ethnic lines—at least for Hispanics.*

Even though changes in class segregation vary somewhat among specific metro areas, *class segregation shrunk more for blacks than for Hispanics across all four metro*

area types. In the *Fast-Growing Hubs*, class segregation dropped 26 percent for blacks compared with 7 percent for Hispanics, and in *New Destination* places, comparable declines were 22 percent for blacks and 14 percent for Hispanics. The growing Hispanic presence was accompanied by a lowering of class segregation for blacks even as their population shares remained stable. These trends have profound implications for the contours of race and ethnic economic and social well being because they are highly correlated with school options. That is, spatial divisions by income classes determine whether youth attend quality or underperforming schools; who owns and who rents their dwellings; and job options. We briefly examine each of these outcomes.

School Segregation

Following the historic *Brown* decision, court-ordered school desegregation that initially included bussing spawned a spate of social science research tracking progress toward integration across schools and districts (Black, 1992; Coleman, 1966). Although Hispanic school segregation has increased steadily as the population grew, Hispanics were not even considered in school segregation litigation until 19 years after the Brown decision (Orfield and Lee, 2004).[16] Therefore, during the 1960s and 1970s, researchers primarily tracked trends in racial desegregation of schools and districts (Coleman, 1966; Taeuber, 1975a; 1975b). The changing urban landscape coupled with mounting evidence that inner city school resegregation was on the rise brought into sharp focus the rising concentration of Hispanic students (Orfield and Lee, 2004; Reardon and Yun, 2001). Although in schools Hispanic youth remain more integrated with whites than their black counterparts (.58 versus .65 based on D), both groups became more segregated during the

[16] The *Méndez v. Westminister School District* decision actually predated the Brown decision and served as a testing ground for many of the arguments and actors involved in the widely celebrated, historic *Brown* decision (Ferg-Cadina, 2004).

1990s, following the Supreme Court decision that allowed districts to end their segregation plans (Lewis Mumford Center, 2002).

The pernicious effects of school segregation derive from its divisive class underpinnings. Resource poor schools have more unqualified teachers, offer more remedial courses and fewer advanced placement courses, hence their students—disproportionately black and Hispanic—fare poorly on standardized achievement tests (Schneider, et al., this volume). In 2000, black and Hispanic students attended segregated schools where two out of three students were poor or near poor. Moreover, social class segregation has been on the rise (Lewis Mumford Center, 2002). Orfield and Lee (2004) note that 88 percent of the intensely minority segregated schools (i.e., with less than 10 percent whites) also concentrated poverty, but equally segregated white schools were only 15 percent poor. Orfield, Disher and Luce (2003) report that the two school districts in the greater Miami region became poorer and their degree of income segregation increased even as segregation eased slightly owing to increased diversification of the student body.

That many financially well-off nonminority parents exercised their option of enrolling in their children to private schools or moving to suburban neighborhoods undermined the spirit of court-ordered desegregation (Coleman, 1990). But even as minority youth become more suburbanized, their chances of enrolling in segregated schools remain significantly higher than those of white youth. Reardon and Yoon (2001) analyzed panel data on suburban public high school enrollment and concluded that minority suburbanization is associated with increased segregation, contrary to what one would expect with higher levels of spatial integration. However, the components of

change, namely within versus between district segregation, differ among groups. For blacks, increases in school segregation mainly derives from changes in residential segregation between districts, but for Hispanics (and Asians), higher levels of school segregation reflect more complex processes, including possible class selectivity of Hispanic surburbanites and the concentration of Hispanic surburbanization in the South and West, where large, countywide districts are the norm

Using entropy measures to analyze changes in school segregation in the South during the 1990s, Reardon and Yun (2003) further demonstrate the reversal of several decades of stable integration as the association between housing and school segregation became uncoupled. Specifically, *in 1990 schools located in southern metro counties were 40 percent less segregated than housing patterns, but a decade later the schools were only 27 percent less segregated than the local housing markets.* Their findings are quite pertinent for Hispanic youth in light of the growing Hispanic dispersal to *New Destination* metros in the South. Even as black-white school segregation increased modestly, Hispanics registered modest declines both in residential and school segregation from whites during the 1990s, which Reardon and Yun attribute to inter-county segregation.

Both state of residence and school district within states contribute to highly differentiated levels of Hispanic school segregation, but uneven enrollment *within* districts is the major source of division between white and Hispanic students in specific states. That changes in school segregation of blacks and Hispanics were driven by very different dynamics has important implications for future patterns of social integration, particularly in light of their recent geographic scattering. So too does evidence that school

re-segregation was largely driven by the reversal of social integration policies rather than changes in residential location. Because school segregation along ethnic lines is highly correlated with social class and school quality, evidence of a weakened association between school and residential segregation is weakened is particularly worrisome; it means that social integration of future cohorts, including the burgeoning second generation, may be thwarted.

Whether high schools support one prom or several depends not only on settlement patterns, but also whether black, Hispanic and white students interact socially within and beyond the school halls. “Soft segregation” as evidenced by Toombs County, Georgia, is not even broach by the vast literature about growing race and ethnic homogeneity of student enrollment even as residential diversity increases. More generally, the resegregation of schools where large and growing numbers of Hispanic students enroll bodes ill for their social and economic futures because they are generally resource poor learning environments (Schneider, et al., this volume). That Hispanic residential dispersal to *New Metropolitan Destinations* in the south has been accompanied by rising school segregation underscores the urgent need for social policies to foster class integration in learning environments. Given the momentum of the Hispanic geographic scattering, and its broad reach across states and metro areas, failure to heed this important population dynamic could produce deleterious consequences for the well-being of the burgeoning second generation.

Home Ownership

Housing exerts a powerful influence on social integration because it determines school choices, work opportunities, neighborhood safety, and quality of life (Massey and

Denton, 1993). Home purchases not only represent a commitment to settle, but also represent financial investments that usually appreciate in value. Simply put, for working-class and low-income families, home ownership represents the realization of the American dream. Unfortunately, housing discrimination not only dampens ownership rates, but also limits opportunities to foster residential integration. Turner and associates (2002) report in the most recent national Housing Discrimination Survey (HDS 2000) that Hispanics now experience higher levels of discrimination in rental and sales markets for housing than do blacks. Papademetriou and Ray (2004) show that home ownership is two times higher in cities that do not serve as immigrant gateways, such as the *Established Hispanic Metros*.

