September 2004

SOUTHERNERS IN THE WEST: THE RELATIVE WELL-BEING OF "DIRECT" AND "ONWARD" MIGRANTS*

Stewart E. Tolnay

and

Suzanne C. Eichenlaub

Department of Sociology
University of Washington
Seattle, Washington 98195-3340

* This research was supported by a grant to Tolnay from the National Science Foundation (SES-0317247). We are grateful to Patty Glynn for expert programming support, and to Amy K. Bailey for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Direct correspondence to: Stewart Tolnay, Department of Sociology, Box 353340, University of Washington, Seattle, WA 98195; email: tolnay@u.washington.edu.

SOUTHERNERS IN THE WEST: THE RELATIVE WELL-BEING OF "DIRECT" AND "ONWARD" MIGRANTS

ABSTRACT

The Great Migration of southerners away from their region of birth stands as one of the most significant demographic events in the history of the United States. The first waves of southern migrants headed primarily to the Northeast and Midwest. But, during and after World War II, a larger proportion moved to the West, especially to the Pacific Coast states. In this paper we use information from the 1970 and 1980 public use microdata samples to examine more closely the economic status of southern migrants in the West, with a special focus on the relative well-being of "onward migrants" from the Northeast and Midwest and "direct migrants" from the South. Our findings show that white, but not black, onward migrants enjoyed higher occupational status and incomes than direct migrants in 1970. By 1980, however, the economic advantage for white onward migrants had evaporated. In contrast, black and white onward migrants were less likely than direct migrants to be employed in 1970, but that difference had also disappeared by 1980. These results are largely consistent with our hypotheses that are based on difference between onward and direct migrant in human capital acquisition, and on socioeconomic changes that were occurring in the North and South during this time period.

SOUTHERNERS IN THE WEST: THE RELATIVE WELL-BEING OF "DIRECT" AND "ONWARD" MIGRANTS

INTRODUCTION

Throughout much of the 20th century, southern-born Americans fled their region of birth in search of better social and economic opportunities outside of Dixie. Between 1910 and 1970, millions of southerners participated in this "Great Migration" that substantially altered the regional and residential distribution of the U.S. population, especially for African Americans (Alexander 1998; Eldridge and Thomas 1964; Johnson and Campbell 1981; Long 1988; Tolnay 2003a). These peripatetic southerners also shaped the cultural dynamics and political balances in their adopted cities and states, creating legacies that have persisted into the 21st century (e.g., Berry 2000; Gregory 1989; Grossman 1989; Lemann 1991). Thus, the Great Migration can legitimately be considered one of the most important and influential demographic events in the nation's history.

Originally, the vast majority of migratory southerners headed to the Midwest and Northeast, as they took advantage of convenient transportation routes and more the proximate economic opportunities in those urbanized and industrialized regions (Alexander 1998; Berry 2000; Eldridge and Thomas 1964; Johnson and Campbell 1981; Long 1988; Taylor 1998; Tolnay 2003a, Tolnay, White, Crowder, and Adelman 2004). Large cities such as Boston, Chicago, Detroit, New York, and Philadelphia absorbed huge numbers of southern-born arrivals between 1910 and 1940. And, even smaller cities like Cincinnati, Ohio, Flint, Michigan, and Bloomington, Indiana saw large influxes of southerners. Eventually, the growth of defense-related industries on the West Coast during World War II attracted a larger share of southern migrants to the more distant destinations of California, Oregon, and Washington. Although

included within the broader phenomenon of the Great Migration, this later stage of movement to the West has not attracted the same level of scholarly attention as the relocation of southerners into the Northeast and Midwest.

The western migration of southerners differed in many important respects from their more widely studied movement to the Northeast and Midwest. Obviously, the timing was different, with the vast majority of migration to the West occurring after 1940. But, the regional destinations also varied in a number of important ways. The composition of the western population was different from that in the Northeast and Midwest. Japanese, Chinese, Native Americans, and Mexicans were significant ethnic minorities in the West (Gregory 1989; James 1945; McWilliams 1945; Taylor 1998), while African Americans and European immigrants were the primary ethnic groups of the Northeast and Midwest (e.g., Bodnar, Simon, and Weber 1982; Duncan and Duncan 1957; Grossman 1989; Lieberson 1980; Perlmann 1988). The large cities of the West exhibited a different urban ecology from their counterparts in the East. Newer, and with settlement patterns that were less dense, they had not, yet, had a chance to become as rigidly segregated as the older cities in the Northeast and Midwest (Farley and Frey 1994; Logan, Stults, and Farley 2004; Massey and Denton 1993). Finally, the migrants themselves were not the same. First, because the western migration occurred later, those migrants who came directly from the South to the West were drawn from a different population at their places of origin, and were likely also exposed to different selection processes (e.g., Tolnay 1998). Second, many of the southerners who headed to the West had already spent time in the Northeast or Midwest before moving on.

In this paper we examine the adaptation experiences of southern migrants in the West, while devoting special attention to a comparison between the economic well-being of those who

moved directly from the South and those "onward" migrants who had resided previously in the Northeast or Midwest. We draw from migration theory to propose competing hypotheses regarding the differences between these two groups in employment patterns, income, and occupational status. On the one hand, migrants who had already spent time in the Northeast or Midwest might be expected to fare better than those who moved directly from the South because they had had an opportunity to acquire additional human capital that provided them with an economic advantage in the West. On the other hand, it is possible that some of the onward migrants were moving on because they had failed in the industrial economy of the North and that they would experience the same disappointment in the West. Furthermore, it is possible that these processes were different for black and white southern migrants, and that they changed over time as a result of transformations in the economies of the rural South and the urban North. We explore these questions with data from the public use microdata samples (PUMS) of the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Population Censuses.

BACKGROUND AND THEORY

The Great Migration and the West

The Great Migration of southerners to other regions of the country escalated sharply during the second decade of the 20th century. Many of the same forces were instrumental in causing this exodus of both white and African American southerners. Economic stagnation, especially in agriculture, followed by farm mechanization and the displacement of many landless farmers, contributed to the incentives for southerners to flee the region (Daniel 1985; Fligstein 1981; Kirby 1987; Tolnay 1999; Woofter 1920). But, this was not a movement only of people directly from the farm. Many of the migrants originated in small towns and cities throughout the South (Alexander 1998; Marks 1989). Pulling the migrants northward were the new economic

opportunities created by the expansion of industrial production required by the nation's entry into World War I (Collins 1997). Because the War, and later legislative restrictions, had sharply reduced the number of immigrants entering the country, those industrial opportunities were no longer dominated by newcomers from southern, central, and eastern Europe, as they had been in the past. As a result, a labor vacuum developed in the North, creating unprecedented opportunities for white and black southerners who were willing to move.

While the poor economic conditions in the South affected both whites and blacks, there were also forces that uniquely induced African Americans to leave the region. Decades of strict racial segregation, economic discrimination, social humiliation, and violence made many African Americans desire the perceived relative equality and safety of the North (e.g., Faulkner, Heiser, Holbrook, and Geismar 1982; Henri 1975; Tolnay and Beck 1992). However, it was not until restricted immigration combined with industrial expansion that those desires could be translated into reality for most aspiring migrants. Once it began, the African American exodus from the South was profound. At the outset of the Great Migration, ninety percent of African Americans resided in the South. By the time it had run its course, the black population of the United States was divided roughly evenly between South and North (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1985).

From the very beginning of the Great Migration, southern whites were more likely than southern blacks to choose a western destination (see Figure 1). In 1920 only about 5% of black southern migrants resided in the West, compared to roughly one-quarter of white migrants. After 1940, the West became a much more popular destination for southern migrants of both races. By 1980, over 40% of white and more than 20% of black southern migrants resided in the West. Although the West continued to attract proportionately more white than black southerners during this Post-World War II surge in migration, the sharp increase for blacks attracted more than its

share of attention. For example, the *Journal of Educational Sociology* published a special issue on black migration in 1945, focusing on the experiences of four West Coast cities that were receiving increasing numbers of black migrants from the South – Los Angeles, Portland, San Francisco, and Seattle. Despite the recognition of many social problems that were associated with this influx of population, including strains on local transportation systems, housing, and race relations, the articles in this special issue painted a rather optimistic picture of the long-term prospects for African Americans in the West. One author, Carey McWilliams (1945:187) captured this sense of opportunity and optimism by writing, "Not only has the Pacific Coast become our new racial frontier, but in many respects, it has become our new economic and industrial frontier."

[Figure 1 About Here]

"Direct" Versus "Onward" Migrants

The literature on southern migration to the West tends to lump together all people living in the West who were born in the South, usually distinguishing them only by race (as does Figure 1). In fact, however, the West was not the initial destination for many migrants who had abandoned the South. Many had moved originally to the Northeast or Midwest, and then eventually continued their trek to the more distant West. This distinction between "direct" and "onward" migrants to the West has potential importance that transcends the geographic route that was taken by southerners to reach the West. Specifically, the two groups may have varied in the economic success that they enjoyed, once they reached their western destinations. But, why should we expect different adjustment experiences for direct and onward migrants?

Any differences between direct and onward migrants are likely rooted partially in corresponding differences between the two groups in their motivations for moving. Migration

theory tells us that, in general, migrants who are motivated primarily by forces "pushing" them from their current places of residence will be negatively selected from the general population. That is, they should have lower levels of education, poorer job skills, and less ambition than those who chose not to move. In contrast, those who undertake a move in response to factors "pulling" them to their new destinations will be positively selected from the general population (Greenwood 1985; Lee 1966; Ravenstein 1885, 1889). Short of asking them directly, it is difficult to know whether migrants are motivated primarily by push or pull forces. However, some inferences can be drawn from the general circumstances surrounding their move. Regarding possible differences between onward and direct migrants from the South, such circumstances may lead to conflicting expectations. For example, DaVanzo and Morrison (1981:87) have noted this possibility for migrants who make repeat moves – either returning to their places of origin, or moving on to new destinations,

> "Repeat migrants, having moved before, should be more efficient in acquiring information and forming accurate expectations about the characteristics of destination areas; and their broader spatial awareness (based on having lived in several places) should have crystallized into clearly defined locational preferences. However, repeat migrants also include some persons with poor judgment, whose inability to form accurate expectations necessitates additional moves."

Empirical support for these differences identified by DaVanzo and Morrison has been offered by previous investigators comparing repeat migrants who return to their original places of residence and those who move on. In general, return migrants, especially those who return to their place of origin relatively soon after moving, have lower levels of education, fewer job skills, and are older than repeat migrants who move on to a new location (e.g., DaVanzo 1983;

DaVanzo and Morrison 1981; Grant and Vanderkamp 1980). We are aware of no studies that directly compare onward migrants and direct migrants who have moved to the same general destination, while following different routes, as we do in this paper. However, it is possible to draw from migration theory and the historical setting to summarize competing expectations regarding the relative economic well-being of onward and direct southern migrants in the West.

There are compelling reasons to expect onward migrants to have fared better in the West than did those migrants who moved directly from the South. First, as noted by DaVanzo and Morrison (1983), onward (or repeat) migrants are more experienced than primary migrants in the migration process and, perhaps, more efficient in making decisions about when to move and where to go in order to maximize their opportunities. Among all repeat migrants who began their journeys in the Northeast or Midwest, those who headed west should have been more positively selected than those who returned to the South. As a result, according to migration theory, the onward migrants had been subjected to a two-stage, positive selection process – first when they left the South for the North, and second when they moved on to the West, rather than returning to the South. In contrast, the direct migrants were relatively "untested" in their ability to adjust to the non-southern economy and society. Some would thrive in their chosen destinations, but others would return rather quickly to the South because of unfulfilled hopes and expectations.

Second, by virtue of their prior residence in the Northeast and Midwest, onward migrants had an opportunity to acquire occupational training and skills that were appropriate for an industrial workplace. On average, then, onward migrants were more likely than direct migrants from the South to bring with them work experience and job skills that were transferable to the expanding industrial economy in the West. While the South had also experienced substantial

economic development and industrialization by the close of the Great Migration, it had not, yet, achieved parity with the North or the West (Cobb 1982; Daniel 1985; Wright 1986). However, the employment and occupational benefits of prior residence in the non-South likely varied by race. White southern migrants were more likely than black migrants to acquire additional human capital during their periods of residence in the Northeast and Midwest that would ease their economic transition to the West. African Americans, including southern migrants, experienced strong economic discrimination in the North, including a disadvantaged position within an occupational queue that was stratified by race and ethnicity (Adelman and Tolnay 2003; Boyd 2001; Lieberson 1980; Tolnay 2003b). Compared with whites, blacks in the Northeast and Midwest were more heavily concentrated in unskilled jobs that offered little remuneration or opportunity for upward mobility. Therefore, we might expect that prior "northern experience" carried more significant economic benefits for white southern migrants than it did for black migrants.

There are also counterbalancing reasons to expect that direct migrants might have enjoyed certain advantages over onward migrants. First, it is possible that some prior southern migrants were compelled to leave the Northeast and Midwest because they had failed socially or economically in those regions. As suggested by DaVanzo and Morrison (1981), it is likely that more "failed" migrants chose to return to the South, rather than to move onward. However, some certainly would have decided to try their luck in the booming western region. DaVanzo (1981) also suggests that unsuccessful migrants are especially likely to move onward, rather than return, if their place of origin is economically depressed, as was the case for the South during the early decades of the Great Migration. To be sure, all migration streams include individuals who decide to move because they could not succeed in their current place of residence. However, the critical

question is whether the stream of onward migrants contained proportionately more of these individuals than did the corresponding stream of direct migrants.

Cultural and experiential differences also might have contributed to higher levels of unemployment for onward migrants than for direct migrants. First, it is possible that their temporary stays in the Northeast and Midwest had created higher expectations among onward migrants and a reluctance to settle for unattractive jobs with low wages, at least in the short run. In contrast, direct migrants had been subjected to even stronger forms of economic discrimination in the South, and had been paid even lower wages, than their counterparts in the Northeast and Midwest. Therefore, the same job opportunity that was deemed unacceptable to the onward migrant may have been viewed as an attractive opportunity by the direct migrant. Rose (1975:313) noted the potential for this phenomenon of differential expectations when he argued that socialization in the rural South "...is expected to lead southern black migrants of nonmetropolitan origin to settle for less in the job market. A presumption of lower esteem works to influence one's perception of what constitutes satisfactory employment...The perceptions of the existence of a more open society on the part of black youth socialized in large northern centers is thought to have influenced the attitude of those youths regarding what constitutes acceptable employment." Lemke-Santangelo (1996:6) refers to a similar phenomenon in her study of the adaptation of African American female southern migrants to the East Bay area of California. Regarding the employment opportunities available to the migrant women she writes, "However bad these jobs were, women relished the fact that 'we were at least getting paid to put up with it. In the South it had been nothing but hard work and bad treatment. Here I was making more in a day than I made back home in a month.'"