Table 6 summarizes trends and differentials in home ownership rates since 1980 by metro area type type. *Hispanic homeownership rates inched up from 40 to 44 percent in the top 100 metro areas, but remained about 24 to 27 percentage points below those of non-Hispanic whites throughout the period. However, both the period-specific ownership rates and the trends over time varied across metro area types.* Black ownership rates were virtually unchanged over the period because they fell during the 1980s but recovered the following decade. Initially, Hispanic home ownership rates were slightly below those of blacks, but their rates converged over time to 44 percent, as growing numbers of Hispanics purchased homes.[17]

(Table 6 About Here)

Hispanic home ownership rates exceeded those of blacks in the *Established Metros* throughout the period, but both groups saw their ownership rates fall during the

[17] These rates include site-built and mobile, manufactured housing. Minorities are more likely than whites to occupy and own manufactured homes, hence these differences understate the ownership rate of site-built homes.

1990s, after peaking at 47 and 39 percent, respectively, in 1990. In fact, the Hispanic ownership advantage widened over time owing largely to their surge in home ownership during the 1980s. A rather different pattern characterizes the *New Destination Metros,* where black and Hispanic home ownership rates were identical in 1980, about 47 percent, but diverged over time. In the *New Destination Metros,* ownership rates fell during the 1980s and only partly recovered the following decade. Thus, by 2000, black home ownership rates in the *New Hispanic Destination Metros* were slightly higher than those of Hispanics. Yet, because white home ownership rates also rose appreciably over the period, minority disadvantage vis-a-vis whites widened.

Minority home ownership rates in the *Fast Growing Hubs* were relatively high in 1980, but blacks' home ownership rate eroded 4 percentage points by 2000 while that of Hispanics remained stable. The Hispanic-white home ownership gap widened over the period, because the white home ownership rate rose faster during the 1990s. Finally, in the *Small Hispanic Places* black home ownership rates remained two to three percentage points above those of Hispanics throughout the period. Moreover, because the white ownership rate in these metro areas rose modestly, the minority ownership gap eroded slowly as well.

As dwelling costs escalate in the largest of the *Established Metros,* affordable housing lures Hispanics, and immigrants in particular, to *New Destinations* and *Fast Growing Hubs* (Kelly and Chavez, 2004). But, the lure of jobs is an equally powerful magnet drawing Hispanics to nontraditional metros (*The Economist*, 2004). Bartley (2004) notes that the *New Destinations* in the South had higher concentrations of immigrant labor in a few industries, but her exclusive focus on Mexican immigrants

ignores both native-born Mexicans and non-Mexican Hispanics, who also participated in the geographic scattering. The final section documents the labor force consequences of the Hispanic dispersal.

Labor Force Consequences of the Hispanic Dispersal

Job growth averaged 30 percent in the largest 100 metro areas between 1980 and 2000. Uneven job growth across labor markets pulled Hispanics, and particularly the foreign-born, away from the traditional gateway cities toward rapidly growing southern labor markets. Compared with the 40 and 54 percent job growth that occurred in the *New Destination* and *Fast Growing Metros*, respectively, the 21 and 13 percent averages for the *Established Metros* and *Small Hispanic Places*, respectively, is not only modest, but well below the metro average. As Table 7 shows, the Hispanic scattering, largely fueled by immigration and the expansion of unskilled jobs in construction and personal and repair services, altered the ethno-racial composition of urban labor markets, albeit not uniformly. In 1980 native born Hispanic workers outnumbered their foreign-born counterparts in the largest metro areas, but by 2000 this scenario reversed, even as Hispanics doubled their share of total urban employment from 7.2 to 15.1 percent. Specifically, Hispanic immigrants trebled their employment share, from three to nine percent of all workers, but the comparable change for native-born Hispanics was far more modest—a mere 1.5 percentage points—slightly above the change for blacks. The white share of total urban employment shrunk from 78 to 64 percent, although their absolute numbers remained constant because the total number of jobs increased.

(Table 7 About Here)

Changes in the ethno-racial composition of the workforce were most pronounced in the *New Destination and Fast Growing Hubs*, largely owing to the volume of new immigrants where few had settled before. In the *New Destinations*, where Hispanic immigrants comprised less than one percent of all workers in 1980, their employment share rose to just under five percent by 2000, which is more than double the share of native-born Hispanics in that year. A more dramatic scenario obtains for the *Fast Growing Hubs*; not only were Hispanics more numerous in absolute and relative terms in 1980—four and eight percent, respectively, for immigrants and natives—but two decades later one-in-four workers in these metro areas were Hispanic (14 percent foreign-born and 11 percent U.S.-born). *Established* and *Small Hispanic Metros* also witnessed a convergence in the shares of native and foreign-born Hispanic workers such that by 2000, the relative shares of immigrant and U.S.-born Hispanic workers in the *Established Metro Areas* were roughly equal, around 19 percent.

Table 8 displays the industrial allocation of Hispanic labor for the top 100 metro areas by type in 1980 and 2000.[18] Across all metro areas, the biggest disparities in the industrial allocation of Hispanic workers compared with the total labor force can be traced to construction, professional services, and especially personal and repair services. Non-Hispanics are disproportionately represented in the professional services compared with Hispanics, while the obverse holds for the unskilled jobs (See Hotz, et al., this volume). In fact, the growth of unskilled construction, personal and repair service jobs is largely responsible for the lure of Hispanics, particularly the foreign born, to *New Destination Metros* and even the *Small Hispanic Places*. That these industries expanded

[18] The comparable information for the total civilian labor force is not included in the interest of parsimony, but the data is available from the authors.

as a share of total employment, rising from 15 to 22 percent of all urban jobs since 2000, not only favored the absorption of unskilled immigrants, but also made labor demand group specific as specific jobs become ethnic-typed as Mexican or immigrant jobs (Tienda and Wilson, 1991). For example, even as nondurable manufacturing decreased as a share of total urban employment, from approximately 13 to 6 percent, the immigrant composition of the industry rose 12 percent points.[19]

(Table 8 About Here)

The index of dissimilarity provides a convenient metric to summarize changes in the industrial distribution of Hispanic employment over time, among types of metro areas, and compared with the total labor force of the largest metro areas. **D** indicates the percent of workers who would have to change industries for two distributions compared to be equal. During the 1980s and 1990s, industrial distribution of the Hispanic and total labor force of the largest metro areas diverged slightly, as the average value of **D** rose from 12 to 15. However, in the *New Destination metros*, **D** rose from 10 to 19, indicating that the industrial allocation of Hispanic workers became appreciably less similar to that of the total labor force in these labor markets. Greater dissimilarity of industrial distributions implies that Hispanic workers were become more concentrated in specific industries, which is consistent with the idea of ethnic job typing. In the Fast Growing Hubs, the value of **D** comparing the total with the Hispanic industrial distributions also rose from 13 in 1980 to 16 in 2000, indicating that the industrial allocation of Hispanic and nonHispanic labor was diverging.