Social and Economic Trends within the North and South

Neither the North nor the South was static as the Great Migration proceeded. Social and economic changes occurred within both regions and they undoubtedly influenced the composition of the flow of migrants that headed to the West. After 1960, many of the onward migrants were responding to deteriorating social and economic conditions in the large urban centers of the Northeast and Midwest. Economic restructuring saw many of the blue-collar job opportunities that had originally attracted southern migrants to the North heading to the South and West (Kasarda 1989; 1995; Sale 1975; Tabb 1987). Many onward and return migrants were following those employment opportunities. For those who remained in the North, suburbanization produced a shifting tax base that further reduced job opportunities for the residents of central cities, especially for black males (Squires 1987; Wilson 1987, 1996), leading to widespread un- and under-employment. In turn, the resulting economic distress contributed to a variety of increasing social problems, including crime, welfare dependency, and single-parent families (Wilson 1987, 1996). For African American residents, these disturbing trends were magnified by persistently high levels of residential segregation from 1960 through 1980 (Massey and Denton 1993).

These were powerful social and economic forces pushing the residents of central cities outward – to nearby suburbs or to more distant destinations, such as the West or South. While traditional migration theory would predict that these "pushed" migrants were negatively selected from the population at origin, it is not obvious whether that generalization applies in this specific case. For both blacks and whites, there are reasons to believe that the unskilled and poorly educated population may not have headed West. First, the "truly disadvantaged" of both races may have had difficulty escaping the declining central cities and neighborhoods in the Northeast

and Midwest, lacking the financial resources required to move themselves and their families across the country. Second, at least for whites, even the less well-off had access to nearby suburbs as they attempted to flee the deteriorating conditions in the central cities (Frey 1979). Third, residential segregation in the Northeast and Midwest imposed an even stronger barrier to the long-distance migration of poor African Americans who might have benefitted from moving to the West (Massey and Denton 1993).

Significant social and economic changes were also occurring in the post-War South. By 1960, fundamental agricultural re-organization and widespread farm mechanization had reduced the South's dependence on tenant farmers and farm laborers (Daniel 1985; Fligstein 1981; Kirby 1987). As a result, the number of workers engaged in agricultural pursuits had fallen sharply. In contrast, the region's drive to increase industrial activity and to modernize its economy had begun to pay dividends. Manufacturing activity in the South increased and created substantially more employment opportunities in the non-agricultural sector (Wright 1986). These trends intensified after 1960 with the movement of manufacturing and industrial operations out of the North and into the sunbelt (Kasarda 1995; Sale 1975; Squires 1987). Socially, the harsh conditions of racial segregation gradually gave way to a more tolerant racial climate in the South. The Civil Rights Movement and Federal legislation eventually produced racially integrated institutions in the South and ushered in an improved, if still imperfect, era of southern race relations.

What implications did these social and economic changes have for migrants moving directly from the South to the West? We can suggest four possibilities. First, as the southern economy offered more opportunities for non-agricultural employment, migrants were increasingly likely to possess job skills and experience that were more transferable to the

industrial workplaces in the West. Second, the expansion of secondary schooling within the South after 1940 also reduced the educational gap between the South and the North – a trend that would have been reflected in the composition of the migration streams coming from the two regions (Anderson 1988; Margo 1990; Tolnay 1998). Third, the moderated racial climate in the South reduced the level of segregation, discrimination, and racial violence to which blacks were subjected. As a result, it is likely that proportionately fewer African migrants would have moved West in order to flee the oppressive social conditions in the South, and that proportionately more would have been attracted by economic opportunities.[1] Finally, the expanded educational and economic opportunities in the South, as well the improved racial climate, may have made the region more attractive to potential return migrants from the Northeast and Midwest, especially those who had enjoyed more economic success. That, in turn, could have altered the relative socioeconomic profiles of the streams of return and onward migrants leaving those two regions. In sum, all of these changes point to the possibility of a declining difference between onward and direct migrants over time.

Hypotheses

The analyses to follow are designed to answer the general question that motivates this research: Did onward or direct migrants fare better economically after their arrival in the West? While the previous discussion of the Great Migration, relevant migration theory, and socioeconomic trends within the North and South might not yield unanimous predications about the relative success of the two groups of migrants, we believe that they do provide the basis for a set of research hypotheses that will prove useful for guiding the empirical analyses that follow.

---

[1] Of course, the specific motivations that produced a stream of African American migrants from the South to the West would have included both economic and non-economic factors. And, the intensity of each motivation would have varied from individual to individual.

First, we expect to find that, in general, onward migrants to the West enjoyed greater economic success (employment, income, and occupational status) than did migrants who moved directly from the South. This hypothesis is based largely on the expectation that onward migrants were able to enhance their human capital during their temporary stays in the North. However, it is possible that the difference in *employment status* between onward and direct migrants will be attenuated because of lower expectations by direct migrants that made them more willing to accept less attractive positions. Second, because of racially-defined differences in the experiences of southern migrants in the Northeast and Midwest, we expect the economic advantage of onward migrants to have been greater for whites than for blacks. Third, the differences between onward and direct migrants are expected to have grown weaker over time, as a result of economic and social changes within the North and South. These hypotheses can be summarized as follows:

H_1: Onward migrants enjoyed greater economic success in the West than did direct migrants.

H_{1a}: The economic advantage for onward migrants was greater for whites than for African Americans.

H_{1b}: The economic advantage for onward migrants was weaker for employment status than for income or occupational prestige.

H_2: The economic advantage for onward migrants declined over time.

DATA, VARIABLES, AND METHOD

Data

We use information from the public use microdata samples (PUMS) of the 1970 and 1980 U.S. Population Censuses to compare the relative economic well-being of direct and

onward southern migrants in the West.[2] These censuses capture the experience of migrants near the close of the Great Migration. A variety of factors prevent the inclusion of data from earlier censuses in our study. The 1940 census occurred prior to the sharp increase in migration to the West, therefore includes too few southern migrants to conduct rigorous comparisons between direct and onward migrants. The 1950 census used a different time reference (1-year versus 5-years) when asking questions about residence in the past, and collected certain key information (e.g., income and education) only from a smaller set of "sample line persons." As a result, analyses using the 1950 data would not be comparable to analyses based on other census years, and would also have too few direct and onward migrants for the analysis of some economic characteristics.[3] The 1960 PUMS does not include information about residence five-years before the census that would allow us to construct measures of recent inter-regional migration. While it would be advantageous to have information about onward and direct migrants to the West for an earlier decade, we believe that the 1970 and 1980 censuses are capable of supporting tests of our central research hypotheses. As described below, the recent migration behavior measured by the 1970 census occurred sometime between 1965 and 1970, still within the temporal boundaries of the Great Migration. Onward migrants would have moved from the South to the Northeast or Midwest prior to 1965, in some cases significantly before that date. Finally, the 1970 and 1980 censuses span a period of important social and economic changes in the North and South, so are

[2] We use the public use samples for 1970 and 1980 as prepared and made available by the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS) project at the Minnesota Population Center. The reader is referred to Ruggles and Sobek (2003) or the IPUMS website at http://www.ipums.umn.edu/ for more information.