Not only was overall employment growth more dynamic in *New Destination* and *Fast Growing* metros, but construction, personal and repair service industries grew as a

[19] Information about the Hispanic composition of industries is available from the authors.

share of total employment, favoring the absorption of unskilled immigrant workers. For example, Hispanics account for 13 percent of construction workers in the *New Destination* metros, yet this industry accounts for only 6 percent of all employment in these places. And, while over one-in four Hispanics residing in these metros is employed in personal and repair services, these industries account for only 16 percent of the total labor force in the *New Destination* metros. Similarly, in the *Fast Growing Hubs*, where the industrial distribution of Hispanic workers diverged slightly from that of the total labor force in these metro areas (**D** = 13.4 and 16.4 in 1980 and 2000, respectively), these same industries account for the growing disparity in the industrial allocation of Hispanic workers vis-à-vis the total workforce. In these metros, 23 percent of Hispanic workers were engaged in low-skill personal and repair services in 2000—up from 15 percent in 1980—yet these industries accounted for only 16 percent of total employment. Construction absorbed 8 percent of the total labor force in the *Fast Growing* metros, but 13 percent of Hispanics worked in construction industries in these areas.

In the *Established* metros, there is some evidence that the industrial distribution of the Hispanic labor force diverged from all workers, but the resulting change was much smaller (**D** = 13.6 and 14.2 for 1980 and 2000 respectively). The share of all Hispanic workers engaged in construction, personal and repair service industries is slightly lower compared with the *New Destination* and *Fast Growing* metros, yet these industries are even more ethnically typed in the *Established* metros. Specifically, considering all 100 metro areas in 2000, over one in three dwelling and landscaping workers are foreign-born Hispanics, but in the *Established* metros, over 50 percent of these workers were Hispanic immigrants and in the *Fast Growing* metros 48 percent of these workers were foreign-

born Hispanics. That less than 20 percent of landscaping workers in the New Destination metros are Hispanic immigrants suggests considerable employment opportunity for future newcomers as the scattering continues to unfold in the years ahead.

In sum, *immigration from Mexico, Central and South America not only was a driving force behind the Hispanic scattering, but also transformed both the ethno-racial composition of urban employment and the industrial composition of urban employment. In the largest 100 metro areas, not only did the share of all employment that is Hispanic rise, but the foreign-born share surpassed the native-born share of workers in these urban areas. The Hispanic dispersion to New Destinations was accompanied by and facilitated changes in the industrial distribution of employment, as the expansion of construction, personal and repair services—industries that have become immigrant-typed in the Established metros—allowed for the absorption of unskilled immigrant labor and lured unskilled immigrants to the New Destinations and Fast Growing Hubs.*

Conclusions

The unprecedented Hispanic geographic scattering, which began during the 1970s and gained considerable momentum during the 1990s, is a significant agent of urban social transformation both because of its pace and the sheer number of persons and places involved. In addition to its potential for reconfiguring racially divided space, Hispanics' spatial scattering has broad ramifications for inter-group relations and the contours of ethnic stratification more generally.

We show that increased diversification of the largest 100 metro areas, which was fueled by Hispanic immigration and scattering to new areas was accompanied by real

declines in spatial segregation of blacks, even as Hispanic segregation levels rose, but document considerable diversity in these patterns across types of metro areas. With one-third of all residents of Hispanic origin and one-in-four residents foreign born, the *Established* Hispanic metros are among the most diverse, and they exhibit moderate segregation levels. Blacks and Hispanics are about equally segregated from other groups . Hispanics in these metros average high levels of neighborhood isolation, which translates into relatively low exposure to blacks and Asians and only moderate contact with non-Hispanic whites. Linguistic isolation doubled in the *Established* Hispanic metros since 1980, but overall class segregation is low.

Hispanic residential isolation is also pronounced among the *Fast Growing Hubs*, where the average Hispanic neighborhood is just over 40 percent Hispanic and 40 percent white. In these places, where Hispanics are slightly more segregated from other groups than blacks, they have relatively low contact with blacks. Although the foreign-born population is smaller than that of *Established* metros, linguistic isolation levels trebled since 1980 and overall Hispanic spatial isolation is high. Yet, class segregation is relatively low.

New Destinations are experiencing rapid diversification and have moderate overall levels of segregation. Hispanics in these metro areas are highly integrated with whites and experience low levels of linguistic isolation. However, economic incorporation appears less complete in the *New Destinations*, as poor Hispanics are twice as segregated as the poor overall in these metros. The different spatial outcomes in these metros compared with the *Established* metros reflect several factors including, the pace of change; the large share of foreign born among the newcomers; and the fact that blacks

greatly outnumber Hispanics, by a 2:1 ratio. Although linguistic isolation levels and racial segregation from other groups are relatively low, the higher levels of segregation experienced by poor Hispanics in the *New Destinations* may indicate a redrawing of social boundaries along economic rather than ethnic lines in these metro areas. The *Small Hispanic Places* are the least diverse and black segregation remains at the highest levels. In these areas, Hispanics have the highest probability of contact with whites, and largely a function population composition, a slightly higher level of exposure to blacks than to other Hispanics. Class segregation is highest in these metro areas.

The consequences of the Hispanic dispersion for school, housing and work are mixed. It appears that school integration patterns in the south have been reversed even without accounting for "soft" segregation. However, Hispanic home ownership rates have risen slightly since 1980. Finally, the geographic scattering of Hispanics was accompanied by, and in turn facilitated, changes in the industrial composition of employment. The expansion of construction, personal and repair services allowed for the absorption of unskilled immigrant labor, particularly in the *New Destination* and *Fast Growing* metro areas.

Although vestiges of longstanding regional concentration will persist for the foreseeable future, Hispanics' residential makeover is a potential harbinger of changes in inter-group relations. But much depends on how the newcomers are received in the nontraditional hubs. Many suburbanites welcome the new immigrants as hard working people, but in other places the newcomers experience a backlash of discrimination. The consequences of Hispanics' changing spatial imprints will shape their futures in myriad ways, yet to be played out and tallied even as they reshape the U.S. urban landscape.

Our descriptive foray into the contours and consequences of Hispanics' changing residential configuration can not establish any causal connection with declines in racial segregation, but we do offer suggestive evidence to support the "buffering hypothesis". Our work sets the stage for exploring the causal underpinnings of the changing urban ethno-racial landscape. In addition to developing a multivariate strategy to test this hypothesis in a causal framework, future research seeking to better understand the consequences of the Hispanics unprecedented geographic scattering should employ techniques that account for increasingly multi-ethnic character of the urban landscape such as the entropy index.

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Table 1: Total and Hispanic Population Distribution and Composition According to Metro Area Type, 1980-2000 (in percent)

	1980					1990					2000				
	Population					Population					Population				
	Distribution		Composition			Distribution		Composition			Distribution		Composition		
Metro Area Type	**Total**	**Hisp**	**% H**	**% B**	**% FB**	**Total**	**Hisp**	**% H**	**% B**	**% FB**	**Total**	**Hisp**	**% H**	**% B**	**% FB**
Established Hispanic Metros	15	49	20	15	17	16	46	26	14	23	16	40	32	14	27
New Hispanic Destinations	24	9	2	13	5	25	10	4	14	6	26	15	7	15	10
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	6	14	14	9	8	8	17	20	10	12	9	19	28	9	18
Small Hispanic Places	13	4	2	17	5	12	4	3	18	5	11	3	4	18	6
Top 100 (P)MSA Sub-Total	59	76	8	14	9	61	77	11	14	11	62	78	16	14	15
Other Metro Areas	18	13	5	9	4	17	12	6	9	5	19	13	9	10	6
Non-Metro Areas	23	11	3	8	1	22	10	4	9	2	20	9	6	9	4
Total	100	100	6	12	7	100	100	9	12	8	100	100	13	12	11
N ('000)	226,546	14,609				248,710	22,354				281,422	35,306			

Source: Data extracted from the GeoLytics CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000 Tract Data

Note: The "Total" and "Hisp" columns represent group distribution; the % H, % B, & % FB columns are strata composition

Table 2: Diversification and Segregation Trends by Metro Area Type: 1980-2000

Metro Area Type	1980					1990					2000				
	E_D	H_M	H_H	H_B	H_{FB}	E_D	H_M	H_H	H_B	H_{FB}	E_D	H_M	H_H	H_B	H_{FB}
Established Hispanic Metros	**0.647**	**0.289**	**0.228**	**0.361**	**0.078**	**0.605**	**0.275**	**0.214**	**0.269**	**0.085**	**0.736**	**0.241**	**0.218**	**0.252**	**0.085**
Chicago, IL PMSA	0.623	0.565	0.352	0.753	0.141	0.610	0.541	0.337	0.651	0.163	0.784	0.441	0.347	0.617	0.166
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA PMSA	0.816	0.358	0.267	0.538	0.113	0.723	0.340	0.269	0.308	0.107	0.883	0.307	0.280	0.300	0.085
San Antonio, TX MSA	0.680	0.328	0.321	0.351	0.052	0.569	0.277	0.270	0.247	0.051	0.704	0.229	0.241	0.200	0.046
Miami, FL PMSA	0.774	0.384	0.292	0.565	0.175	0.752	0.362	0.289	0.489	0.143	0.752	0.323	0.262	0.491	0.102
New Hispanic Destinations	**0.366**	**0.348**	**0.115**	**0.460**	**0.056**	**0.380**	**0.314**	**0.117**	**0.376**	**0.070**	**0.533**	**0.252**	**0.153**	**0.321**	**0.090**
Atlanta, GA MSA	0.478	0.507	0.056	0.585	0.074	0.490	0.409	0.089	0.460	0.105	0.700	0.323	0.183	0.403	0.144
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	0.327	0.317	0.104	0.509	0.030	0.371	0.328	0.124	0.443	0.057	0.565	0.268	0.158	0.399	0.083
Milwaukee, WI PMSA	0.372	0.509	0.234	0.666	0.043	0.423	0.529	0.255	0.636	0.073	0.567	0.449	0.313	0.586	0.124
Raleigh-Durham, NC MSA	0.472	0.271	0.051	0.302	0.082	0.464	0.227	0.044	0.249	0.087	0.647	0.179	0.096	0.207	0.069
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	**0.582**	**0.232**	**0.162**	**0.320**	**0.069**	**0.589**	**0.207**	**0.159**	**0.205**	**0.091**	**0.774**	**0.198**	**0.179**	**0.167**	**0.097**
Austin, TX MSA	0.593	0.275	0.193	0.369	0.045	0.600	0.202	0.143	0.231	0.063	0.716	0.179	0.159	0.171	0.090
Sacramento, CA PMSA	0.520	0.154	0.078	0.248	0.048	0.505	0.148	0.084	0.192	0.073	0.731	0.151	0.084	0.164	0.080
Houston, TX PMSA	0.695	0.382	0.235	0.534	0.101	0.707	0.316	0.206	0.379	0.111	0.860	0.291	0.227	0.333	0.115
Orange County, CA PMSA	0.496	0.152	0.188	0.145	0.079	0.515	0.210	0.226	0.060	0.110	0.766	0.219	0.273	0.060	0.102
Small Hispanic Places	**0.421**	**0.427**	**0.122**	**0.515**	**0.062**	**0.409**	**0.419**	**0.133**	**0.481**	**0.082**	**0.503**	**0.351**	**0.133**	**0.445**	**0.088**
Detroit, MI PMSA	0.463	0.593	0.152	0.715	0.079	0.469	0.620	0.156	0.714	0.099	0.574	0.521	0.224	0.674	0.144
Newark, NJ PMSA	0.586	0.485	0.274	0.594	0.101	0.612	0.493	0.264	0.555	0.108	0.764	0.409	0.262	0.531	0.115
Charleston, SC MSA	0.539	0.260	0.060	0.294	0.047	0.513	0.221	0.068	0.241	0.061	0.592	0.173	0.077	0.202	0.051
Gary, IN PMSA	0.557	0.541	0.212	0.694	0.078	0.552	0.546	0.206	0.696	0.072	0.629	0.457	0.192	0.635	0.084
Total Top 100 MSA's	**0.446**	**0.343**	**0.140**	**0.441**	**0.062**	**0.445**	**0.319**	**0.140**	**0.363**	**0.077**	**0.586**	**0.266**	**0.162**	**0.320**	**0.089**

Source: Data extracted from the GeoLytics CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000 Tract Data

Note: Segregation is measured using entropy indices

E_D = Diversity Index

H_M = Four-Group Multi-Racial Entropy Index

H_H = Hispanics vs Others Entropy Index

H_B = Blacks vs Others Entropy Index

H_{FB} = Foreign-Born vs Others Entropy Index

Table 3: Trends in Hispanic and Black Exposure (P*) to Other Groups by Metro Area Type, 1980-2000