[3] For example, we estimate that there were only 16 black onward migrants and 84 black direct migrants in 1940 PUMS file and only 1 black onward migrant and 9 black direct migrants in the 1950 PUMS file.

capable of supporting our investigation of the possible changes in the relative well-being of onward and direct migrants over time.

Our quantitative analyses are based on extracts from the 1970 and 1980 PUMS that include black and white adult males (18 years and older) who were born in the census-defined South but resided in the census-defined West at the time of census enumeration. Those enrolled in school at the time of the census, or living abroad five-years before the census, were excluded from the sample. These selections yield a total of 44,781 white southern migrants in the West in 1970 and 38,845 in 1980. For blacks the comparable totals are 10,416 and 10,539, for 1970 and 1980, respectively. We do not include a parallel analysis of female southern migrants because a thorough investigation of gender differences in the relative economic well-being of direct and onward migrants is beyond the scope of this study and worthy of its own investigation.

Variables

Dependent Variables. We use three different dependent variables in our analyses: (1) employment status, (2) wage and salary income, and (3) occupational status. *Employment status* is measured as a dichotomy that distinguishes those males who were currently employed in the week prior to the census from those who were either in the labor force and unemployed or not in the labor force. *Wage and salary income* is measured as an interval scale and refers to money that was received as an employee during the previous calendar year, including wages, salaries, commissions, cash bonuses, tips, and other money income received from an employer. Our analyses of income were restricted to those males who were currently employed. *Occupational status* is measured using the Duncan Socioeconomic Index (SEI), a constructed variable that is based on the 1950 occupational classification system. More specifically, it is based on the income level and educational attainment linked with each occupation in 1950 (see Duncan 1961;

Ruggles and Sobek 2003). Larger values on SEI imply a higher occupational standing, with scores ranging from a possible low of 3 to a possible high of 96. SEI scores are available for all males who reported an occupation – those who had worked sometime during the previous 10-years for 1970 or during the previous 5-years for 1980.

Independent Variables. In the analyses of all three dependent variables primary attention is focused on two independent variables that are central to testing our research hypotheses (1) the recent migration history of southern migrants living in the West, and (2) the race of migrants. Three groups of migrants are identified, based on their history of inter-regional migration during the five-years preceding the census: direct migrants, onward migrants, and "pioneers." *Direct migrants* are those males who reported that they were born in the South and resided in the South 5-years before the census (i.e., 1965 or 1975). *Onward migrants* were those who reported a southern birthplace but a northeastern or midwestern residence 5-years prior to the census. *Pioneers* were born in the South, but reported a western residence at the time of the census as well as 5-years before. A smaller set of onward migrants is identified by using information about that state-of-birth of the subject's co-resident children, if any. Two types of onward migrants were identified in this way: (1) southern-born men who reported living in the South five years before the census, but who resided with an own-child under 5 years of age who was born in the Northeast or Midwest, and (2) southern-born men who reported living in the West five years before the census, but who resided with an own-child older than five years of age who was born in the Northeast or Midwest. This supplemental strategy for identifying onward migrants is not foolproof, and does not capture all onward migrants who are missed because of the limitations

imposed by the census questions about residence five-years in the past.[4] Moreover, because the strategy is available only for men who co-resided with an own child, it may introduce some type of selection bias for onward migrants who are identified in this way. In light of that possibility, we include in our analyses a dummy variable that distinguishes those onward migrants whose migration history is based on the birthplace of a co-resident child. *Race* is also a key variable in our analyses, in which we distinguish white from black migrants from the South.

In addition to recent migration history and race, a limited set of independent variables is included in order to avoid drawing conclusions about the differences between onward migrants and direct migrants that are really the result of compositional differences between the two groups. Specifically, these predictors are characteristics that might affect economic well-being (employment, income, or occupational status) while also varying by recent migration history. A potential curvilinear relationship between age and economic well-being is allowed by including linear and quadratic terms for the subject's age in years – *age* and age^2. The possible influence of family obligations on economic well-being is considered by distinguishing between men who are married and co-residing with a spouse versus all others (the reference group). Years of schooling completed is included to control for group differences in educational attainment and its possible effect on corresponding differences in economic well-being. Group variation in residential distribution within the West is considered by distinguishing among (1) those living in the central cities of metropolitan areas, (2) those living the suburbs of a metropolitan area, and

[4] There are important limitations to measuring migration histories based only on state of birth, state of current of residence, and state of residence five-years in the past (See e.g., Cromartie and Stack 1989; DaVanzo and Morrison 1981). Especially problematic are multiple moves that are not captured by considering only residence at these three distinct points in time. Return migration that "erases" a previous move will also not be detected by this measurement strategy. Despite those potential problems, this is the standard approach that has been used to measure recent migration using PUMS data.

(3) those living in a non-metropolitan area (the reference group).[5] A control variable is included that identifies southern-born residents of the West who were current members of the military. Inter-regional migration that is the result of military assignments or transfers may have economic implications that differ from those for non-military migrants. Finally, we include a control for the subject's employment status, working versus not working, five years prior to the census. This variable may provide some purchase on the economic success of migrants prior to moving to the West. Those who were not working five years ago were more likely to have migrated in response to economic frustration or failure.[6]

Method

For each dependent variable we estimate a series of three multivariate models, with different combinations of predictors on the right-hand-side of the equation. Because employment status is measured as a dichotomy, we use binary logistic regression techniques in analyses for which it is the dependent variable. For income and occupational status we use ordinary least squares regression. The first model is used to assess the net differences between onward and direct migrants while controlling for all independent variables except past employment status. The second model adds past employment status as a predictor in an effort to determine the

---

[5] A non-trivial number of cases have missing values for current place of residence because of confidentiality restrictions imposed on certain samples for the 1970 PUMS. In order to retain those cases in our analysis, we include a control variable that indicates the place of residence is "missing." We also estimated models that included as predictors a set of dummy variables representing the subject's state-of-residence in order to control further for possible residential differences between onward and direct migrants. However, we have opted to report the results from the more parsimonious models, without state-of-residence, because the group differences in economic well-being inferred from the fuller models were virtually identical to those reported here.

[6] Roughly 4 percent of all cases for 1970 had missing values on employment status five-years in the past. Rather than drop those cases from the analyses, we include a dummy variable that indicates missing data for that variable.

impact of previous economic failure on the group differences in economic well-being. The results from these models will allow us to test the hypothesis (H_1) that onward migrants enjoyed greater economic success than did direct migrants, as well as the hypothesis (H_{1b}) that the advantage for onward migrants was weaker for employment status than for income or occupational prestige. The third and final model adds multiplicative interaction terms for race and recent migration history in order to test the hypothesis (H_{1a}) that white onward migrants fared better than black onward migrants. We conduct separate analyses for 1970 and 1980 which allows us to test the hypothesis (H_2) that the differences between onward and direct migrants grew weaker over time.