	1980				1990				2000			
Group & Metro Area Type	**White**	**Black**	**Hispanic**	**Asian & Other**	**White**	**Black**	**Hispanic**	**Asian & Other**	**White**	**Black**	**Hispanic**	**Asian & Other**
Hispanics												
Established Hispanic Metros	0.429	0.066	0.463	0.043	0.367	0.070	0.497	0.009	0.229	0.070	0.549	0.082
New Hispanic Destinations	0.763	0.144	0.075	0.019	0.733	0.136	0.101	0.008	0.623	0.166	0.167	0.045
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	0.585	0.083	0.288	0.044	0.511	0.088	0.335	0.010	0.406	0.091	0.423	0.080
Small Hispanic Places	0.701	0.188	0.073	0.038	0.700	0.166	0.090	0.005	0.650	0.190	0.105	0.055
Blacks												
Established Hispanic Metros	0.350	0.363	0.248	0.039	0.339	0.306	0.287	0.008	0.303	0.263	0.346	0.088
New Hispanic Destinations	0.449	0.496	0.038	0.017	0.475	0.442	0.055	0.008	0.467	0.396	0.096	0.042
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	0.443	0.314	0.196	0.048	0.448	0.233	0.235	0.009	0.395	0.197	0.303	0.105
Small Hispanic Places	0.361	0.587	0.028	0.024	0.367	0.576	0.031	0.005	0.366	0.551	0.042	0.042

Source: Data extracted from the GeoLytics CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000 Tract Data
Note: Exposure measures are derived as P*

Table 4: Immigrant and Linguistic Isolation by Metro Area Type: 1980-2000

Metro Area Type	1980			1990			2000		
	P^*_H	P^*_{FB}	P^*_L	P^*_H	P^*_{FB}	P^*_L	P^*_H	P^*_{FB}	P^*_L
Established Hispanic Metros	**0.463**	**0.225**	**0.118**	**0.497**	**0.266**	**0.159**	**0.549**	**0.314**	**0.257**
Chicago, IL PMSA	0.380	0.222	0.130	0.422	0.237	0.135	0.476	0.294	0.197
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA PMSA	0.501	0.326	0.165	0.575	0.415	0.247	0.633	0.426	0.278
San Antonio, TX MSA	0.633	0.116	0.012	0.649	0.108	0.015	0.656	0.129	0.105
Miami, FL PMSA	0.583	0.501	0.222	0.672	0.552	0.276	0.710	0.561	0.406
New Hispanic Destinations	**0.075**	**0.092**	**0.022**	**0.101**	**0.080**	**0.039**	**0.167**	**0.131**	**0.096**
Atlanta, GA MSA	0.022	0.085	0.008	0.050	0.083	0.045	0.187	0.205	0.284
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	0.097	0.107	0.025	0.151	0.145	0.069	0.230	0.205	0.119
Milwaukee, WI PMSA	0.162	0.085	0.059	0.212	0.068	0.060	0.325	0.121	0.158
Raleigh-Durham, NC MSA	0.014	0.128	0.003	0.018	0.061	0.010	0.114	0.133	0.110
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	**0.288**	**0.178**	**0.086**	**0.335**	**0.195**	**0.159**	**0.423**	**0.258**	**0.271**
Austin, TX MSA	0.352	0.091	0.070	0.335	0.100	0.071	0.397	0.185	0.259
Sacramento, CA PMSA	0.140	0.111	0.035	0.159	0.138	0.056	0.209	0.195	0.100
Houston, TX PMSA	0.355	0.153	0.111	0.400	0.212	0.126	0.489	0.294	0.262
Orange County, CA PMSA	0.319	0.214	0.147	0.448	0.336	0.325	0.533	0.382	0.373
Small Hispanic Places	**0.073**	**0.090**	**0.020**	**0.090**	**0.074**	**0.024**	**0.105**	**0.093**	**0.030**
Detroit, MI PMSA	0.079	0.113	0.023	0.102	0.104	0.023	0.193	0.163	0.087
Newark, NJ PMSA	0.263	0.190	0.088	0.326	0.227	0.102	0.358	0.279	0.143
Charleston, SC MSA	0.022	0.039	0.001	0.026	0.033	0.003	0.047	0.047	0.003
Gary, IN PMSA	0.235	0.091	0.061	0.251	0.064	0.026	0.265	0.082	0.045
Total Top 100 MSA's	**0.160**	**0.123**	**0.044**	**0.188**	**0.121**	**0.068**	**0.242**	**0.166**	**0.126**

Source: Data extracted from the GeoLytics CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000 Tract Data
Note: Isolation measures are derived as P*
H = Hispanic
FB = Foreign-Born
L = Language

Table 5: Trends in Hispanic Economic Segregation by Metro Area Type: 1980-2000

	1980				1990				2000			
Metro Area Type	**% Poor**	**H_P**	**H_{PH}**	**H_{PB}**	**% Poor**	**H_P**	**H_{PH}**	**H_{PB}**	**% Poor**	**H_P**	**H_{PH}**	**H_{PB}**
Established Hispanic Metros	**12**	**0.099**	**0.203**	**0.310**	**12**	**0.111**	**0.194**	**0.273**	**13**	**0.098**	**0.172**	**0.253**
Chicago, IL PMSA	10	0.200	0.368	0.475	10	0.211	0.355	0.462	10	0.167	0.280	0.419
Los Angeles--Long Beach, CA PMSA	12	0.101	0.201	0.386	13	0.109	0.192	0.315	15	0.100	0.182	0.272
San Antonio, TX MSA	15	0.120	0.212	0.355	16	0.125	0.202	0.266	13	0.107	0.169	0.232
Miami, FL PMSA	13	0.091	0.139	0.367	15	0.094	0.117	0.341	15	0.081	0.095	0.314
New Hispanic Destinations	**9**	**0.104**	**0.274**	**0.401**	**9**	**0.121**	**0.238**	**0.357**	**9**	**0.115**	**0.235**	**0.311**
Atlanta, GA MSA	11	0.139	0.21	0.376	9	0.146	0.228	0.334	9	0.119	0.225	0.282
Nassau-Suffolk, NY PMSA	5	0.071	0.239	0.399	4	0.069	0.221	0.328	5	0.068	0.195	0.297
Milwaukee, WI PMSA	7	0.174	0.375	0.499	10	0.249	0.429	0.499	10	0.205	0.393	0.430
Raleigh-Durham, NC MSA	11	0.074	0.282	0.222	10	0.097	0.114	0.216	9	0.091	0.145	0.179
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	**10**	**0.082**	**0.203**	**0.308**	**11**	**0.107**	**0.202**	**0.257**	**11**	**0.108**	**0.189**	**0.229**
Austin, TX MSA	12	0.100	0.211	0.316	14	0.115	0.201	0.261	10	0.134	0.192	0.230
Sacramento, CA PMSA	10	0.058	0.159	0.262	10	0.102	0.181	0.263	11	0.119	0.182	0.238
Houston, TX PMSA	9	0.117	0.225	0.353	13	0.124	0.222	0.305	12	0.115	0.192	0.282
Orange County, CA PMSA	7	0.066	0.226	0.215	8	0.106	0.229	0.197	9	0.106	0.226	0.187
Small Hispanic Places	**10**	**0.128**	**0.280**	**0.393**	**11**	**0.148**	**0.278**	**0.383**	**10**	**0.133**	**0.249**	**0.346**
Detroit, MI PMSA	9	0.165	0.337	0.429	12	0.210	0.380	0.460	10	0.167	0.367	0.399
Newark, NJ PMSA	10	0.200	0.391	0.415	8	0.190	0.344	0.384	9	0.171	0.290	0.358
Charleston, SC MSA	14	0.098	0.190	0.221	13	0.093	0.151	0.198	12	0.090	0.220	0.173
Gary, IN PMSA	9	0.121	0.226	0.403	11	0.165	0.261	0.436	10	0.141	0.233	0.411
Total Top 100 MSA's	**10**	**0.106**	**0.256**	**0.374**	**10**	**0.124**	**0.236**	**0.338**	**10**	**0.115**	**0.223**	**0.301**