FINDINGS

Employment Status

The results from our logistic regression analyses of current employment status are presented in Table 1. Beginning with the findings for 1970, Model 1 shows that onward migrants were significantly *less likely* than direct migrants (the reference group) to be employed. Net of all other independent variables, the odds of an onward migrant being employed were roughly three-quarters of the odds for a direct migrant (Odds Ratio = $e^{-.302} = .74$).[7] The employment advantage for direct migrants does not change appreciably when employment history is controlled, as shown in Model 2. Thus, the employment difference between the two groups can not be attributed to a disproportionate movement of "failed migrants" from the

[7] Odds ratios are obtained by exponentiating the coefficients from the logistic regression analysis. An odds ratio of 1.0 suggests equivalence between the reference and index groups on the dependent variable, in this case employment. Odds ratios greater than 1.0 indicate a higher likelihood of employment for the index group than for the reference group, while a ratio of less than 1.0 indicates a lower likelihood of employment for the index group. We do not report odds ratios in Table 1 in order to avoid clutter.

Northeast and Midwest. In Model 3 we relax the assumption that the employment difference between direct and onward migrants was the same for blacks and whites. Although the coefficient for the multiplicative interaction between race and onward migration status (b = -.284) does not achieve statistical significance by conventional criteria, it is more than 1.5 times its standard error (p = .109, two-tailed test) and, therefore, worthy of some attention. For blacks, the odds of employment for onward migrants were roughly sixty-percent of those for direct migrants (Odds Ratio = $e^{-.544}$ = .58)[8]; while, among whites, the corresponding odds-ratio is roughly three-quarters (Odds Ratio = $e^{-.260}$ = .77).

[Table 1 About Here]

The inference of an employment advantage for direct migrants over onward migrants contradicts our hypothesis (H_1). However, it is consistent with the speculation that migrants who moved directly to the West from the South may have been more willing to take jobs that were deemed unattractive or unsatisfactory by those migrants who had some experience with the non-southern labor market (e.g., Lemke-Santangelo 1996; Rose 1975). The finding that the employment disadvantage for onward migrants was somewhat weaker for white than for black onward migrants is consistent with our hypothesis (H_{1a}) of a greater economic advantage (or in this case, a *weaker disadvantage*) for white onward migrants.

By 1980 the situation had changed appreciably. The results in Models 1 and 2 contain no evidence of an employment difference between onward and direct migrants. Furthermore, Model 3 suggests that this absence of a relationship between employment status and migration history

[8] The odds ratio for blacks is obtained by first deriving the appropriate logistic regression coefficient from Model 3 by combining the coefficient for the main effect of onward migration status and the coefficient for the interaction between race and onward migration status (i.e., (-.260 + [-.284]) = -.544).

was common to both blacks and whites. Although the change between 1970 and 1980 is somewhat difficult to reconcile with our hypothesis (H_2) of a decline in the economic advantage for onward migrants over time (given the original economic *disadvantage* for onward migrants in 1970), it does suggest a growing similarity between those who moved directly from the South and those who stopped-over in the Northeast or Midwest. This trend may be indicative of the changing labor market in the South, which made direct migrants more similar to onward migrants in their requirements for acceptable employment.

The findings reported in Table 1 also reveal several significant predictors of current employment, with great consistency in the observed patterns for 1970 and 1980. In sum, the likelihood of employment was greater for those males who were: married, more educated, in the military, working five years before the census, and residing in metropolitan areas, especially in suburbs. Age exhibits a curvilinear relationship with employment, with the likelihood of employment increasing with age, then flattening out at the older ages. Finally, "pioneers" were significantly less likely than direct migrants to be employed during both decades, though this difference pertained only to whites in 1980.[9]

Wage and Salary Income

The results from the analysis of wage and salary income reported in Model 1 of Table 2 reveal a sizeable and statistically significant advantage for onward migrants. Net of all other variables in the model, onward migrants earned an average of $587 more from wages during the

[9] Model 3 for 1980 includes a statistically significant, positive coefficient for the interaction between race and pioneer status and a significant and negative coefficient for the main effect of pioneer status. Thus, for whites, the odds of a pioneer being employed were roughly 80 percent of the corresponding odds for direct migrants. For blacks, the odds for pioneers were about 10 percent greater than the odds for direct migrants, though the difference in employment between pioneers and direct migrants is not statistically significant for blacks.

previous year than did direct migrants. To put the magnitude of this difference in better perspective, the overall mean income for all southern migrants in our sample was $7,608 in 1970. Controlling for employment history has little effect on the income differential between onward and direct migrants, as shown in Model 2. But, Model 3 suggests that only white onward migrants enjoyed an income advantage over direct migrants. During the year prior to the census, white onward migrants earned an average of $771 more from wages than their counterparts who moved directly from the South. In contrast, black onward migrants actually earned $140 less than black direct migrants (771.227 - 911.292 = -140.065).[10] This evidence for 1970 is quite consistent with our hypothesis (H_1) that onward migrants would have acquired work experience and skills in the North that could be translated into higher wages in the West. And, our hypothesis (H_{1a}) of a greater advantage for white onward migrants is also supported by the findings for 1970. Indeed, *black* onward migrants enjoyed no income advantage over direct migrants.

[Table 2 About Here]

Again, the findings for 1980 reveal substantial changes in the relative economic well-being of onward and direct migrants. Contrary to the evidence for 1970, Models 1 and 2 reveal no statistically significant difference between the incomes of onward and direct migrants in 1980. This result is consistent with our hypothesis (H_2) of a declining economic advantage for onward migrants over time. Furthermore, unlike the findings for 1970, Model 3 suggests that the contrast between onward and direct migrants did not differ significantly between blacks and whites in 1980 (i.e., the interaction between race and migration history is non-significant).

[10] Supplemental analyses that used blacks as the reference category for race indicated that the income disadvantage of $140 for black onward migrants was not statistically significant at $p < .05$.

Although the income disadvantage for black onward migrants ($968.35) in 1980 does not achieve statistical significance at $p < .05$, supplementary analyses indicate that the difference between onward and direct migrants for blacks is more than 1.5 times its standard error ($p = .109$, two-tailed test).

Among the other findings in Table 2 regarding the predictors of wage and salary income, it appears that earnings were higher in both 1970 and 1980 for those who were: married, more educated, employed five-years before the census, not in the military, and residing in metropolitan areas, especially in suburbs. Once again, age exhibits a significant curvilinear relationship with income first rising with age, then eventually reaching a plateau among older men. By 1980 a significant disadvantage had emerged for both black and white pioneers, consistent with other, previous evidence of an earnings advantage for recent southern migrants when compared with non-migrants or past migrants (see e.g., Lieberson 1978; Long and Heltman 1975).

Occupational Status

In 1970 onward migrants also reported significantly higher occupational status than did direct migrants after they moved West, consistent with our hypothesis (H_1). Model 1 of Table 3 reveals an occupational advantage for onward migrants of roughly 1.35 points on the Duncan SEI scale. Although a rather modest difference, given the overall mean of 33 for all southern migrants, it should be noted that this difference is net of all variables on the right-hand-side of the equation, including age, education, and employment history (in Model 2). Model 3 offers further evidence of a greater economic advantage for white onward migrants than for black onward migrants, as hypothesized (H_{1a}). For whites the difference in occupational status between onward and direct migrants is estimated at 1.5 points, which is statistically significant at $p < .01$. In contrast the comparable difference for blacks is estimated at only .436 points (1.503 + [-1.067]

= .436), which is not statistically significant a $p < .05$.[11]

[Table 3 About Here]

Further support for our hypothesis (H_2) that the economic advantage for onward migrants weakened over time can be inferred from the results for 1980 in Table 3. According to Model 1 and Model 2 the difference in occupational status between onward and direct migrants declined to statistical non-significance by 1980. Interestingly, the results from Model 3 suggest that black onward migrants actually *trailed* direct migrants in occupational status by a little more than two points (-.250 + [-1.908] = -2.158) during this later period. This difference is statistically significant at $p < .05$, and consistent with the income disadvantage for black onward migrants in 1980 that was not statistically significant by conventional standards, but for which the relevant coefficient was more than 1.5 times larger than its standard error. Combined, the modest income and occupational *disadvantages* for black onward migrants in 1980 suggest that economic restructuring in the North and economic development in the South were influencing the composition of the migration streams of African Americans from those two regions to the West, to the relative disadvantage of those moving from the Northeast or Midwest.