Source: Data extracted from the GeoLytics CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000 Tract Data

Note: Segregation is measured using entropy indices

% Poor = % Below the Poverty Line

H_P = Poor vs Non-Poor Entropy Index

H_{PH} = Poor Hispanics vs Others Entropy Index

H_{PB} = Poor Blacks vs Others Entropy Index

Table 6: Homeownership Rates by Race/Ethnicity and Metro Area Type

	1980				1990				2000			
Metro Area Type	**Total**	**White**	**Hispanic**	**Black**	**Total**	**White**	**Hispanic**	**Black**	**Total**	**White**	**Hispanic**	**Black**
Established Hispanic Metros	**48**	**54**	**36**	**33**	**60**	**65**	**47**	**39**	**64**	**63**	**42**	**35**
New Hispanic Destinations	**64**	**69**	**47**	**47**	**62**	**67**	**41**	**42**	**67**	**73**	**43**	**46**
Fast-Growing Hispanic Hubs	**61**	**64**	**48**	**47**	**59**	**62**	**45**	**40**	**62**	**69**	**48**	**43**
Small Hispanic Places	**66**	**73**	**47**	**50**	**67**	**71**	**44**	**46**	**69**	**75**	**45**	**47**
Total Top 100 MSA's	**60**	**66**	**40**	**44**	**62**	**67**	**43**	**42**	**63**	**71**	**44**	**44**

Source: Data extracted from the GeoLytics CensusCD Neighborhood Change Database 1970-2000 Tract Data

Table 7: Ethno-Racial Composition of the Employed Civilian Labor Force by Metro Area Type, 1980-2000

	1980					1990					2000				
	Established Metros	New Destinations	Fast-Growing	Small Places	Total	Established Metros	New Destinations	Fast-Growing	Small Places	Total	Established Metros	New Destinations	Fast-Growing	Small Places	Total
Hispanic FB	8.0	0.7	3.8	0.4	3.1	15.5	1.7	7.7	0.8	5.9	19.2	4.7	13.8	1.3	9.4
Hispanic NB	8.6	1.1	7.9	1.1	4.1	8.8	1.2	8.5	1.0	4.1	11.1	2.1	10.8	1.4	5.7
Whites	66.1	84.7	76.3	82.2	77.8	56.4	82.7	70.9	82.2	74.3	45.7	73.4	58.5	76.1	64.1
Blacks	12.6	12.0	9.0	13.7	12.2	11.3	11.9	8.1	12.4	11.3	11.7	14.1	8.9	16.1	13.1
All Others	4.7	1.5	3.0	2.7	2.9	8.0	2.5	4.7	3.6	4.4	12.3	5.7	7.9	5.1	7.7
Total %	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.1	100.1	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.0
Total N ('000)	**17,624.3**	**22,548.1**	**6,774.4**	**13,238.0**	**60,184.8**	**16,141.5**	**26,196.3**	**8,177.8**	**12,354.3**	**62,869.9**	**17,436.6**	**26,024.2**	**9,440.6**	**11,033.4**	**63,934.8**

Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata System (IPUMS)

Table 8: Industry Distribution for the Hispanic Civilian Labor Force by Metro Area Type, 1980-2000