The effects of the other predictor variables on occupational status are generally consistent with their effects on income. Occupational status tended to be higher for southern migrants who were married, well-educated, not in the military, residing in metropolitan areas (with little difference between central cities and suburbs), and employed five years ago. The significant non-linear effect of age suggests a positive relationship between age and occupational status that grows weaker among older men. As was observed in the results for the analysis of income,

[11] Statistical significance for blacks was determined by estimating supplementary models in which blacks were treated as the reference group.

pioneers reported lower occupational status than direct migrants, with the deficit being considerably larger for blacks than for whites in both 1970 and 1980 (-1.777 and -2.121 for whites in 1970 and 1980, respectively; -4.610 and -5.368 for blacks in 1970 and 1980, respectively).[12] The lower occupational status for pioneers of both races appears to have been primarily a result of their over-representation in "service" and "other labor" occupations that had lower than average occupational status. In addition, black pioneers were substantially under-represented among "craftsmen," who had higher than average occupational status for blacks in 1970 and 1980.

CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

There is a tendency by social scientists, as well as by longtime residents of destination areas, to overlook sources of heterogeneity within migrant populations. Within the vast literature on the Great Migration from the South, researchers regularly have distinguished the differential experiences of blacks and whites, and occasionally the differential experiences of males and females (see e.g., White 2004). It is less common to dig more deeply into the recent histories of southern migrants to assess their implications for the adaptation experiences of the migrants in their new places of residence. In this paper, we have attempted to "unpack" the larger group of southern migrants to the West during the Post-World War II period to determine whether those who had spent time in the Northeast or Midwest enjoyed economic benefits over those who had moved directly from the South.

The results of our statistical analyses reveal interesting differences between onward and direct migrants that were generally consistent with our research hypotheses that are based on

[12] Supplementary analysis in which onward migrants were used as the reference group showed that occupational status also was significantly lower for pioneers than for onward migrants in 1970 and 1980.

migration theory, previous research on the Great Migration, and well-known social and economic trends within the North and South. In 1970, onward migrants enjoyed larger incomes and higher occupational status than their counterparts who had moved to the West directly from the South. That the economic advantage was restricted to white onward migrants is consistent with our explanation based on the greater ability of white onward migrants to accumulate human capital during their temporary stays in the Northeast or Midwest, which was transferable to the West. We argue that African American onward migrants would not have experienced the same accumulation of human capital. As hypothesized, the economic benefits of onward migration did not extend to employment status, and direct migrants were actually *more likely* than onward migrants to be currently employed. It is possible that the higher levels of employment for direct migrants in 1970 reflect their lower expectations and requirements for suitable employment, given the greater employment and occupational disadvantages that they had faced in the South.

By the later time period, 1980, the economic benefits enjoyed by onward migrants had evaporated, as had the employment advantage observed for direct migrants. These findings are generally supportive of our hypothesis of attenuation over time in the relative economic well-being of onward and direct migrants, and are also consistent with the broad social and economic changes that were occurring in the North and South during this time. Interestingly, there is even modest evidence to suggest that an economic advantage for black direct migrants from the South had emerged by 1980. Although this finding warrants further exploration, it may reflect the divergent economic paths taken by the urban North and the developing South after 1960. While economic restructuring produced a deteriorating economic climate for inner-city black males in the "rustbelt" Northeast and Midwest, industrial and economic expansion in the "sunbelt" South created more opportunities for African Americans. Perhaps as a result of these region-specific

trends, southern migrants to the West no longer improved their economic potential by spending time in the Northeast or Midwest. Or, it is possible that the more successful southern migrants in the Northeast or Midwest were more likely to return to the South, and its emerging opportunity structure, than to move on to the West. Either process could have reduced the economic advantage that onward migrants enjoyed over direct migrants in the West by the later time period.

The flow of southerners into the West contributed significantly to the dramatic social, demographic, and economic changes that occurred within the region. Gradually, California surpassed New York as the nation's most populous state. African Americans became a large and prominent minority group within certain locales, especially in the larger urban areas such as Los Angeles, Oakland, Richmond, and Seattle. Southern culture made its mark on the diets, music, and lifestyle of the West. To a considerable extent, the "story" of the West is the story of the various populations that have moved there – including southerners. The evidence that we have presented in this paper furthers our understanding of the southern migrants. And, by considering the diversity of their experiences, our findings emphasize the value of treating migrant populations as heterogeneous groups. By doing so it is possible to tell more nuanced stories about migration streams and the destinations that they affected.

REFERENCES

Adelman, Robert M. and Stewart E. Tolnay. 2003. "Occupational Status of Immigrants and African Americans at the Beginning and End of the Great Migration." *Sociological Perspectives* 46:179-206.

Alexander, J. T. 1998. "The Great Migration in comparative perspective." *Social Science History* 22:349–76.

Anderson, J. D. 1988. *The Education of Blacks in the South, 1860-1935.* Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.

Berry, C. 2000. *Southern Migrants, Northern Exiles*. Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.

Bodnar, J., R. Simon, and M. P. Weber. 1982. *Lives of Their Own: Blacks, Italians, and Poles in Pittsburgh, 1900–1960.* Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press.

Boyd, R.L. 2001. "Ethnicity, Niches, and Retail Enterprise in Northern Cities, 1900. *Sociological Perspectives* 44:89-110.

Cobb, J. 1982. *The Selling of the South: The Southern Crusade for Industrial Development, 1936-1980*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Collins, W. J. 1997. "When the tide turned: Immigration and the delay of the Great Black migration." *Journal of Economic Hist*ory 56:607–32.

Cromartie, J. And C.B. Stack. 1989. "Reinterpretation of Black Return and Nonreturn Migration to the South, 1975-1980." *Geographical Review* 79:297-310.

Daniel, P. 1985. *Breaking the Land: The Transformation of Cotton, Tobacco, and Rice Cultures Since 1880*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

DaVanzo, J.S. 1981. "Repeat Migration, Information Costs, and Location-Specific Capital." *Population and Environment* 4:45-73.

_____. 1983. "Repeat Migration in the United States: Who Moves Back and Who Moves On?" *The Review of Economics and Statistics* 65:552-59.

DaVanzo, J.S. and P.A. Morrison. 1981. "Return and Other Sequences of Migration in the United States. *Demography* 18:85-101.

Duncan, O.D. 1961. "A Socioeconomic Index for All Occupations." Pp. 108-34 in A. Reiss (ed.) *Occupations and Social Status* New York: Free Press.

Duncan, O.D. and B. Duncan. 1957. *The Negro Population of Chicago: A Study of Residential Succession*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Eldridge, H. T. and D. S. Thomas.1964. *Population Redistribution and Economic Growth. United States, 1870-1950. Volume III. Demographic Analyses and Interrelations*. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society.

Farley, R. and W.H. Frey. 1994. "Changes in the Segregation of Whites from Blacks During the 1980s" Small Steps Toward a Racially Integrated Society." *American Sociological Review* 59:23-45.

Faulkner, A.O., M.A. Heiser, W. Holbrook, and S. Geismar. 1982. *When I was Comin' Up: An Oral History of Aged Blacks*. Hamden, CN: Archon Books.

Fligstein, N. 1981. *Going North: Migration of Blacks and Whites from the South, 1900–1950.* New York: Academic Press.

Frey, W.H. 1979. "Central City White Flight: Racial and Nonracial Causes." *American Sociological Review* 44:425-88.

Grant, E.K. and J. Vanderkamp. 1986. "Repeat Migration and Disappointment." *Canadian Journal of Regional Science* IX:299-322.

Greenwood, M. 1985. "Human Migration: Theory, Models, and Empirical Studies." *Journal of Regional Sciences* 25:521-44.

Gregory, J. N. 1989. *American Exodus : The Dust Bowl Migration and Okie Culture in California*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Grossman, J. R. 1989. *Land of Hope: Chicago, Black Southerners, and the Great Migration.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Henri, F. 1975. *Black Migration: Movement North, 1900–1920.* Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press.

James, J. 1945. "Profiles: San Francisco." *Journal of Educational Sociology* 19:166–78.

Johnson, D. M., and R. R. Campbell. 1981. *Black Migration in America: a Social Demographic History*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Kasarda, J.D. 1989. "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass." *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 501:26-47.

_____. 1995. "Industrial Retructuring and the Changing Location of Jobs." Pp. 215-67 in R. Farley (ed.) State of the Union, America in the 1990s. Volume One: Economic Trends. New York: R

Kirby, J.T. 1987. *Rural Worlds Lost: The American South, 1920-1960.* Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press.

Lee, E.S. 1966. "A Theory of Migration." *Demography* 3:47-57.

Lemann, N. 1991. *The Promised Land: The Great Black Migration and How it Changed America*. New York: Knopf.

Lemke-Santangelo, G. 1996. *Abiding Courage: African American Migrant Women and the East Bay Community*. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press.

Lieberson, S. 1978. "A Reconsideration of the Income Differences Found Between Migrants and Northern-born Blacks." *American Journal of Sociology* 83:940-966.

_____. 1980. *A Piece of the Pie. Blacks and Immigrants Since 1880.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Logan, J.R., B.J. Stults, and R. Farley. 2004. "Segregation of Minorities in the Metropolis: Two Decades of Change." *Demography* 41:1-22.

Long, L. H. 1988. *Migration and Residential Mobility in the United States*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Long, L.H., and L, R. Heltman. 1975. "Migration and Income Differences Between Black and White Men in the North." *American Journal of Sociology* 80:1391-1409.

Margo, R. 1990. *Race and Schooling in the South, 1880-1950.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Marks, C. 1989. *Farewell—We're Good and Gone: The Great Black Migration*. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press.

Massey, D. S. and N. A. Denton. 1993. *American Apartheid*. *Segregation and the Making of the Underclass*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

McWilliams, C. 1945. "Critical Summary. *Journal of Educational Sociology* 19:187–97.

Perlmann, J. 1988. *Ethnic Differences. Schooling and Social Structure Among the Irish, Italians, Jews, and Blacks in an American City, 1880-1935.* New York: Cambridge University Press.

Ravenstein, E.G. 1885. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 48:167-227.

_____. 1889. "The Laws of Migration." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society* 52:241-301.

Rose, H.M.. 1975. "Urban Black Migration and Social Stress: The Influences of Regional Differences in Patterns of Socialization." Pp. 301-33 in G. Gappert and H.M. Rose (eds.) *The Social Economy of Cities*. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.

Ruggles, S. and M. Sobek. 2003. Integrated Public Use Microdata Series: Millennial Edition. Minneapolis, Minn.: Minnesota Population Center.

Sale, K. 1975. *Power Shift: The Rise of the Southern Rim and Its Challenge to the Eastern Establishment*. New York: Random House.

Squires, G.D. 1987. "Capital Mobility Versus Upward Mobility: The Racially Discriminatory Consequences of Plant Closing and Corporate Relocations." Pp. 152-62 in L. Sawers and W.K. Tabb (eds.) *Sunbelt/Snowbelt: Urban Development and Regional Restructuring*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tabb, W.K. 1987. "Urban Development and Regional Restructuring, and Overview." Pp. 3-15 in L. Sawers and W.K. Tabb (eds.) *Sunbelt/Snowbelt: Urban Development and Regional Restructuring*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, Q. 1998. *In Search of the Racial Frontier. African Americans in the American West 1528–1990*. New York: W.W. Norton.

Tolnay, S. E. 1998. "Educational selection in the migration of southern Blacks, 1880–1990." *Social Forces* 77:487–514.

_____. 1999. *The Bottom Rung: African American Family Life on Southern Farms*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

_____. 2003a. "The African American 'Great Migration' and Beyond." *Annual Review of Sociology* 29:209-32.

_____. 2003b. "Trends in the Relative Occupational Status of African Americans and European Immigrants in Northern Cities, 1880-1970." *Social Science Research* 32:603-32.

Tolnay, S. E., and E. M. Beck. 1992. "Racial violence and black migration in the South, 1910 to 1930." *American Sociological Review* 57:103–16.

Tolnay, S.E., K.J.C. White, K.D. Crowder, and R.M. Adelman. 2004. "Distances Traveled During the 'Great Migration': An Analysis of Racial Differences Among Male Migrants." *Social Science History*, in press.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. 1985. "The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States: An Historical View, 1790-1978." *Current Population Reports*, special studies series P-23, no. 80.

White, K.J.C. 2004. "Women in the Great Migration: Economic Activity of Black and White Southern-Born Female Migrants in 1920, 1940, and 1970." *Social Science History*, in press.

Wilson W.J. 1987. *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, The Underclass, and Public Policy*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

_____. 1996. *When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor*. New York: Knopf.

Woofter, T. J. 1920. *Negro Migration: Changes in Rural Organization and Population of the Cotton Belt*. New York: Negro Universities Press.

Wright, G. 1986. *Old South, New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War*. New York: Basic Books.

Figure 1. Percentage of southern out-migrants residing in the West, by race. United States 1900-1990



Table 1. Logistic Regression Models Predicting Employment Status for Southern-Born Adult Males Living in the West in 1970 or 1980[a].