	Established		New Destinations		Fast-Growing Hubs		Small Places		Top 100 MSA's	
Industry Sector	**1980**	**2000**	**1980**	**2000**	**1980**	**2000**	**1980**	**2000**	**1980**	**2000**
Agriculture & Mining	3.0	1.3	3.5	1.3	8.5	3.1	2.1	1.6	4.0	1.7
Construction	5.1	7.8	5.4	12.9	10.2	13.2	4.5	8.0	6.1	10.1
Non-Durable Manufacturing	14.5	7.6	9.7	5.5	8.0	4.8	10.3	7.1	12.7	6.5
Food	*2.8*	*1.7*	*2.4*	*2.1*	*2.4*	*1.6*	*3.2*	*2.0*	*2.7*	*1.7*
Textile	*0.8*	*0.9*	*0.9*	*0.6*	*0.1*	*0.3*	*0.3*	*0.8*	*0.6*	*0.7*
Apparel &Shoes	*6.5*	*2.3*	*2.7*	*0.7*	*1.7*	*0.4*	*2.5*	*0.5*	*5.1*	*1.5*
Other	*4.6*	*2.6*	*3.7*	*2.2*	*3.8*	*2.4*	*4.3*	*3.9*	*4.3*	*2.5*
Durable Manufacturing	16.4	9.1	13.5	8.1	13.6	8.8	18.8	12.2	15.7	8.9
Wholesale Trade	4.7	5.1	3.6	3.6	4.1	4.4	3.3	3.1	4.4	4.6
Durable Goods	*2.0*	*2.1*	*1.7*	*1.5*	*1.9*	*2.0*	*1.3*	*1.6*	*1.9*	*2.0*
Non-Durable Goods	*2.7*	*3.0*	*1.9*	*2.1*	*2.1*	*2.4*	*1.9*	*1.5*	*2.5*	*2.6*
Retail Trade	10.5	11.8	9.6	10.6	10.2	11.4	10.9	11.9	10.4	11.5
Transport & Utilities	5.0	5.0	4.5	4.0	5.0	4.1	5.9	3.6	5.0	4.5
Information & Communication	1.1	2.4	1.0	2.2	1.0	1.9	0.9	2.3	1.1	2.2
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate	5.5	5.5	5.6	5.2	3.9	4.8	3.2	5.2	5.1	5.2
Business & Administrative Services	3.1	5.2	4.0	5.5	2.4	5.1	3.3	5.0	3.1	5.2
Health, Education, Professional Services	12.6	15.8	15.7	12.8	12.5	12.4	16.1	17.7	13.0	14.5
Hospital & Nursing Care	*4.6*	*3.5*	*5.9*	*3.1*	*3.8*	*2.5*	*5.3*	*4.9*	*4.6*	*3.3*
Child & Residential Care	*0.6*	*1.8*	*0.7*	*1.7*	*0.8*	*1.5*	*0.5*	*1.3*	*0.6*	*1.7*
Other	*7.5*	*10.5*	*9.1*	*8.0*	*7.9*	*8.3*	*10.3*	*11.5*	*7.8*	*9.5*
Public Administration	3.9	2.6	6.1	2.8	5.5	3.0	5.7	3.6	4.5	2.8
Personal & Repair Services	14.5	20.9	17.7	25.6	15.1	23.0	15.0	18.6	15.0	22.2
Recreation & Entertainment	*1.0*	*1.5*	*2.3*	*2.3*	*1.1*	*1.4*	*1.5*	*2.0*	*1.2*	*1.6*
Restaurants & Bars	*5.2*	*7.5*	*5.6*	*9.3*	*5.6*	*8.9*	*6.6*	*8.1*	*5.4*	*8.2*
Hotels, Motels, & Lodging	*1.7*	*1.7*	*3.4*	*3.8*	*2.0*	*1.9*	*2.2*	*1.8*	*2.0*	*2.2*
Laundry	*0.7*	*0.6*	*0.7*	*0.7*	*1.0*	*0.8*	*0.4*	*0.3*	*0.7*	*0.7*
Dwelling Maintanence & Landscaping	*0.8*	*3.3*	*0.6*	*4.6*	*0.7*	*4.2*	*0.9*	*2.5*	*0.8*	*3.8*
Automotive Services	*1.5*	*1.9*	*0.9*	*1.3*	*1.2*	*2.1*	*0.6*	*0.9*	*1.3*	*1.8*
Misc. Repair	*0.5*	*0.5*	*0.3*	*1.0*	*0.5*	*0.6*	*0.6*	*0.5*	*0.5*	*0.5*
Religious or Civic Organization	*0.6*	*0.9*	*1.4*	*1.3*	*0.7*	*0.6*	*0.4*	*1.3*	*0.7*	*0.9*
Private Households	*1.4*	*1.6*	*1.2*	*0.8*	*1.0*	*1.5*	*0.8*	*0.4*	*1.3*	*1.5*
Other Personal Services	*1.0*	*1.3*	*1.1*	*1.0*	*1.1*	*0.9*	*1.1*	*0.9*	*1.1*	*1.1*
Total %	99.9	100.1	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.1	99.9
N's ('000)	2920.8	5280.4	402.7	1762.2	791.2	2330.5	191.7	294.7	4306.4	9667.8

Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata System (IPUMS)

Table 9: Hispanic Composition of Employment by Industry Sector and Metro Area Type, 1980-2000