	1970[b]			1980[c]		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Onward Migrant	-.302***	-.327***	-.260**	-.030	-.059	-.083
	(.086)	(.089)	(.099)	(.079)	(.082)	(.093)
Pioneer	-.082†	-.203***	-.200***	-.091*	-.146**	-.224***
	(.047)	(.049)	(.055)	(.045)	(.047)	(.054)
Black	-.244***	-.186***	-.164	-.425***	-.300***	-.567***
	(.031)	(.032)	(.101)	(.032)	(.034)	(.096)
In Military	1.996***	2.176***	2.180***	2.200***	2.650***	2.683***
	(.076)	(.076)	(.076)	(.112)	(.111)	(.112)
Age	.221***	.107***	.107***	.212***	.096***	.095***
	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.005)	(.006)	(.006)
Age^2	-.003***	-.002***	-.002***	-.003***	-.002***	-.002***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
Married Spouse Present	1.164***	.951***	.952***	.893***	.709***	.710***
	(.028)	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)	(.032)	(.032)
Education	.116***	.112***	.112***	.126***	.110***	.110***
	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)	(.004)
In Metro City Center	.146**	.128*	.127*	.245***	.260***	.257***
	(.054)	(.057)	(.057)	(.041)	(.044)	(.044)
In Metro Surrounding Areas	.204***	.190***	.190***	.327***	.312***	.313***
	(.052)	(.054)	(.054)	(.039)	(.041)	(.041)
Employed 5 Years Ago		1.778***	1.780***		1.869***	1.871***
		(.032)	(.032)		(.031)	(.031)
Black * Onward Migrant			-.284			.092
			(.177)			(.172)
Black * Pioneer			-.011			.313**
			(.107)			(.102)
Intercept	-4.208***	-2.678***	-2.682***	-3.901***	-2.390***	-2.315***
	(.121)	(.128)	(.131)	(.130)	(.137)	(.140)
-2 Log Likelihood	43503	40343	40340	39725	35981	35971
Pseudo R^2	.263	.316	.316	.310	.375	.375

[a] Standard Errors are in parentheses. N for 1970 is 55,197; N for 1980 is 49,384.

[b] The models for 1970 also included dummy variables indicating (1) missing values for place of residence and employment status in 1965, and (2) identification of onward migrants using birthplace for co-resident children. See text.

[c] The models for 1980 also included a dummy variable indicating identification of onward migrants using birthplace for co-resident children.

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Table 2. OLS Regression Models Predicting Wage Income for Currently Employed, Southern-Born Adult Males Living in the West in 1970 or 1980[a].

	1970[b]			1980[c]		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Onward Migrants	586.930***	610.216***	771.227***	-375.876	-301.447	-131.687
	(146.571)	(146.022)	(156.173)	(293.424)	(292.877)	(321.580)
Pioneers	166.942*	84.735	159.108†	-829.411***	-847.318***	-849.456***
	(82.688)	(82.482)	(88.307)	(177.043)	(176.681)	(191.617)
Black	-1321.585***	-1292.822***	-887.224***	-2632.691***	-2563.110***	-2521.856***
	(65.148)	(64.920)	(174.283)	(158.672)	(158.444)	(360.864)
In Military	-1533.640***	-1218.588***	-1206.601***	-2665.125***	-1727.427***	-1715.504***
	(92.100)	(94.371)	(94.445)	(236.679)	(248.187)	(249.399)
Age	584.220***	526.531***	527.099***	1352.896***	1272.548***	1272.115***
	(11.363)	(11.741)	(11.746)	(30.934)	(31.553)	(31.601)
Age^2	-6.310***	-5.753***	-5.759***	-14.254***	-13.456***	-13.451***
	(.129)	(.132)	(.132)	(.354)	(.359)	(.359)
Married Spouse Present	1549.402***	1440.855***	1442.747***	2710.980***	2617.483***	2620.088***
	(64.607)	(64.619)	(64.616)	(149.220)	(149.104)	(149.116)
Education	441.777***	444.834***	444.745***	916.584***	916.600***	916.564***
	(7.569)	(7.543)	(7.543)	(19.020)	(18.981)	(18.981)
In Metro, City Center	1026.097***	1002.163***	1004.567***	1550.266***	1559.435***	1555.203***
	(113.901)	(113.499)	(113.566)	(203.742)	(203.321)	(203.507)
In Metro, Surrounding Areas	1215.231***	1187.348***	1186.868***	3012.214***	2988.427***	2985.573***
	(106.258)	(105.868)	(105.865)	(189.330)	(188.947)	(188.956)
Employed 5 Years Ago		1444.637***	1449.266***		2240.428***	2242.445***
		(78.185)	(78.193)		(182.152)	(182.209)
Black * Onward Migrants			-911.292**			-836.659
			(308.551)			(661.237)
Black * Pioneers			-433.422*			27.486
			(187.446)			(400.061)
Intercept	-11464.000***	-11240.000***	-11329.000***	-27069.000***	-27117.000***	-27122.000***
	(262.400)	(261.647)	(264.337)	(660.715)	(659.354)	(665.970)
Adjusted R^2	.208	.214	.214	.183	.187	.187

[a] Standard Errors are in parentheses. N for 1970 is 42,723; N for 1980 is 36,084.

[b] The models for 1970 also included dummy variables indicating (1) missing values for place of residence and employment status in 1965, and (2) identification of onward migrants using birthplace for co-resident children. See text.

[c] The models for 1980 also included a dummy variable indicating identification of onward migrants using birthplace for co-resident children. See text.

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10 (two-tailed tests)

Table 3. OLS Regression Models Predicting Occupational Status (SEI) for Southern-Born Adult Males Living in the West in 1970 or 1980[a].

	1970[b]			1980[c]		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Onward Migrant	1.351**	1.348**	1.503**	-.693	-.633	-.250
	(.519)	(.519)	(.557)	(.489)	(.489)	(.538)
Pioneers	-2.186***	-2.272***	-1.777***	-2.736***	-2.750***	-2.121***
	(.290)	(.290)	(.312)	(.293)	(.293)	(.320)
Black	-7.557***	-7.531***	-5.146***	-7.974***	-7.886***	-5.283***
	(.222)	(.222)	(.619)	(.255)	(.255)	(.599)
In Military	-18.560***	-18.407***	-18.368***	-19.257***	-18.426***	-18.620***
	(.328)	(.334)	(.335)	(.407)	(.421)	(.423)
Age	.581***	.491***	.497***	.699***	.610***	.621***
	(.034)	(.036)	(.036)	(.045)	(.046)	(.046)
Age^2	-.005***	-.004***	-.004***	-.005***	-.004***	-.005***
	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.001)	(.001)
Married Spouse Present	2.460***	2.273***	2.268***	1.817***	1.679***	1.677***
	(.210)	(.211)	(.211)	(.237)	(.237)	(.237)
Education	3.451***	3.446***	3.446***	3.570***	3.564***	3.564***
	(.025)	(.025)	(.025)	(.030)	(.030)	(.030)
In Metro, City Center	2.169***	2.086***	2.140***	3.964***	3.975***	4.038***
	(.384)	(.384)	(.384)	(.325)	(.325)	(.325)
In Metro, Surrounding Areas	2.131***	2.056***	2.068***	4.363***	4.335***	4.338***
	(.359)	(.359)	(.359)	(.303)	(.302)	(.302)
Employed 5 Years Ago		1.826***	1.827***		2.134***	2.098***
		(.240)	(.240)		(.277)	(.277)
Black * Onward Migrants			-1.067			-1.908†
			(1.091)			(1.094)
Black * Pioneers			-2.833***			-3.247***
			(.661)			(.658)
Intercept	-18.514***	-17.816***	-18.376***	-24.555***	-24.214***	-24.938**
	(.831)	(.837)	(.847)	(.995)	(.996)	(1.007)
Adjusted R^2	.336	.337	.337	.333	.334	.335

[a] Standard Errors are in parentheses. N for 1970 is 52,235; N for 1980 is 42,800.

[b] The models for 1970 also included dummy variables indicating (1) missing values for place of residence and employment status in 1965, and (2) identification of onward migrants using birthplace for co-resident children. See text.

[c] The models for 1980 also included a dummy variable indicating identification of onward migrants using birthplace for co-resident children.

*** p<.001, ** p<.01, * p<.05, † p<.10 (two-tailed tests)