	Established				New Destinations				Fast-Growing				Small Places				Top 100 MSA's			
	1980		2000		1980		2000		1980		2000		1980		2000		1980		2000	
Industry Sector	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**	**% FB Hisp**	**% NB Hisp**
Agriculture & Mining	17.9	14.4	47.7	14.4	1.1	2.4	11.1	2.5	14.1	10.5	34.9	10.4	0.7	1.3	4.9	1.2	8.1	7.0	26.0	7.5
Construction	7.9	10.0	29.5	11.4	0.6	1.0	11.1	1.9	6.4	8.5	30.1	10.4	0.3	0.9	2.0	1.6	3.2	4.4	17.6	5.7
Non-Durable Manufacturing	17.2	10.3	39.6	8.7	1.0	1.3	7.4	2.0	5.5	10.7	22.8	12.4	0.5	1.4	2.7	1.5	6.6	5.1	18.5	5.3
Food	*16.8*	*13.3*	*37.6*	*11.0*	*1.1*	*1.6*	*10.9*	*2.6*	*8.9*	*15.2*	*30.6*	*15.4*	*0.5*	*2.8*	*3.9*	*2.3*	*6.4*	*6.6*	*20.3*	*6.7*
Textile	*21.6*	*10.8*	*60.2*	*7.3*	*0.8*	*0.9*	*8.4*	*1.0*	*11.3*	*1.6*	*39.3*	*10.4*	*0.2*	*1.4*	*7.8*	*1.4*	*5.4*	*3.1*	*28.9*	*4.0*
Apparel &Shoes	*32.8*	*12.7*	*54.4*	*5.5*	*2.0*	*1.7*	*13.6*	*1.5*	*13.3*	*16.4*	*38.5*	*12.6*	*1.4*	*2.7*	*5.9*	*0.8*	*17.3*	*7.9*	*41.0*	*4.7*
Other	*8.8*	*7.9*	*27.7*	*9.7*	*0.6*	*1.1*	*4.8*	*1.9*	*3.1*	*8.9*	*16.7*	*11.3*	*0.4*	*0.8*	*1.9*	*1.3*	*3.3*	*3.9*	*11.3*	*4.9*
Durable Manufacturing	12.4	9.6	26.5	9.3	0.7	1.3	5.3	1.9	4.6	9.5	17.0	10.5	0.4	1.2	1.7	1.4	4.1	4.3	11.6	4.9
Wholesale Trade	7.9	8.3	26.7	11.5	0.5	0.9	4.9	2.0	3.2	7.1	16.1	11.1	0.3	0.9	1.3	1.2	3.1	3.9	12.5	6.1
Durable Goods	*6.3*	*7.4*	*21.6*	*11.3*	*0.6*	*0.7*	*3.3*	*1.8*	*3.0*	*5.9*	*12.6*	*10.3*	*0.2*	*0.6*	*0.9*	*1.3*	*2.5*	*3.3*	*9.4*	*5.7*
Non-Durable Goods	*9.3*	*9.1*	*31.6*	*11.7*	*0.5*	*1.2*	*6.8*	*2.1*	*3.3*	*8.6*	*20.4*	*12.1*	*0.3*	*1.2*	*1.7*	*1.1*	*3.8*	*4.7*	*16.1*	*6.6*
Retail Trade	5.6	9.1	18.0	14.2	0.4	1.0	3.6	2.4	2.2	7.0	10.3	13.1	0.4	0.9	0.9	1.6	2.1	3.9	7.7	6.8
Transport & Utilities	5.5	7.6	16.6	11.9	0.4	1.0	3.2	2.0	2.6	8.1	8.2	11.7	0.3	1.3	0.7	1.3	2.3	3.9	7.4	6.2
Information & Communications	3.5	7.9	7.4	9.4	0.3	0.8	2.3	2.0	1.4	7.2	4.9	9.9	0.1	1.0	0.7	1.8	1.4	3.8	4.1	5.4
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate	5.0	6.5	10.6	10.3	0.6	0.9	2.6	2.0	1.7	5.1	6.5	10.0	0.2	0.6	0.7	1.3	2.2	3.3	5.1	5.4
Business & Administrative Services	3.9	5.1	9.9	8.3	0.6	1.0	2.6	1.7	1.4	4.3	6.1	8.4	0.4	0.9	0.7	1.1	1.8	2.8	4.9	4.5
Health, Education, Professional Services	4.2	7.8	11.7	11.5	0.6	1.0	2.6	1.8	2.1	6.8	6.5	9.9	0.4	0.9	0.9	1.2	1.7	3.6	5.3	5.5
Hospital & Nursing Care	*5.2*	*8.3*	*12.1*	*10.1*	*0.8*	*1.0*	*2.5*	*1.6*	*2.3*	*7.4*	*6.7*	*9.7*	*0.3*	*0.9*	*0.9*	*1.2*	*2.1*	*3.7*	*5.2*	*4.7*
Child & Residential Care	*4.8*	*12.6*	*21.0*	*13.4*	*0.9*	*1.3*	*4.6*	*2.2*	*3.2*	*9.3*	*12.8*	*12.3*	*0.3*	*1.2*	*1.0*	*1.3*	*2.2*	*5.7*	*9.4*	*6.4*
Other	*3.7*	*7.3*	*10.5*	*11.8*	*0.5*	*1.0*	*2.3*	*1.8*	*1.9*	*6.4*	*5.7*	*9.7*	*0.4*	*0.9*	*0.9*	*1.2*	*1.5*	*3.4*	*4.9*	*5.6*
Public Administration	3.2	11.2	7.9	14.9	0.5	1.2	1.9	1.9	1.8	9.8	4.0	12.2	0.3	1.5	0.7	1.5	1.2	4.6	3.3	6.2
Personal & Repair Services	10.5	8.6	29.0	10.8	1.0	1.4	8.6	2.6	5.1	8.6	24.3	11.5	0.5	1.3	1.8	1.6	4.2	4.3	15.5	6.0
Recreation & Entertainment	*4.3*	*5.9*	*9.9*	*10.5*	*1.4*	*1.6*	*4.5*	*2.8*	*2.9*	*6.7*	*10.1*	*9.3*	*0.5*	*1.1*	*1.2*	*1.6*	*2.4*	*3.5*	*6.3*	*5.6*
Restaurants & Bars	*10.5*	*8.6*	*29.5*	*12.7*	*0.7*	*1.4*	*8.8*	*2.9*	*4.6*	*9.0*	*24.7*	*13.2*	*0.4*	*1.5*	*1.8*	*2.1*	*3.8*	*4.3*	*15.4*	*6.9*
Hotels, Motels, & Lodging	*15.5*	*9.8*	*32.8*	*10.6*	*2.1*	*2.0*	*14.8*	*3.6*	*8.4*	*9.2*	*26.6*	*11.4*	*1.4*	*1.8*	*2.5*	*1.9*	*6.3*	*4.9*	*19.4*	*6.3*
Laundry	*13.0*	*10.5*	*38.6*	*10.6*	*0.7*	*2.0*	*15.2*	*2.3*	*8.6*	*13.1*	*39.5*	*12.3*	*0.0*	*1.2*	*1.8*	*1.0*	*5.2*	*5.8*	*23.5*	*6.0*
Dwelling Maintanence & Landscaping	*16.3*	*11.3*	*51.8*	*10.1*	*0.7*	*1.7*	*18.3*	*3.2*	*8.2*	*12.5*	*47.8*	*10.7*	*2.0*	*1.4*	*3.4*	*2.1*	*6.9*	*6.0*	*30.9*	*6.3*
Automotive Services	*13.7*	*11.8*	*38.3*	*11.6*	*0.6*	*1.3*	*6.2*	*2.3*	*7.6*	*6.5*	*27.9*	*12.6*	*0.2*	*0.8*	*2.0*	*0.8*	*5.5*	*5.1*	*18.6*	*6.5*
Misc. Repair	*10.2*	*10.2*	*28.8*	*8.9*	*0.7*	*0.8*	*4.3*	*1.4*	*3.6*	*7.6*	*16.4*	*11.2*	*0.2*	*1.9*	*2.4*	*1.0*	*3.7*	*4.7*	*12.7*	*5.1*
Religious or Civic Organization	*3.5*	*6.7*	*9.8*	*8.6*	*0.8*	*1.3*	*2.2*	*1.8*	*2.4*	*5.4*	*5.2*	*8.1*	*0.2*	*0.3*	*1.2*	*0.8*	*1.6*	*3.0*	*4.3*	*4.1*
Private Households	*18.9*	*7.4*	*53.9*	*5.3*	*1.9*	*0.8*	*16.7*	*2.0*	*6.9*	*7.1*	*43.4*	*9.9*	*0.7*	*1.0*	*3.0*	*0.5*	*7.6*	*3.6*	*35.0*	*4.5*
Other Personal Services	*8.4*	*9.2*	*21.6*	*10.5*	*0.9*	*1.1*	*3.2*	*1.8*	*2.4*	*11.5*	*8.6*	*10.8*	*0.5*	*1.1*	*0.6*	*1.2*	*3.2*	*4.7*	*8.8*	*5.5*
All Industries	**8.0**	**8.6**	**19.2**	**11.1**	**0.7**	**1.1**	**4.7**	**2.1**	**3.8**	**7.9**	**13.8**	**10.8**	**0.4**	**1.1**	**1.3**	**1.4**	**3.1**	**4.1**	**9.4**	**5.7**

Source: Integrated Public Use Microdata System (IPUMS)